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EDITED BY

G. H. HOWISON, LL.D.

MILLS PROFESSOR OF INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY
AND CIVIL POLITY

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THE CONCEPTION OF GOD



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THE

CONCEPTION OF GOD

*A PHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSION CONCERNING
THE NATURE OF THE DIVINE IDEA
AS A DEMONSTRABLE REALITY*

BY

JOSIAH ROYCE

PROFESSOR OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY

JOSEPH LE CONTE AND G. H. HOWISON

PROFESSORS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

AND

SIDNEY EDWARD MEZES

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS

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INTRODUCTION BY THE EDITOR

THE first volume of the projected Publications of the Philosophical Union of the University of California, delayed by unavoidable circumstances, here at length appears, as promised at the time of issuing the volume counted as second,— Professor Watson's *Christianity and Idealism*. It consists (1) of the documents of the public discussion held at the seat of the University in 1895, reprinted with only a very few trifling verbal alterations, and, in Article IV, two or three additional sentences; (2) of a new Supplementary Essay by Professor Royce, in which he develops his central doctrine in a more systematic way, discusses afresh the long-neglected question of Individuality, and, in conclusion, replies to his critics.

The contents of the book very rightly take the form of a discussion, for discussion is the method of philosophy. Of the three chief objects upon which philosophy directs its search,— God, Freedom, and Immortality,— notable as also the essential objects of religion, this discussion, in its outset, aimed only at the first—the nature and the reality of God. But the feature of eminent interest in it is, that in the direct pursuit of its chosen problem it presently becomes even more engaged on the problem of Freedom, and cannot forego, either, the consideration of Immortality; so true it is that the attempt to conceive God,

and to establish his existence, is futile apart from grappling with the other two connected ideals. The interest of the discussion at length unavoidably concentrates about the question of Freedom, and this turn in the pressure of the contest is what gives the debate its significance for the world of philosophy and of religion. One cannot but feel that this significance is marked, and for reasons that will in the sequel appear.

On the initial question : Is the fundamental belief of religion valid,—is a Personal God a reality? all the participants in the discussion are to be understood as distinctly intending to maintain the affirmative. But as soon as this question is deliberately apprehended, it becomes evident that no settlement of it can be reached until one decides what the word “God” veritably means, and also what “reality” or “existence” can rationally mean. Here, accordingly, the divergence among the participants begins. Very largely agreeing in an idealistic interpretation of what must constitute Reality if the word is to have any explicable meaning, they nevertheless soon expose a profound difference as to what Idealism requires when one comes to the question of the reality of spiritual beings,—above all, of a being deserving to be called divine. Thence follows, of course, a like deep difference as to the nature and the conception of God himself. More specifically, these differences concern the following points :

(1) Whether the novel method of proving God real, put forward by the leader of the discussion, and here given a fresh form, different from that in his

Religious Aspect of Philosophy, is adequate to establish in the Absolute Reality a nature in the strict sense divine.

(2) Whether the conception of God upon which the whole argument of the leader proceeds is in truth a conception of a Personal God.

(3) Whether this conception is compatible with that autonomy of moral action which mankind in its fully enlightened civilisation, and especially under the Christian consciousness, has come to appreciate as the vital principle of all personality.

On the first matter, Professor Mezes and Professor Howison differ with Professor Royce. Professor Le Conte declines any critical opinion upon it, though he prefers, and offers, an entirely different argument for the reality of a Personal God.

On the second point, the extreme division is between Professor Royce on the one side (apparently supported by his pupil, Professor Mezes), and Professor Howison on the other. Here, the question disputed being in fact the question of an Immanent God as against a God distinct from his creation, Professor Le Conte offers a mediating theory, based on the doctrine of Cosmic Evolution, by which he would conjoin the conception of God as immanent in Nature with the conception of man as eventually a literally free intelligence: through the process of evolution, operated by the God indwelling in it, the human being is at length completely extricated from Nature, hence becomes strictly self-active, and thus intrinsically immortal. To this proposal for reconciling an Immanent God with a Personal God,—the

test of personality being the possession by God of a World of Persons, all really free, with whom he shares in moral relations, acknowledging Rights in them, and Duties towards them,— Professor Howison demurs, urging that no such World of Freedom can arise out of a process of natural evolution, as this is always a process of efficient causation, and so works by a *vis a tergo*, whose law is necessitation.

On the third question, which is thus brought strongly to the front, the divergence between Professor Howison and Professor Royce comes out at its sharpest. Here, Professor Howison maintains there is a chasm, incapable of closure, between the immanence of God, even as Professor Royce conceives this, and the real personality, the moral autonomy, of created minds. Professor Royce, in rejoinder, contends there is no such chasm, that a Divine Self-Consciousness continuously inclusive of our consciousness is demanded if a knowable God is to be proved, and that its existence is not only compatible with the existence of included conscious Selves, but directly provides for them, imparts to them as its own members its own freedom, and thus gives them all the autonomy permissible in a world that is moral. In this difference, it may be presumed that Professor Mezes and Professor Le Conte side tacitly with Professor Royce; though Professor Le Conte, of course, would only do so with the reservation that the reconciliation of the dispute must be sought in his theory of evolution. Professor Royce, however, pursues his object by another path, more purely in the region of idealistic psychology, and

devotes his Supplementary Essay, in its main purpose, to a systematic investigation of the nature and the source of Individuation. He seeks in this way to show how Personality, conceived as self-conscious individuality, flows directly and even solely from his conception of God, when the essential implications of this are developed. Here Professor Howison's contention is, that this theory of the Person, making the single Self nothing but an *identical part* of the unifying Divine Will (as Professor Royce is explicit in declaring), gives to the created soul no freedom at all of its own; that the moral individual, the Person, cannot with truth be thus confounded with the logical singular; and that personality, as reached by this doctrine, is so truncated as to cease being true personality. The central topic of the book, proving thus to be this question of Free Personality, marks by the region entered, and by the method of investigation employed, the advance of philosophical thought into a new stadium.

On a different matter, of high philosophical import, with weighty religious consequences, the parties in the discussion all appear to agree. They unite in recognising, in some form or other, an organic correlation among the three main objects common to philosophy and religion,—God, Freedom, Immortality. They differ, to be sure, as to precisely what, and exactly how much, these three elements of the One Truth mean; but they agree that neither of the three can adequately be stated except with the help of the properly correlative statement of the other two. Thus: *No God except with human Selves*

free and immortal in some sense, in some degree or other; and so, likewise, *mutatis mutandis*, of Freedom and of Immortality. The differences here are as to the sense in which Freedom and Immortality are to be taken,—whether with unabated completeness or with a suppression and reduction. On this issue, Professor Le Conte, as to the resulting state of Real Existence aimed at by his method, is at one with Professor Howison: both hold to a God *distinctly* real, in relation with *distinctly* real souls, though Professor Howison questions the conceptions on which Professor Le Conte bases his method for reaching this result. Opposed to them stands Professor Royce. Professor Mezes perhaps supports this opposition with tacit assent, though he has refrained from any open expression.

Restating in the usual but more technical language of the schools the main divergence as now brought out, one would say that it is an issue between two views concerning the Whole of Real Existence—between the view known as Monism, and the view known as Pluralism. Professor Royce, and apparently Professor Mezes, adheres to Monism; Professor Le Conte and Professor Howison hold by Pluralism, though Professor Le Conte colours this with an intermediary Monism, as the means by which the final Pluralism comes to be. Only it is of essential importance to add, that both parties interpret their views in terms of Idealism. To both alike, all reality at last comes back to the reality of Mind; to the primary reality of self-consciousness, and the derivative reality of “things,” or objects ordinarily so called, as real items in such self-

consciousness. The difference is, as to whether there really are many minds, or, in the last resort, there is only one Mind; whether the Absolute Reality is a system of self-active beings forming a Unity, or is after all, with whatever included variety, a continuous Unit; whether it is a free Harmony, or, as Professor James satirically calls it, a "solid Block." The one view, then, would be more accurately designated Idealistic Monism, as Professor Royce himself prefers to call it; or Monistic Idealism, as it has sometimes been named; or Cosmic Theism, as still others at times call it,—though this last title is oftener used in an agnostic than in an idealistic sense. The opposed view would in like manner be called Pluralistic Idealism, or Ethical Idealism;¹ or, again, as its supporter would prefer, simply Personal Idealism, since all other forms of Idealism are, as he thinks, in the last analysis non-personal— are unable to achieve the reality of any genuine Person. Professor Le Conte's special form of Pluralism has sometimes been called, with his approval, Evolutional Idealism; and this is descriptive of what he regards as the most important factors in it, and is in so far suitable.

¹ Professor Royce designates this view Ethical Realism. Professor Howison has no particular objection to this title, as it names, quite appropriately, an actual aspect of the doctrine. He would himself willingly call it Absolute Idealism (as in his opinion the only system expressing completely the *Ideal of the Reason*, and reaching an ideal that *per se* turns real), were not that name already associated—illegitimately, as he holds—with the theory of Hegel, and so with Professor Royce's own. *Absolute* Idealism, of course, however interpreted, must also be called *Absolute Realism*. Accordingly, Ethical Idealism is in its reverse aspect Ethical Realism.

So much for the chief sides represented in the discussion. Its significance for the existing situation in philosophy and religion can be made duly clear by exhibiting its place in that larger movement of thought which has most prominently marked the century now passing away.

This movement, so far as it affected our English-speaking communities, was in its bearing on the rational foundations of religion professedly defensive; but only so by intent, and on the surface of its thinking; in its deep undertow it was from its springs profoundly negative,—destructive in tendency. When in the mind of the early century the question first clearly uttered itself: “What will all our scientific discoveries, all our independent philosophisings, all our historical, textual, and other critical doubts, leave us of our religious tradition?—above all, is the Personal God of past faith to remain intact for us?” the pressure of the situation, having borne the anthropomorphic supports of Theism indiscriminately away, forced thinking people to ask further: “What, then, do we indeed mean by ‘God,’ since we are no longer to think him ‘altogether such an one as ourselves’?—has the meaning gone out of the word ‘God’ entirely?” To many—as, for instance, to Sir William Hamilton—it seemed that, substantially, the answer must come in this form: “God, surely, is the *Absolute*, the one and only unconditioned Reality; the universal Ground of all, which it is impossible not to account real: for it is impossible not to believe that *Something is real*, and therefore impossible not to believe there is an Ultimate Reality. What is

sensibly present is finite, is thereby only derivatively real, and thus is intrinsically conditioned by this Ground of all, which is thus, again, intrinsically the Unconditioned. Hence, though God therefore certainly is, he is forever unknown and unknowable: because to know is to think, to think is to condition, and to condition the Unconditioned is a self-contradiction." In this way the so-called being of God was supposed to be saved at the cost of his essence; and the mysteries of traditional faith were held to be further preserved and vindicated, because, as it was announced, need was now shown, and a way made, for Revelation, since our human knowledge had been demonstrated incompetent.

In contrast to this attempted theistic Agnosticism, there appeared almost simultaneously, issuing from France through Comte, an Agnosticism openly atheistic. It was entitled Positivism, as restricting its credence to the only things certain by "positive" evidence—the immediate and autocratic evidence of sensible experience. It said: "Let there be an end now, not only to theological, but to all metaphysical Entities quite as much; for all are alike the illusory products of mere abstraction and conjecture." As the substitution of the "Ultimate Reality" for God had turned God into something unknowable, God—and the "Ultimate Reality" too, as for that—became, as the positivist justly enough observed, an affair of no more concern to us knowers than if he or it didn't exist. So, let human life be organised without any reference to any "Reality" beyond phenomena, and let us confine our knowledge to its

authentic objects, namely, "the things which do appear." Comte brought to the task of this "positive" organisation of life a comprehensive acquaintance with the results and the general methods of all the sciences, and a noticeable facility in classified and generalised statement. These qualities, joined with an ardour of conviction and an insistence of advocacy that lent their possessor something of the character of the prophet and the apostle, earned for the new cause an attention sufficient not only to found a new sect, intense in cohesion, if limited in numbers, but to spread the contagion of its general empirical view wide through a world interested in the theory of knowledge, however indifferent to the religious powers claimed for the new doctrine. A philosophy insisting on the sole credibility of scientific evidence, and chiefly busied in formulating scientific truths in generalisations so rarefied as to seem from their unexpectedness like new scientific discoveries, naturally appealed to many a scientific expert, but still more to the ever-swelling throng of general readers who fed upon scientific "results," and gradually formed the public now known to the venders of "popular science."

So matters stood, in the world that was balancing between the interests of philosophy and of religion, till about the middle of the century. At that juncture, following upon the latest developments in the sciences, particularly in the field of biology, Herbert Spencer appeared with his project of a "Synthetic Philosophy," based on the principle of Evolution carried out to cosmic extent. This view presently

received an almost overwhelming reinforcement, at least for the general scientific intelligence, by the unexpected scientific proofs of biological evolution, worked out chiefly by Darwin. The change of front in the scientific world, upon the question of Species and of Origins, was almost as immediate as it was revolutionary. The conception of the origin of natural things in a direct act of "creation" — a supposed instant effect of a Divine Will operating without any means — thus seemed to the popular mind to be assailed in the seat of its life. Many felt, indeed, that this view, so ingrained in the religious tradition, had received its deathblow. In this feeling, as fact requires us to acknowledge, they had at any rate the countenance, if not the direct leading, of many of the scientific experts who promoted the new evolutional theory. The nature of the Eternal Ground of things appeared to need a radical reconception, to adjust it to the evidences, felt to be irresistible, of the presence of evolution in the world. The way was thus made, over a field widely prepared, for the favourable reception of a philosophy that proposed nothing less than the harmonious satisfaction and fulfilment, in an alleged Higher Synthesis, of the conflicting interests reflected in the Agnosticism of Hamilton, in the Positivism of Comte, in the evolutional results of science, and even in the Theism of the traditional religious consciousness. The theist was to be shown right, in so far as he resisted the positivist by asserting the fact of an "Ultimate Reality"; for this was not only an "absolute datum of consciousness," but the unavoidable presupposition

of the fact of evolution, which could only be explained by "the reality of an Omnipresent Energy." The positivist, in his turn, was to be shown right, in so far as he maintained against the theist, theological or metaphysical, traditional or philosophical, the weighty discovery that all knowledge is necessarily relative to the constitution of the knowing subject, therefore cannot be the knowledge of any Ultimate Reality, nor of things as they are in themselves, but must be knowledge of phenomena only — of things as they appear to conscious experience, limited as this is by correlation with a specific nervous organism. The agnostic, however, was to be shown the most comprehensively right of all: for his was the truth that embraced and harmonised the truth of the positivist and the truth of the theist, at once and together; his was the immovable assurance of the fact of an Ultimate Reality, whose nature nevertheless could only be stated as the "Unknowable," or as the Power present in all things, the Eternal Mystery immanent in all worlds; his was the possession, too, of a boundless cosmos of phenomena, indefinitely receding into the mysterious recesses of the past, and unfolding by orderly evolution, ever more richly complex both in psychic and in physical intricacy, into the indefinite mystery of the future. Thus he was able, moreover, to meet the genuine demands of the religious consciousness, and to meet them supremely; namely, by an Eternal Power immanent in the world, instead of by an anthropomorphic God transcendent of the world, — to meet them supremely, because religion, at its authentic base, was founded in Solemnity and

Awe, and these had their only secure footing in the unfathomable and the mysterious—the omnipresence of the Omnipotent, from which none can escape, whose ways are past finding out. Thus, finally,—let it not be overlooked,—the belief of traditional religion in the Personality of God, in the self-conscious purposive Wisdom and Love at the root of all things, was to disappear. Not, to be sure, in behalf of Materialism; not in behalf of Atheism, taken as the dogmatic *denial* of God; but in behalf of Agnosticism, the far subtler *avoidance* of a Personal Absolute,—an avoidance all the more plausible from its appeal to the impartiality which is of the essence of reason; an appeal to the rational neutrality that would no more deny than it would assert God, would no more assert than it would deny the eternity of Matter, but with disciplined self-restraint would confine itself to the affirmation, declared alone defensible, of simply some Ultimate Reality, whose nature was impenetrable to our knowledge.

Confronted as our human intelligence always is with the fact of our ignorance, and bred as the religious thinking of that day had been in apologetics based on an agnostic philosophy such as Hamilton's; impressed, too, as the general public was, religious and non-religious alike, with the steadfast march of natural science towards bringing all facts under the reign of physical law,—above all, under the law of evolution,—we need not wonder that this public was widely and deeply influenced by this philosophy. It is accessible to the general intelligence, and its evidences are impressive to minds unacquainted with the

subtleties inseparable from the most searching thought, while its refutation unavoidably carries the thinker into the intricacies of dialectic that to the general mind are least inviting, or are even repellent.

Since the diffusion of the doctrines of Darwin and Spencer, the more alert portion of the religious world has exhibited a busy haste to readjust its theological conceptions to the new views. In fact, these efforts have been noticeable for their speed and adroitness rather than for their large or considerate judgment; in their anxiety for harmony with the new, they have not seldom lost sight of the cardinal truths in the old. Memorable, unrivalled among them, was the proposal of Matthew Arnold, in the rôle of a devoted English Churchman, to replace the Personal God of "the religion in which we have been brought up," and in the name of saving this religion, by his now famous "Power, not ourselves, that makes for Righteousness": a proposal which while sacrificing the very heart of the warrant for calling the religion Christian — the belief in the divine Personality — was put forward in the most evident good faith that it was Christian still, and in a form so eminent for literary excellence that it beyond doubt increased the spread of its agnostic views in the very act of satirising the "Unknowable," and preserved for the New Negation, in a lasting monument of English letters, the æsthetic charm which it added to the cause.

Agnosticism thus became adult and adorned, and made its conquests. But it was to meet a mortal foe; a foe, too, sprung from its own germinal stock. The

successive stages of its growth, by the express declaration of their authors, all had their impulse in doctrines of Kant. Though their religious negations were connected with Kant by a more or less violent misinterpretation of his philosophical method and aim, Kant's own way of dealing with what he called Theoretical as distinguished from Practical Reason was doubtless still largely responsible for these results, so erasive of Personality, in all its genuine characters, from the whole of existence. The counter-movement in thought was also founded on Kant, by another one-sided construction of his doctrines.

For meanwhile, indeed during a whole generation prior to these negative movements in the English-speaking world and in France, there had followed Kant's thinking, in Kant's own fatherland, a succession of systems deriving from his theoretical principles, and distinguished by the great names of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, each aiming to surmount the Agnosticism lurking in Kant's doctrine of knowledge. If Kant made the bold attempt to remove religion beyond the reach of intellectual assault forever, by drawing around the intellect, under the depreciatory name of the Theoretical Reason, the boundary of restriction to objects of sense; if he thus left religion in the supposed impregnable seat of the Practical Reason, which alone dealt with supersensible things,—with God, with Freedom, and with Immortality,—but dealt with them unassailably, as the very postulates of its own being and action; and if to him this made religion, in all its several aspects of devotion, of aspiration, and of hope, the

direct expression of human rational will: to all of his great successors, on the contrary, this rescuing of faith by identifying it with pure will, after depriving it of all support from intelligence, seemed in fact the evaporation of freedom itself into a merely formal or nominal power, meaningless because void of intelligible contents; and hence the method, so far from being the support, appeared to be simply the undermining of religion. So, in ways successively developing an organic logic, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel set seriously about the task of bringing the entire conscious life, religion included, within the unbroken compass of knowledge. But as they all alike accepted one characteristic tenet of Kant's theory of knowledge, namely, that the possibility of knowledge is conditional upon its object's being embraced in the same "unity of consciousness" with its subject, they either had to confess God — for religious consciousness the Supreme Object — unknowable and unprovable (as Kant had maintained in his famous assault on the standard theoretical arguments for God's existence), or else had to say that God must henceforth be conceived as literally immanent in the world, not as strictly transcendent of it. God, as an intelligibly defensible Reality, thus appeared to become indisputably immanent in our human minds also: this, too, whether our minds were conceived, with Fichte, as having the physical world immanent in them; or, with Schelling, as being embraced in Nature as component members of the Whole informed with God; or, again, with Hegel, as standing over against the members of Nature, members in a

correlated world of Mind, and implicated together with Nature in the consciousness of God,—components in that Consciousness, in fact,—items in the Divine Self-Expression unfolding from eternity to eternity. By this theory of a Divine Immanence, fulfilling the “Divine Omnipresence” of the traditional faith, they aimed at once to convict Kant of construing God as a “thing in itself,”—of the very fallacy of “transcendental illusion” which he had himself exposed in his *Transcendental Dialectic*,—and to refute his criticism, made in the same place, of the Ontological Proof for the existence of God. Drop, they said, this whole illusion of the “thing in itself,” shown to be meaningless and therefore null, and God, human freedom, and human immortality would once more fall within the bounds of knowledge, since the being of God would become continuous with the being of man, the being of man with the being of God.

The condition of this apparent victory for religion, however, as we must not fail to note, was the acceptance of the Immanent God, the all-pervasive Intelligence; precisely as later, in the system of Spencer, the solution of the tension between Positivism and agnostic Pietism was the acceptance of the Immanent Unknowable. But more worthy of note is the fact, that in the continuous dialectical development involved in the self-expression of the “Divine Idea,” as this was worked out by Hegel, provision had been made, as if ready to hand, not only for the great law of evolution in the creation, but—of far greater significance—for its explanation by something more illu-

mining than a “final inexplicability,” — the utmost explanatory reach of the “Unknowable.”

These sketches of the historic thought lying directly behind us, barest outline though they are, suffice to explain the issues in which we at this day are engaged. If the scientific doctrine of Evolution, taken with all its suggestions, has been to the religious conceptions inherited by our century the surpassing summons to prepare for a radical change; and if to those friends of the deep things in the traditional faith who incline to hearken at the summons the Spencerian construction of evolution in terms of the “Unknowable” seems a revolution amounting to the abandonment of all religious conceptions worth human concern,— since it puts an end to the conscious communion of the creature with a conscious Creator and Saviour, and in its depths unmistakably forebodes the eventual extinction of personal being from the universe,— if these things are so, then it is easy to understand how the idealistic conceptions of Kant’s successors, especially in the form given to them by Hegel, should appeal as strongly as they have appealed, and are still appealing, to those who would preserve to their conviction the Personality of the Eternal, and all that this carries with it for religion. For this idealistic philosophy seems by one and the same stroke to assure them of God’s reality, and to adjust his nature, and his way of existence, to their minds “as affected by modern knowledge.” It assigns to him such an immanence in his works as explains evolution by presenting it as “continuous creation,” and it gives, at last, what seems like a

real meaning to the traditional dogma of his Omnipresence.

In this light, the conflict existing in thought down to the present day, so far as it bears on religion, appears to lie between the conception of the Immanent God and the conception of the Immanent Unknowable,—between a world-informing Person, whom it is supposed this idealistic Monism secures us, and a world-pervading Power, perpetually transforming its effects, which is all that the agnostic Monism leaves us. On this view, Monism would appear as if settled: there would only remain, as the reflecting world so far appears to think, a choice between its two species. It was therefore with pertinence that Mr. Balfour, in his *Foundations of Belief*, set these two systems, under the titles of "Naturalism" and "Transcendental Idealism," in a contrasting agreement in lack, and, exposing some of their incurable defects, while assuming them to exhaust the possibilities of rational ingenuity, made this assumption the basis of his subtle and rather telling plea for a return to external authority, as the only foundation for religious stability. The day has assuredly gone by, however, when men, confessing there is no support for religion in reason, are willing to rest it on decrees and on might; or, going M. de Voltaire one better in his cynicism, are "for the safety of society" not only willing to "invent a God," but are ready to enforce him. "When it comes to that," the minds of this generation surely would say, "it is time to give religion over, and to let God go." On the other hand, quite as surely,

multitudes of them are still of firm hope, and even of persuasion, that religion, in its highest historic meaning, is verifiable by reason. Their inheritance in aspirations after Immortality as the only field for exercising to the full their moral Freedom,—in longings after the reality of God, in which alone, as they see, have those aspirations any sure warrant,—this inheritance they are still confident will be shown valid at the bar of knowledge, will be vindicated as of the substance of reality itself, when once the nature of that reality gets stated as genuine intelligence sees it to be. They know the inheritance is worthless unless it has this certification by intelligence, but they are alert in the trust that the certification is there, and only waits to be shown. The hour has arrived, they are sure, for a higher philosophy, thoroughly Personal, which will prove itself Complete Idealism and Fulfilled Realism at one and the same time.

It is on this ground, one now may repeat, that the existing interest in that form of Theism which culminates in the school of Hegel can be explained. In this way, too, one can understand why this interest, in spite of interrupting pauses, has continued to grow since the day of its beginning, and why, coming into a religious medium more serious and stable when it took possession of the English-speaking mind, it has spread far more widely since the rise and growth of scientific evolution. At present, the way of thinking which engages this interest moves, in one form or another, side by side with the advancing spread of Spencerian thought, and appears more and more as

the reliance of those who would vindicate an eternal Person against the hostile theory of Agnosticism. That this spread of the conception of an Immanent God is a fact, affecting not only the world of technical philosophy but also the world of applied theology and practical religion, it is enough to cite in evidence the writings and influence of the late Professor Green in England, of the brothers Caird in Scotland, of Professor Watson in Canada, and, in the United States,—besides its presence in various modified forms in the philosophical chairs at the leading universities,—the preaching of Phillips Brooks, the long and impressive philosophical industry of our National Commissioner of Education, the noticeable book of Professor Allen entitled *The Continuity of Christian Thought*, the recent public declaration of Dr. Strong, and the writings of Dr. Gordon, such as his *Christ of To-day* and his *Immortality and the New Theodicy*. Nor should one forget, in this connexion, the Bampton Lectures of 1893, by Mr. Upton. Idealistic Monism pervades the religious influence of all these minds, gives this its controlling tone, and tinges deeply the New Theology, as it is called, wherever this appears,—be it among Anglicans, Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Baptists, Methodists, or Unitarians, or even among the progressive Romanists: one finds clear traces of it in the “liberal” theological seminaries in almost every denomination. A significant fact of the same order was the irenical essay of Mr. John Fiske, *The Idea of God as affected by Modern Knowledge*, with its extraordinary popular success. Here a professed

follower of Darwin and of Spencer undertook to interpret the Philosophy of Evolution so as to impart to the Immanent Power, the "Omnipresent Energy" of the evolutionist, a tinge of the Personal God, and to transfigure evolutional Agnosticism into Cosmic Theism. Of this, the pervading theme was the substitution of a "*quasi-personal* God immanent in the world" for the traditional "God remote from the world." Evolutionism joined forces with a semi-idealistic Monism, to extend the spread of the conception of a one and only Immanent Spirit.¹

But whatever religious advantages this form of Idealism may have,—in the way of displacing Agnosticism and of recovering an Absolute that shall be personal so far as regards possession of self-consciousness and intelligent purpose,—or even in the way of winning an assurance of something for the human Self that may excusably be called everlasting life,—there still remains to be settled a question of far graver import for religion and for human worth; the question, namely, of Freedom, and of the moral responsibility and moral opportunity dependent on freedom. *Can the reality of human free-agency, of moral responsibility and universal moral aspiration, of unlimited spiritual hope for every soul,—can this be made out, can it even be held, consistently with*

¹ The pervasion of pure literature by this fascinating theme must not be overlooked in recounting the causes of its present prevalence. It has filled, especially, almost the whole realm of Poetry, from the days of Goethe. The English poetry of the century is alive with it: Wordsworth, Shelley, Keats, Tennyson, Browning, Arnold,—it seems the ceaseless refrain of all their song. Nor, to turn to the essayists, may we forget Carlyle; nor, in his theistic moods, Emerson.

the theory of an Immanent God? This, for a few awakened minds at least, now becomes the “burning question.” It well may be, that, in their preoccupation with the task of rescuing out of Agnosticism something absolutely real which they could also call a Person, these philosophical allies of religion have overlooked a lurking but fatal antagonism between their form of Idealism and the central soul of the traditional faith, the vital interests of man as man. At all events, the time has come when the question whether this is not so should be raised with all emphasis, and examined to the end. For if our genuine freedom is to disappear when we accept the religion whose God is the Immanent Spirit, then the new religion is in truth a decline from the highest conceptions of the historic faith, and in this regard has no advantage over the religion of the “Unknowable,” — a religion which, not simply by the confession, but by the emphatic proclamation of its philosophical sponsor and its chief heralds, is based on the doctrine of hereditary necessitation, and from which personal freedom and moral opportunity equal for all minds are cancelled entirely and finally.

Our question, then, urgent for religion and for philosophy alike, is the one that must surely give character to the immediate future of both. As shown already, it is really the main question of the present book. If the discussion here printed has any significance for current thought, the significance lies in the fact that its centre of conflict is upon just this question. The problem of Freedom, the search into the

meaning and the fact of Individual Reality and Real Individuality, has in the pressure of the unavoidable course of philosophy long been left in abeyance. One might almost say, with truth, that no effective argumentation upon it has appeared since the memorable reasonings of Jonathan Edwards carried, apparently, such disaster upon the cause of human free-will,—disaster that the wide-spread theory of the total explanation of man by cosmic evolution seems to deepen beyond reprieve. At any rate, one can securely say that nothing of crucial import has come forward in the interest of human freedom since Kant started the inspiring but hitherto little fruitful conception of moral autonomy. Instead, as we have seen, the world's thinking has been absorbed in questions that thus far have ended in a persuasion of the immanence of the Eternal in all things,—at best, the all-pervasive presence of an Immanent Spirit. Is it possible, now, for Kant's kindling suggestion of our moral autonomy, so pregnant to the conscience disciplined in the higher traditional religion,—*is it possible for this to be met by this monistic conception of the Absolute, even when this takes on its highest and most coherent, its most intelligible and most intellectual form in a monistic Idealism?*

Professor Royce, in the pages ensuing, answers *Yes*,—with the proviso, however, that in answering there must be a critically discriminating knowledge of what moral autonomy in truth can mean; and he devotes his Supplementary Essay to a searching analysis of (1) the conception of an absolute Unity of Self-Consciousness, which he argues is required for the

reality of knowledge, and is essential to the knowledge of reality, (2) the conception of Individuality, and the Principle of Individuation, and (3) the conception of Moral Freedom,—all with the object of furnishing the philosophical proof that the answer Yes is the truth. Professor Howison, on the other hand, maintains that the answer is unqualifiedly *No*; and after considering everything advanced in the Supplementary Essay, he still holds to the answer.

The significance, then, of the present discussion is that it enters the historical conflict in religious philosophy at just the crisis which has above been described. Professor Royce represents, in a fresh and subtly reasoned way, the Idealistic Monism which has now been explained as one of the main sides in that conflict, and which he, in the pages that follow, himself explains with greater fulness and force. The Pluralistic Idealism which Professor Howison in opposition contends for, receives in the book no correspondingly detailed defence, analytic and affirmatively theoretical. Professor Howison's contribution to the discussion is by the exigencies of the case chiefly critical and consequently negative. Its office must be regarded as fulfilled, for the time being, if it has served the important purpose of challenging the Monism—especially the idealistic form of this—which so long has filled the philosophic and religious imagination, and which has received at the hands of Professor Royce a defence so detailed, so carefully organised, and so expressive. If it help, as its author ventures to hope it may, to serve the further object of directing philosophical discussion upon the field where the next

signal conflict in advancing thought is to occur, its success will be all that could be expected, with the present statement of its case. Its author would not have the reader suppose, however, that the complete Idealism which maintains the mutually transcendent and still thoroughly knowable reality of God and souls is not, to his mind, supplied with a defence at least as organic as that which Idealistic Monism has here received. Nor would he have it assumed — as from the silence imposed on him by the limits of the volume it might perhaps be assumed — that he considers the account given by such Monism of the nature and the source of Personal Individuality, either conclusive, or sufficient, or correct, even when this account is expounded with the brilliant force given to it by Professor Royce. In his judgment, this intensely interesting problem requires an altogether different analysis, and has a profoundly different explanation, issuing directly in an idealistic Pluralism. He admits, of course, the pertinence of the claim that this analysis and explanation should be given. To be sure, the principles upon which he would found the defence of Personal Idealism, with its genuine Personal God, with its human Persons genuinely real because really free, have been plainly indicated in his article following; even the course of reasoning has there been outlined (sufficiently, he thinks, for its steps to be caught by those versed in philosophy),¹ by which he would expose and rectify that error of Kant's which he believes to be responsible for the Monistic Idealism that has indeed claimed, and with good credentials,

¹ See pp. 123–127 below.

legitimate descent from Kant, but which, it is useful to remember, Kant himself expressly repudiated. But the matter in controversy, especially now that Professor Royce, with the aim of adjusting Idealistic Monism to the demands of our moral reason, has supplemented his philosophy by this new and striking inquiry into the Principle of Individuation and the nature of Individuality, undoubtedly requires, somewhere, a systematic presentation of the proofs for the opposing Pluralistic Idealism; especially is the solution which this affords of the riddle of Individuality demanded. Professor Howison therefore hopes to offer, in a separate writing, and at a date not too remote, a thorough affirmative treatment of the theory here only suggested. In this the questions here started will appear in their proper setting, in the system of philosophy to which they belong.

One misapprehension of his position he feels it necessary to guard against; particularly since Professor Royce himself, alert and exact thinker as he is, appears to have fallen into it. Professor Howison's point is not at all to set the moral consciousness, simply as a "categorical imperative," at odds with the theoretical, and merely have the "heart" breathe defiance to the "intellect"; not that the spirit cannot do this, as Carlyle does in *Sartor Resartus*, but that doing it doesn't amount to philosophy. His position is by no means correctly apprehended as one side of "an antinomy between the claims of theory and the presuppositions of ethics." Ethics, for him as for Professor Royce, can have no valid presuppositions except such as find their place in

a totally coherent, totally embracing *theoretical* view. His position is that of a side in a controversy between two schemes of *theory*, one of which, as he still maintains, in full view of everything that has now been said in its favour, makes, and can make, no provision for that self-activity which the moral consciousness recognises as the crucial, though not indeed the only factor in a moral order; while the other aims to construe the moral consciousness itself as a part, and the *intellectually* organising part, of the theoretical whole. He therefore doesn't at all remain standing on the historical position of Kant merely, which made moral autonomy a thing not only "primate" over the theoretical world, but utterly disconnected with it. The way—a way wholly indirect, and therefore easily overlooked—by which the true and continuously significant autonomy of Conscience is to be shown, as the really integrating factor in the theoretical consciousness itself,—the way by which a genuine development of Kant's fundamental principles is to be effected,—has been clearly hinted at in Professor Howison's article, as already said. The full exhibition of this way—which involves the rediscussion, in the footsteps of Kant, of the entire problem of the conditions necessary and sufficient for natural science—must await a later and a freer occasion.

As for Professor Howison's associates in the criticism of Professor Royce, in their behalf it is only possible to enter here a simple *caveat*, as brief as may be. Professor Le Conte asks not even for that; but he authorises the statement, that, much as Professor

Royce's supplementary discussion has interested him, particularly its colouring of the Divine Consciousness with an aspect of Will under the form of Attention, he is not led, on the whole, to any withdrawal of his original criticisms of Professor Royce's system, nor, indeed, to any material modification of them; in fact, that he comes out of the whole discussion, with its objections to his own system from all hands, without feeling that he must retract or materially alter the propositions which give it a distinguishing character. Its real value, whatever that may be, he would leave to a discerning public to decide.

Neither does Professor Mezes feel that Professor Royce's formal reply to his criticisms requires him to withdraw them, or to modify their substance. He notes that Professor Royce makes to the first of these criticisms three distinct answers. As to the second of these answers,—about the responsibility of philosophy for principles of inference,—he desires the reader should observe that it proceeds upon a misapprehension of his meaning, and fails when this misapprehension is corrected. As to the first and the third, he would simply give notice that he replies by a counter-dissent, and is ready with his written defence of this. Regarding the reply to his second criticism, he quite agrees with Professor Royce that the "Eternal Now" is "simply not the temporal present," and believes the reader will find that his remarks about the "Eternal Now" really characterise this as the "Absolute Moment." With reference, generally, to the questions raised in this second connexion, he brings forward suggestions upon the meta-

physical relations of Omniscience and Will that are curiously premonitory of the views set forth in Parts II, III, and IV of the Supplementary Essay. He adds, in substance, that if in Professor Royce's original argument the question were simply of proving real the conception of an *Absolute*, the objections he made would indeed fail of pertinence, but that they seem to hold unyieldingly when the conception is offered as the conception of God. He wishes it known, however, that with respect to this charge of deficiency in divine fulness he writes only in view of Professor Royce's original argument, his earlier books, and his direct reply to the objections, and without acquaintance with the remainder of the Supplementary Essay,—that is to say, with the body of it,—which he has not seen.¹

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY,
July 26, 1897.

¹ The editor, for his part, feels much regret that the limits of the volume have forbidden the insertion of Professor Mezes's rejoinder in full. Its unavoidable length precluded its appearance as a whole, while the close articulation of its parts made impracticable any excerpts that would do it justice. It is to be hoped the public may see it elsewhere, and in a less restricted and more adequate form than its author was constrained to give it in his communication to the editor.

I

THE CONCEPTION OF GOD

AN ADDRESS BEFORE THE PHILOSOPHICAL UNION

BY

JOSIAH ROYCE, PH.D.

PROFESSOR OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY

THE CONCEPTION OF GOD

ADDRESS BY PROFESSOR ROYCE

I CANNOT begin the discussion of this evening without heartily thanking first of all my friend the presiding officer, and then the members of the Philosophical Union, for the kindness which has given to me the wholly undeserved and the very manifold privileges which this occasion involves for the one whom your invitation authorises to lead the way in the discussion. It is a privilege to meet again many dear friends. It is a great privilege to be able to bring with me to my old home, as I do, the warm academic greetings of Harvard to my Alma Mater. It is an uncommon opportunity to encounter in a discussion of this sort my honoured colleagues who are to-night of your company. And there is another privilege involved for me in this occasion, which I must not omit to mention. I come here as a former student, to express as well as I can, by means of my poor performance of the present academic task, my thanks to the teachers who guided me in undergraduate days. It is the simplest duty of piety to them to say how I rejoice to be able to see, in this way, those of them who are still here, and with us to-night. Nor can I forbear, in this brief word of personal confession, to express with what especial earnestness of gratitude I come to-night into the presence

of one of your number, and one of my former teachers, whose lectures and whose counsel were to me, in my student days, especially a source of light, of guidance, and of inspiration. This teacher it was, I may say, who first set before me, in living presence, the ideal, still to me so remote, of the work of the thinker; and whenever since, in my halting way, I have tried to think about central problems, I have remembered that ideal of my undergraduate days,—that light and guidance and inspiration,—and the beloved teacher too, whose living presence in those days meant the embodiment of all these things. It is a peculiar delight, ladies and gentlemen,—a wholly undeserved boon,—to have this opportunity to come face to face, in your presence, with Professor Le Conte, and to talk with you, and with him, of questions that are indeed often called vexed questions, but that he first of all taught me to regard with the calmer piety and gentleness of the serious reason.

I

GOD AS THE OMNISCIENT BEING, AND OMNISCIENCE AS
ABSOLUTE UNITY OF THOUGHT AND EXPERIENCE

I have been asked to address the Philosophical Union upon some aspects of the problem of Theism. During the past year the Union has been devoting a very kind attention to a volume entitled *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, which I printed more than ten years ago. Were there time, I should be glad indeed if I were able to throw any direct light either

upon that little book or upon your own discussions of its arguments. But, as a fact, my time in your presence is very short. The great problems of philosophy are pressing. I can do you more service on this occasion, if I devote myself to a somewhat independent confession of how the problems of philosophical Theism look to me to-day, than I could do if I took up your time with an effort to expound or defend a text which, as I frankly confess, I have not read with any care or connectedness since I finished the proof-sheets of the book in question. A man may properly print a philosophical essay for several reasons, taken in combination; namely, because he believes in it, and because he wants to get himself expressed, and, finally, because he wants to get freed from the accidents of just this train of thought. But, on the other hand, no philosophical student is ever persuaded of his opinions merely because he has formerly learned to believe them, or because he has once come to express them. The question for the philosophical student always is: How does the truth appear to me now, with the best reflection that I can at present give? Past expression is therefore no substitute for present effort in philosophy. The very essence of philosophy is an unconcern for every kind of tradition, just in so far as it has become to the individual student mere tradition. For while the contents of any tradition may be as sacred as you please, the traditional form, as such, is the very opposite of the philosophical form. A tradition may be true; but only a present and living insight can be philosophical. If this is the case with any tradition,—even a sacred tradition,—it is

above all the case with the very poor and perhaps, if you will, very profane sort of tradition that an individual student of philosophy may find in the shape of a past piece of his own writing. It is the death of your philosophising, if you come to believe anything merely because you have once maintained it. And therefore I am not unwilling to confess that, if I had to-night to pass an examination upon the text of my book, I might very possibly get an extremely poor mark. Let us lay aside, then, for a moment, both text and tradition, and come face to face with our philosophical problem itself.

The Conception of God — this is our immediate topic. And I begin its consideration by saying that, to my mind, a really fruitful philosophical study of the conception of God is inseparable from an attempt to estimate what evidence there is for the existence of God. When one conceives of God, one does so because one is interested, not in the bare definition of a purely logical or mathematical notion, but in the attempt to make out what sort of real world this is in which you and I live. If it is worth while even to speak of God before the forum of the philosophical reason, it is so because one hopes to be able, in a measure, to translate into articulate terms the central mystery of our existence, and to get some notion about what is at the heart of the world. Therefore, when to-night I speak of the conception of God, I mean to do so in the closest relation to a train of thought concerning the philosophical proof that this conception corresponds to some living Reality. It is useless in this region to define unless one wishes

to show that, corresponding to the definition, there is a reality. And, on the other hand, the proof that one can offer for God's presence at the heart of the world constitutes also the best exposition that one can suggest regarding what one means by the conception of God.

Yet, of course, some preliminary definition of what one has in mind when one uses the word "God" is of value, since our proof will then involve a development of the fuller meaning of just this preliminary definition. For this preliminary purpose, I propose to define, in advance, what we mean under the name "God," by means of using what tradition would call one of the Divine Attributes. I refer here to what has been called the attribute of Omnipotence, or of the Divine Wisdom. By the word "God" I shall mean, then, in advance of any proof of God's existence, a being who is conceived as possessing to the full all logically possible knowledge, insight, wisdom. Our problem, then, becomes at once this: Does there demonstrably exist an Omniscient Being? or is the conception of an Omniscient Being, for all that we can say, a bare ideal of the human mind?

Why I choose this so-called attribute of Omnipotence as constituting for the purposes of this argument the primary attribute of the Divine Being, students of philosophy — who remember, for instance, that the Aristotelian God, however his existence was proved, was defined by that thinker principally in terms of the attribute of Omnipotence — will easily understand, and you, as members of this Union and readers of my former discussion, will perhaps especially com-

prehend. But, for the present, let this selection of the attribute of Omniscience, as giving us a preliminary definition of God, appear, if you will, as just the arbitrary choice of this address. What we here need to see from the outset, however, is that this conceived attribute of Omniscience, if it were once regarded as expressing the nature of a real being, would involve as a consequence the concurrent presence, in such a being, of attributes that we could at pleasure express under other names; such, for instance, as what is rationally meant by Omnipotence, by Self-Consciousness, by Self-Possession—yes, I should unhesitatingly add, by Goodness, by Perfection, by Peace. For, consider for an instant what must be meant by Omniscience if one undertakes for a moment to view an Omniscient Being as real.

An Omniscient Being would be one who simply found presented to him, not by virtue of fragmentary and gradually completed processes of inquiry, but by virtue of an all-embracing, direct, and transparent insight into his own truth,—who found thus presented to him, I say, the complete, the fulfilled answer to every genuinely rational question. Observe the terms used. I say, the answer to every question. The words are familiar. Consider their meaning. We mortals question. To question involves thinking of possible facts, or of what one may call possible experiences, that are not now present to us. Thinking of these conceived or possible experiences that we do not now possess, we question in so far as we ask either what it would be to possess them, or whether the world is such that, under given

conditions, these experiences that we think of when we question could be presented to us. In other words, to question means to have ideas of what is not now present, and to ask whether these ideas do express, or could express, what some experience would verify. I question, on the country road: "Is it four miles to the railway station, or more, or less?" In this case I have ideas or thoughts about possible experiences not now present to me. I question in so far as I wonder whether these possible experiences, if I got them, — that is, if I walked or rode to yonder railway station and measured my way, — would fulfil or verify one or another of these my various thoughts or ideas about the distance. To be limited to mere questions, then, — and here is the essential point about questioning, — involves a certain divorce between your ideas and their objects, between facts conceived and facts directly experienced, between what you think about and what you regard as possibly to be presented to your direct experience. In this divorce of idea or thought and experience or fact, lies the essence of the state of mind of a being who merely questions.

On the other hand, to answer to the full, and with direct insight, any question, means to get your ideas, just in so far as they turn out to be true ideas, fulfilled, confirmed, verified by your experiences. When with full and complete insight you answer a question, then you get into the direct presence of facts, of experiences, which you behold as the confirmation or fulfilment of certain ideas, as the verification of certain thoughts. Take your mere ideas, as such, alone

by themselves, and you have to question whether or no they are true accounts of facts. Answer your questions, wholly for yourself, without intermediation, and then you have got your ideas, your thoughts, somehow into the presence of experienced facts. There are thus two factors or elements in completed and genuine knowing, namely : fact, or something experienced, on the one hand ; and mere idea, or pure thought about actual or possible experience, on the other hand. Divorce those two elements of knowledge, let the experienced fact, actual or possible, be remote from the idea or thought about it, and then the being who merely thinks, questions, and, so far, can only question. His state is such that he wonders : Is my idea true ? But let the divorce be completely overcome, and then the being who fully knows answers questions, in so far as he simply sees his ideas fulfilled in the facts of his experience, and beholds his experiences as the fulfilment of his ideas.

Very well, then, an Omniscient Being is defined as one in whom these two factors of knowledge, so often divorced in us, are supposed to be fully and universally joined. Such a being, I have said, would behold answered, in the facts present to his experience, all rational, all logically possible questions. That is, for him, all genuinely significant, all truly thinkable ideas would be seen as directly fulfilled, and fulfilled in his own experience.

These two factors of his knowledge would, however, still remain distinguishable. He would think, or have ideas,—richer ideas than our present fragments of thought, I need not say ; but he would

think. And he would experience. That is, he would have, in perfect fulness, what we call feeling—a world of immediate data of consciousness, presented as facts. This his world of feeling, of presented fact, would be richer than our fragments of scattered sensation, as I also need not say; but he would experience. Only,—herein lies the essence of his conceived Omniscience,—in him and for him these facts would not be, as they often are in us, merely felt, but they would be seen as fulfilling his ideas; as answering what, were he not omniscient, would be his mere questions.

But now, in us, our ideas, our thoughts, our questions, not merely concern what experienced facts might come to us through our senses, but also concern the value, the worth, the relations, the whole significance, ethical or æsthetic, of our particular experiences themselves. We ask: Shall I win success? And the question implies the idea of an experience of success which we now have not. We ask: What ought I to do? And the question involves the idea of an experience of doing, which we conceive as fulfilling the idea of right. Misfortune comes to us, and we ask: What means this horror of my fragmentary experience?—why did this happen to me? The question involves the idea of an experience that, if present, would answer the question. Now such an experience, if it were present to us, would be an experience of a certain passing through pain to peace, of a certain winning of triumph through partial defeat, of a certain far more exceeding weight of glory that would give even this fragmentary horror its

place in an experience of triumph and of self-possession. In brief, every time we are weak, downcast, horror-stricken, alone with our sin, the victims of evil fortune or of our own baseness, we stand, as we all know, not only in presence of agonising fragmentary experiences, but in presence of besetting problems, which in fact constitute the very heart of our calamity. We are beset by questions to which we now get no answers. Those questions could only be answered, those bitter problems that pierce our hearts with the keen edge of doubt and of wonder,—when friends part, when lovers weep, when the lightning of fortune blasts our hopes, when remorse and failure make desolate the lonely hours of our private despair,—such questions, such problems, I say, could only be answered if the flickering ideas then present in the midst of our darkness shone steadily in the presence of some world of superhuman experience, of which ours would then seem to be only the remote hint. Such superhuman experience might in its wholeness at once contain the answer to our questions, and the triumph over—yes, and through—our fragmentary experience. But, as we are, we can only question.

Well, then,—if the divorce of idea and experience characterises every form of our human consciousness of finitude, of weakness, of evil, of sin, of despair,—you see that Omniscience, involving, by definition, the complete and final fulfilment of idea in experience, the unity of thought and fact, the illumination of feeling by comprehension, would be an attribute implying, for the being who possessed it, much more than a

universally clear but absolutely passionless insight. An Omniscient Being could answer your bitter *Why?* when you mourn, with an experience that would not simply ignore your passion. For your passion, too, is a fact. It is experienced. The experience of the Omniscient Being would therefore include it. Only his insight, unlike yours, would comprehend it, and so would answer whatever is rational about your present question.

This is what I mean by saying that the definition of God by means of the attribute of Omniscience would involve far more than the phrase "mere omniscience" at first easily suggests. As a fact, in order to have the attribute of Omniscience, a being would necessarily be conceived as essentially world-possessing,—as the source and principle of the universe of truth,—not merely as an external observer of a world of foreign truth. As such, he would be conceived as omnipotent, and also in possession of just such experience as ideally ought to be; in other words, as good and perfect.

So much, then, for the mere preliminary definition. To this definition I should here add a word or two of more technical analysis. We mortals have an incomplete experience. This means that the ideas awakened in us by our experience far transcend what we are now able to verify. We think, then, of actual or of possible experience that is not now ours. But an Omniscient Being would have no genuine or logically permissible ideas of any experience actually beyond his own or remote from his own. We express this by saying, technically, that an Omniscient Being would

possess an Absolute Experience; that is, a wholly complete or self-contained experience, not a mere part of some larger whole. Again, the Omniscient Being would be, as we have said, a thinker. But we, as thinkers, are limited, both in so far as there is possible thought not yet attained by us, and in so far as we often do not know what ones amongst our thoughts or ideas have a genuine meaning, or correspond to what an absolute experience would fulfil. But the Omniscient Being would not be thus limited as to his thinking. Accordingly, he would possess what we may call an Absolute Thought; that is, a self-contained thought, sufficient unto itself, and needing no further comment, supplement, or correction. As the union of such an Absolute Thought and Absolute Experience, our Omniscient Being is technically to be named simply the Absolute; that is, the being sufficient unto himself. Moreover, I should also say that the experience and thought of this being might be called completely or fully *organised*. For us, namely, facts come in a disjointed way, out of connexion; and our thoughts, equally, seek a connexion which they do not now possess. An Omniscient Being would have to have present to himself all the conceivable relations amongst facts, so that in his world nothing would be fragmentary, disunited, confused, unrelated. To the question: What is the connexion of this and this in the world? the Omniscient Being would simply always find present the fulfilled answer. His experience, then, would form one whole. There would be endless variety in this whole, but the whole, as such, would fulfil an all-

embracing unity, a single system of ideas. This is what I mean by calling his Experience, as we here conceive it, an absolutely organised experience, his Thought an absolutely organised thought.

And now our question returns. We have defined the Omniscient Being. The question is: Does such a being exist? We turn from the ideal to the hard fact that we mortals find ourselves very ignorant beings. What can such as we hope to know of the Absolute?

II

FIRST DEFINITION OF HUMAN IGNORANCE, APPARENTLY EXCLUDING KNOWLEDGE OF REALITY

Yes, the vast extent of our human ignorance, the limitations of our finite knowledge,—these great facts, so familiar to the present generation, confront us at the outset of every inquiry into our knowledge about God, or about any absolute issue. So little am I disposed to neglect these great facts of our limitation, that, as perhaps you will remember from the book that you studied, philosophy seems to me, primarily, to be as much the theory of human ignorance as it is the theory of human knowledge. In fact, it is a small thing to say that man is ignorant. It is a great thing to undertake to comprehend the essence, the form, the implications, the meaning, of human ignorance. Let us make a beginning in this task as we approach the problem of Theism. For my thesis to-night will be that the very nature of human ignorance is such that you cannot conceive

or define it apart from the assertion that there is, in truth, at the heart of the world, an Absolute and Universal Intelligence, for which thought and experience, so divided in us, are in complete and harmonious unity.

"Man is ignorant," says one, — "ignorant of the true nature of reality. He knows that in the world there is something real, but he does not know what this reality is. The Ultimate Reality can therefore be defined, from our human point of view, as something unknowable." Here is a thesis nowadays often and plausibly maintained. Let me remind you of one or two of the customary arguments for this thesis — a thesis which, for us on this occasion, shall constitute a sort of first attempt at a definition of the nature of our human ignorance.

All that we know or can know, so the defenders of this thesis assert, must first be indicated to us through our experience. Without experience, without the element of brute fact thrust upon us in immediate feeling, there is no knowledge. Now, so far, as I must at once assure you, I absolutely accept this view. This is true, and there is no escape from the fact. Apart from — that is, in divorce from — experience there is no knowledge. And we can come to know only what experience has first indicated to us. I willingly insist that philosophy and life must join hands in asserting this truth. The whole problem of our knowledge, whether of Nature, of man, or of God, may be condensed into the one question: What does our experience indicate? But, to be sure, experience, as it first comes to us mortals, is not yet insight.

Feeling is not yet truth. The problem: What does our experience indicate? implies in its very wording that the indication is not the result. And between the indication and the truth that experience indicates there actually lies the whole travail of the most abstruse science.

But the partisans of our present thesis continue their parable thus: This being true,—experience being the life-blood of our human knowledge,—it is a fact that our human experience is determined by our peculiar organisation. In particular, the specific energies of our sensory nerves determine our whole experience of the physical world. The visual centres get affected from without in such wise only that sensations of light accompany their excitement. The auditory centres respond to sensory disturbance in such wise only that we hear sounds. The physical fact beyond us never gets directly represented in our mental state; for between the physical fact and our experience of its presence lie the complex conditions that give our sensations their whole specific character. And what is true of our sensations is true of the rest of our experience. As it comes to us, this experience is our specific and mental way of responding to the stimulations which reality gives us. This whole specific way therefore represents, not the true nature of outer reality, so much as the current states of our own organisations. Were the outer reality, as it exists not for our senses but in itself, to be utterly altered, still our experience, so long as one supposed our organisation itself somehow to survive in a relatively unchanged form, might retain very many of its pres-

ent characters — so many, in fact, that we need not necessarily suspect the metaphysical vastness of the change. On the other hand, if even a very slight cause, such as the inhaling of a little nitrous oxide or chloroform, chances to alter some essential process in the organisation upon which our specific sort of experience depends, then at once our whole immediate experience undergoes a vast change, and it is as if our world came to an end, and a new world began. Yet the metaphysically real alteration of the universe in such a case may be almost inappreciable.

Thus, then, our experience changes with the current states of our own organisations, rather than reveals the reality beyond; and this reality beyond, as it is in itself, remains unknowable. So far, the well-known and popular argument for agnosticism as to every form of absolute truth.

III

HIGHER DEFINITION OF HUMAN IGNORANCE, VINDICATING A KNOWLEDGE OF REALITY

This first definition of the nature of our ignorance is a very familiar one in the present day. It is a definition that contains, but also, as I must add, conceals, a great deal of truth. I do not know how many times or in how many forms you may meet with it in current literature. You often seem to be meeting it everywhere. I regard it, however, as a statement of a truth in a form so confused as to be almost useless, without revision.

And first, let me ask, when one thus laments our

ignorance of the supposed Absolute Reality, what it is that he desires as his unattainable goal, when he thus laments. You cannot rationally say "I lack," without being properly called upon to define, in some intelligible terms, what you suppose yourself to be lacking. And I know not how the present question can be answered, unless thus: That which man now lacks, in so far as he is ignorant of the Absolute Reality, is logically definable as a possible, but to us unattainable, sort of experience; namely, precisely an experience of what reality is. And I lay stress upon this view, in order simply to point out that our ignorance of reality cannot mean an ignorance of some object that we can conceive as existing apart from any possible experience or knowledge of what it is. What you and I lack, when we lament our human ignorance, is simply a certain desirable and logically possible state of mind, or type of experience; to wit, a state of mind in which we should wisely be able to say that we had fulfilled in experience what we now have merely in idea, namely, the knowledge, the immediate and felt presence, of what we now call the Absolute Reality.

Let us remember, then, this first simple insight: That our ignorance of the Absolute Reality can mean only that there is some sort of possible experience, some state of mind, that you and I want, but that we do not now possess. And next let us proceed to ask why it is that the foregoing popular argument for our human ignorance has seemed to us so convincing,—as it usually does seem. Why is it that when men say: "You are confined to your sensations, and your

sensations never reveal to you the external physical realities as they are in themselves," this argument seems so crushing, this exposure of our human fallibility so impressive?

To this question I answer, that, as a fact, the argument just stated from the physiology of the senses convinces us of our human fallibility and ignorance so persuasively, only because, in the concrete application of this argument, we actually first assume that we have a real knowledge, not, to be sure, of ultimate truth, but of a truth known to us through a higher experience than that of our senses; namely, the experience of that very science of the physiology of the senses which is relied upon to prove our total ignorance. When compared with this assumed higher form of indirect experience, or scientific knowledge, the direct experience of the senses does indeed seem ignorant and fallible enough. For the foregoing argument depends upon the supposition that we do know very well what we mean by the physical states of our organisms, and by the physical events outside of us. And the thesis involved is, in this aspect, simply the doctrine that any given group of sensations, *e.g.* those of colour, of temperature, or of odour, are inadequate indications of the otherwise known or knowable physical properties of the bodies that affect us when we see or feel or smell in their presence. On this side, then, I insist, the doctrine that our sensory experience is dependent upon the physical states of our organism is a doctrine expressive, not of our ignorance of any Absolute Reality (or *Ding an sich*), but of our knowledge of a phenomenal

world. We happen to know, or at all events to believe that we know, concerning what our experience reveals and our science analyses, viz., concerning the so-called physical world, so much, that we can actually prove the inadequacy of our current sensations to reveal directly, or to present to us, physical truths that our science otherwise, and more indirectly, well makes out. The relatively indirect experience of science can and does correct the existent and unconquerable momentary ignorance of our senses. Indirect insight proves to be better, in some ways, than immediate feeling. To use Professor James's more familiar terminology, we declare that we *know about* the physical world more than we can ever grasp by direct *acquaintance with* our sensations. And so, now, it is because we are supposed to know these things about the so-called reality, that we are aware of the limitations of our passing experiences. Thus viewed, the present statement of our limitations appears to be merely a correction of our narrower experience by the organised experience of our race and of our science. It tells us that we are ignorant, in one region of our experience, of what a wider experience, indirectly acquired, reveals to us.

The physiology of the senses, then, rightly viewed, does not assert that *all* our human experience is vainly subjective, including the very type of experience upon which the sciences themselves are founded. What science says is simply that there is a sort of indirect and organised experience which reveals more of phenomenal truth than can ever be revealed to our direct sensory states as these pass by. But our popu-

lar doctrine of the Unknowable Reality uses this so-called "verdict of science" only by confounding it with a totally different assertion. The "verdict of science" is that organised experience indicates much phenomenal truth that the senses can never directly catch. The doctrine of the Unknowable Reality asserts that no human experience can attain any genuine truth, and then appeals to that aforesaid "verdict" to prove this result. But the sciences judge the ignorance of sense by comparing it with a knowledge conceived to be actually attained; namely, the knowledge of certain indirectly known physical phenomena as they really are, not to be sure as absolute realities, but as the objects of our organised physical experience. You surely cannot use the proposition that organised experience is wiser than passing experience, to prove that no experience can give us any true wisdom.

IV

IGNORANCE DEFINED AS UNORGANISED EXPERIENCE, AND AS IMPLYING AN EXPERIENCE ABSOLUTELY ORGANISED

Yet I said, a moment ago, that this popular conception of the nature of our human ignorance contains—or, rather, conceals—much truth. And this notion of the relative failure of every sort of merely immediate experience to reveal a truth at which it kindly hints, is a very instructive notion. Only, we plainly need to try a second time to define the nature of human ignorance, in terms of this very contrast

between a lower and a higher sort of experience. Let us begin anew our analysis of this same significant problem of the nature and limits of knowledge.

The fortune of our empirical science has been, that as we men have wrought together upon the data of our senses, we have gradually woven a vast web of what we call relatively connected, united, or organised knowledge. It is of this world, in its contrast with the world of our sensations, that I have just been speaking. Now, as we have just seen, this organised knowledge has a very curious relation to our more direct experience. In the first place, wherever this organised knowledge seems best developed, we find it undertaking to deal with a world of truth, of so-called reality, or at least of apparent truth and reality, which is very remote from the actual sensory data that any man of us has ever beheld. Our organised science, as many have pointed out ever since Plato's first naïve but permanently important observations upon this topic, deals very largely with conceived — with ideal — realities, that transcend actual human observation. Atoms, ether-waves, geological periods, processes of evolution, — these are to-day some of the most important constituents of our conceived phenomenal universe. Spatial relations, far more exactly describable than they are directly verifiable, mathematical formulæ that express again the exactly describable aspects of vast physical processes of change, — such are the topics with which our exacter science is most immediately concerned. In whose sensory experience are such objects and relationships at all directly pictured? The ideal world

of Plato, the product of a more elementary sort of infant science, was made up of simpler contents than these; but still, when thus viewed, our science does indeed seem as if absorbed in the contemplation of a world of pure,—yes, I repeat, of Platonic ideas. For such realities get directly presented to no man's senses.

But of course, on the other hand, we no sooner try to define the work of our science in these terms than we are afresh reminded that this realm of pure Platonic ideas would be a mere world of fantastic shadows if we had not good reason to say that these ideas, these laws, these principles, these ideal objects of science, remote as they seem from our momentary sensory experiences, still have a real and, in the end, a verifiable relation to actual experience. One uses the scientific conceptions because, as one says, one can verify their reality. And to verify must mean to confirm in sensory terms. Only, to be sure, such verification always has to be for us men an extremely indirect one. The conceived realities of constructive science,—atoms, molecules, ether-waves, geological periods, processes of change whose type is embodied in mathematical formulæ,—these are never directly presented to any moment of our verifying sensory experience. But nevertheless we say that science does verify these conceptions; for science computes that if they are true, then, under given conditions, particular sensory experiences, of a predictable character, will occur in somebody's individual experience. Such predictions trained observers can and do successfully undertake to verify. The verification is

itself, indeed, no direct acquaintance with the so-called realities that the aforesaid Platonic ideas define. But it appears to involve an indirect knowledge about such realities.

Yet our direct experience, as it actually comes, remains at best but a heap of fragments. And when one says that our science reduces our experience to order, one is still talking in relatively ideal terms. For our science does not in the least succeed in effectively reducing this chaos of our finite sensory life to any directly presented orderly wholeness. For think, I beg you, of what our concrete human experience is, as it actually comes, even at its best. Here we are all only too much alike. The sensory experience of a scientific man is, on the whole, nearly as full of immediately experienced disorder and fragmentariness as is that of his fellow the layman. For the scientific student too, the dust of the moment flies, and this dust often fills his eyes, and blinds him with its whirl of chance almost as much as it torments his neighbour who knows no Platonic ideas. I insist: Science throughout makes use of the contrast between this flying experience which we have, and which we call an experience of unreality, and the ideal experience, the higher sort of organised experience which we have not, and which we call an experience of reality. Upon this contrast the whole confession of our human ignorance depends. Let us still dwell a little on this contrast. Remember how full of mere chance the experience of nearly every moment seems to be; and that, too, even in a laboratory; much more, in a day's walk or in a lecture-room. The

wind that sighs; the cart or the carriage that rumbles by; yonder dress or paper that rustles; the chair or boot that squeaks; the twinge that one suddenly feels; the confusions of our associative mental process, "fancy unto fancy linking"; the accidents that filled to-day's newspapers,—of such stuff, I beg you to notice, our immediate experience is naturally made up. The isolating devices of the laboratory, the nightly silence of the lonely observatory, the narrowness of the microscopic field, and, best of all, the control of a fixed and well-trained attention, often greatly diminish, but simply cannot annul, the disorder of this outer and inner chaos. But, on the other hand, all such efforts to secure order rest on the presupposition that this disorder means fragmentariness—random selection from a world of data that our science aims to view indirectly as a world of orderly experience. But even such relative reduction of the chaos as we get never lasts long and continuously in the life of any one person. Your moments of unfragmentary and more scientific experience fill of themselves only fragments of your life. A wandering attention, the interruption of intruding sensations,—such fragments may at any time be ready, by their intrusion, to destroy the orderliness of even the best-equipped scientific experience. The student of science, like other men, knows in fragments, and prophesies in fragments. But—and here we come again in sight of our goal—the world of truth that he wants to know is a world where that which is in part is to be taken away. He calls that the world of an organised experience. But he sees that world as through a

glass,—darkly. He has to ignore his and our ignorance whenever he speaks of such a world as if it were the actual object of any human experience whatever. As a fact, direct human experience, apart from the elaborately devised indirect contrivances of conceptual thought, knows nothing of it.

But let us sum up the situation now before us. It is the very situation that our first statement of human ignorance as dependent on our organisation tried to define. We now define afresh. All our actual sensory experience comes in passing moments, and is fragmentary. Our science, wherever it has taken any form, contrasts with this immediate fragmentariness of our experience the assertion of a world of phenomenal truth, which is first of all characterised by the fact that for us it is a conceptual world, and not a world directly experienced by any one of us. Yet this ideal world is not an arbitrary world. It is linked to our actual experience by the fact that its conceptions are accounts, as exact as may be, of systems of possible experience, whose contents would be presented, in a certain form and order, to beings whom we conceive as including our fragmentary moments in some sort of definite unity of experience. That these scientific accounts of this world of organised experience are true, at least in a measure, we are said to verify, in so far as, first, we predict that, if they are true, certain other fragmentary phenomena will get presented to us under certain definable conditions, and in so far as, secondly, we successfully proceed to fulfil such predictions. Thus all of our knowledge of natural truth depends upon contrasting

our actually fragmentary and stubbornly chaotic individual and momentary experience with a conceived world of organised experience, inclusive of all our fragments, but reduced in its wholeness to some sort of all-embracing unity. The contents and objects of this unified experience, we discover first by means of hypotheses as to what these contents and objects are, and then by means of verifications which depend upon a successful retranslation of our hypotheses as to organised experience into terms which our fragmentary experience can, under certain conditions, once more fulfil.

If, however, this is the work of all our science, then the conception of our human ignorance easily gets a provisional restatement. You are ignorant, in so far as you desire a knowledge that you cannot now get. Now, the knowledge you desire is, from our present point of view, no longer any knowledge of a reality foreign to all possible experience; but it is an adequate knowledge of the contents and the objects of a certain conceived or ideal sort of experience, called by you organised experience. And an organised experience would be one that found a system of ideas fulfilled in and by its facts. This sort of knowledge, you, as human being, can only define indirectly, tentatively, slowly, fallibly. And you get at it thus imperfectly,—why? Because your immediate experience, as it comes, is always fleeting, fragmentary. This is the sort of direct knower that you are,—a being who can of himself verify only fragments. But you can conceive infinitely more than you can directly verify. In thought

you therefore construct conceptions which start, indeed, in your fragmentary experience, but which transcend it infinitely, and which so do inevitably run into danger of becoming mere shadows—pure Platonic ideas. But you don't mean your conceptions to remain thus shadowy. By the devices of hypothesis, prediction, and verification, you seek to link anew the concept and the presentation, the ideal order and the stubborn chaos, the conceived truth and the immediate datum, the contents of the organised experience and the fragments of your momentary flight of sensations. In so far as you succeed in this effort, you say that you have science. In so far as you are always, in presented experience, limited to your chaos, you admit that your sensations are of subjective moment and often delude you. But in so far as your conceptions of the contents of the ideal organised experience get verified, you say that you acquire the aforesaid indirect knowledge of the contents of the ideal and organised experience. We men know all things through contrasts. It is the contrast of your supposed indirect knowledge of the contents of the ideal organised experience with your direct and actual, but fragmentary, passing experience, that enables you to confess your ignorance. Were you merely ignorant, you could not know the fact. Because you are indirectly assured of the truth of an insight that you cannot directly share, you accuse your direct experience of illusory fragmentariness. But in so doing you contrast the contents of your individual experience, not with any mere reality apart from any possible experience, but

with the conceived object of an ideal organised experience — an object conceived to be present to that experience as directly as your sensory experiences are present to you.

V

REALITY AND EXPERIENCE AS CORRELATIVE
CONCEPTIONS

In the light of such considerations, our notion of the infinitely remote goal of human knowledge gets a transformation of a sort very familiar to all students of philosophical Idealism. And this transformation relates to two aspects of our conception of knowledge, viz.: first, to our notion of what reality is, and secondly to our notion of what we mean by that Organised Experience. In the first place, the reality that we seek to know has always to be defined as that which either is or would be present to a sort of experience which we ideally define as an organised — that is, a united and transparently reasonable — experience. We have, in point of fact, no conception of reality capable of definition except this one. In case of an ordinary illusion of the senses we often say: This object seems thus or so; but in reality it is *thus*. Now, here the seeming is opposed to the reality only in so far as the chance experience of one point of view gets contrasted with what would be, or might be, experienced from some larger, more rationally permanent, or more inclusive and uniting point of view. Just so, the temperature of the room seems

to a fevered patient to vary thus or thus; but the real temperature remains all the while nearly constant. Here the seeming is the content of the patient's momentary experience. The real temperature is a fact that either is, or conceivably might be, present to a larger, a more organised and scientific and united experience, such as his physician may come nearer than himself to possessing. The sun seems to rise and set; but in reality the earth turns on its axis. Here the apparent movement of the sun is somewhat indirectly presented to a narrow sort of human experience. A wider experience, say an experience defined from an extra-terrestrial point of view, would have presented to it the earth's rotation as immediately as we now can get the sunrise presented to us. To conceive any human belief as false—say, the belief of a lunatic, a fanatic, a philosopher, or a theologian—is to conceive this opinion as either possibly or actually corrected from some higher point of view, to which a larger whole of experience is considered as present.

Passing to the limit in this direction, we can accordingly say that by the absolute reality we can only mean either that which is present to an absolutely organised experience inclusive of all possible experience, or that which would be presented as the content of such an experience if there were one. If there concretely is such an absolute experience, then there concretely is such a reality present to it. If the absolute experience, however, remains to the end barely possible, then the concept of reality must be tainted by the same bare possibility. But the two

concepts are strictly correlated. To conceive, for instance, absolute reality as containing no God, means simply that an absolutely all-embracing experience, if there were one, would find nothing Divine in the world. To assert that all human experience is illusory, is to say that an absolutely inclusive experience, if there were one, would have present, as part of its content, something involving the utter failure of our experience to attain that absolute content as such. To conceive that absolute reality consists of material atoms and ether, is to say that a complete experience of the universe would find presented to it nothing but experiences analogous to those that we have when we talk of matter in motion. In short, one must be serious with this concept of experience. Reality, as opposed to illusion, means simply an actual or possible content of experience, not in so far as this experience is supposed to be transient and fleeting, but in so far as it is conceived to be somehow inclusive and organised, the fulfilment of a system of ideas, the answer to a scheme of rational questions.

It remains, however, to analyse the other member of our related pair of terms, viz.: the conception of this organised sort of experience itself. In what sense can there be any meaning or truth about this conception?

VI

ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPTION ABSOLUTE EXPERIENCE: MEANING OF ITS REALITY

The conception of organised experience, in the limited and relative form in which the special sciences possess it, is unquestionably through and through a conception that for us men, as we are, has a social origin. No man, if isolated, could develope the sort of thoughtfulness that would lead him to appeal from experience as it comes to him to experience as it ideally ought to come, or would come, to him in case he could widely organise a whole world of experience in clear relation to a single system of conceptions. Man begins his intelligent life by imitatively appealing to his fellow's experience. The life-blood of science is distrust of individual belief as such. A common definition of a relatively organised experience is, the consensus of the competent observers. Deeper than our belief in any physical truth is our common-sense assurance that the experience of our fellows is as genuine as our own, is in actual relation to our own, has present to it objects identical with those that we ourselves experience, and consequently supplements our own. Apart from our social consciousness, I myself should hold that we men, growing up as we do, can come to have no clear conception of truth, nor any definite power clearly to think at all. Every man verifies for himself. But what he verifies,—the truth that he believes himself to be making out when he verifies,

—this he conceives as a truth either actually or possibly verifiable by his fellow or by some still more organised sort of experience. And it becomes for him a concrete truth, and not a merely conceived possibility, precisely so far as he believes that his fellow or some other concrete mind does verify it.

My fellow's experience, however, thus supplements my own in two senses; namely, as actual and as possible experience. First, in so far as I am a social being, I take my fellow's experience to be as live and real an experience as is mine. In appealing to the consensus of other men's experiences, I am so far appealing to what I regard as a real experience other than my own momentary experience, and not as a merely possible experience. But in this sense, to be sure, human experience is not precisely an organised whole. Other men experience in passing moments, just as I do. Their consensus, in so far as it is reached, is no one whole of organised experience at all. But, on the other hand, the fact of the consensus of the various experiences of men, so far as such consensus appears to have been reached, suggests to our conception an ideal—the ideal of an experience which should be not only manifold but united, not only possessed of chance agreements but reduced to an all-embracing connectedness. As a fact, this ideal is the one constantly used by anyone who talks of the “verdict of science.” This significant, whole, and connected experience remains, to us mortals, a conceived ideal,—always sought, never present. The ultimate question is: Is this conception a mere ideal?—or does it stand for a genuine

sort of concrete experience? The social origin of the conception, as we mortals have come to get it, suggests in an ambiguous way both alternatives. The experience to which, as a social being, I first appeal when I learn to talk of truth, is the live actual experience of other men, which I, as an imitative being, primarily long to share, and which I therefore naturally regard as in many respects the norm for my experience. In society, in so far as I am plastic, my primary feeling is that I ought, on the whole, to experience what the other men experience. But in the course of more thoughtful mental growth, we have come to appeal from what the various men do experience to what they all ought to experience, or would experience if their experiences were in unity; that is, if all their moments were linked expressions of one universal meaning which was present to one Universal Subject, of whose insight their own experiences were but fragments. Such an ideally united experience, if it could but absolutely define its own contents, would know reality. And by reality we mean merely the contents that would be present to such an ideal unity of experience. But now, on this side, the conception of the ideally organised experience does indeed at first look like a mere ideal of a barely possible unity. The problem still is: Is this unity more than a bare possibility? Has it any such concrete genuineness as the life of our fellows is believed to possess?

Observe, however, that our question: Is there any such real unity of organised experience? is precisely equivalent to the question: Is there, not as a mere

possibility, but as a genuine truth, any reality? The question: Is there an absolutely organised experience? is equivalent to the question: Is there an absolute reality? You cannot first say: There is a reality now unknown to us mortals, and then go on to ask whether there is an experience to which such reality is presented. The terms "reality" and "organised experience" are correlative terms. The one can only be defined as the object, the content, of the other. Drop either, and the other vanishes. Make one a bare ideal, and the other becomes equally such. If the organised experience is a bare and ideal possibility, then the reality is a mere seeming. If what I ought to experience, and should experience were I not ignorant, remains only a possibility, then there is no absolute reality, but only possibility, in the universe, apart from your passing feelings and mine. Our actual issue, then, is: Does a real world ultimately exist at all? If it does, then it exists as the object of some sort of concretely actual organised experience, of the general type which our science indirectly and ideally defines, only of this type carried to its absolute limit of completeness.

The answer to the ultimate question now before us — the question: Is there an absolutely organised experience? — is suggested by two very significant considerations. Of these two considerations, the first runs as follows:

The alternative to saying that there is such a real unity of experience is the assertion that such a unity is a bare and ideal possibility. But, now, there can be no such thing as a merely possible *truth*, definable

apart from some actual experience. To say: So and so is possible, is to say: There is, somewhere in experience, an actuality some aspect of which can be defined in terms of this possibility. A possibility is a truth expressed in terms of a proposition beginning with *if*, or a hypothetical proposition,—an *is* expressed in terms of an *if*. But every hypothetical proposition involves a categorical proposition. Every *if* implies an *is*. For you cannot define a truth as concretely true unless you define it as really present to some experience. Thus, for instance, I can easily define my actual experience by expressing some aspect of it in the form of a supposition, even if the supposition be one contrary to fact, but I cannot believe in the truth of such a supposition without believing in some concrete and experienced fact. The suitor asks for the daughter. The father replies: "I will give thee my daughter *if* thou canst touch heaven." Here the father expresses his actually experienced intention in the form of a hypothetical proposition each member of which he believes to be false. The suitor cannot touch heaven, and is not to get the gift of the daughter. Yet the hypothetical proposition is to be true. Why? Because it expresses in terms of an *if* what the father experiences in terms of an *is*, namely, the obdurate inner will of the forbidding parent himself. Just so with any *if* proposition. Its members, antecedent and consequent, may be false. But it is true only in case there corresponds to its fashion of assertion some real experience.

And now, to apply this thought to our central problem: You and I, whenever we talk of reality as

opposed to mere seeming, assert of necessity, as has just been shown, that *if* there were an organised unity of experience, this organised experience *would have* present to it as part of its content the fact whose reality we assert. This proposition cannot, as a merely hypothetical proposition, have any real truth unless to its asserted possibility there corresponds some actual experience, present somewhere in the world, not of barely possible, but of concretely actual experience. And this is the first of our two considerations. In fine, if there is an actual experience to which an absolute reality corresponds, then you can indeed translate this actuality into the terms of bare possibility. But unless there is such an actual experience, the bare possibility expresses no truth.

The second consideration appears when we ask our finite experience whereabouts, in its limited circle, is in any wise even suggested the actually experienced fact of which that hypothetical proposition relating to the ideal or absolute experience is the expression. What in finite experience suggests the truth that if there were an absolute experience it would find a certain unity of facts?

VII

PROOF OF THE REALITY OF AN ABSOLUTE EXPERIENCE

To the foregoing question, my answer is this: Any finite experience either regards itself as suggesting some sort of truth, or does not so regard itself. If

it does not regard itself as suggesting truth, it concerns us not here. Enough, one who thinks, who aims at truth, who means to know anything, is regarding his experience as suggesting truth. Now, to regard our experience as suggesting truth is, as we have seen, to mean that our experience indicates what a higher or inclusive, *i.e.* a more organised, experience would find presented thus or thus to itself. It is this meaning, this intent, this aim, this will to find in the moment the indication of what a higher experience directly grasps,—it is this that embodies for us the fact of which our hypothetical proposition aforesaid is the expression. But you may here say: "This aim, this will, is all. As a fact, you and I aim at the absolute experience; that is what we mean by wanting to know absolute truth; but the absolute experience," so you may insist, "is just a mere ideal. There need be no such experience as a concrete actuality. The aim, the intent, is the known fact. The rest is silence,—perhaps error. Perhaps there is no absolute truth, no ideally united and unfragmentary experience."

But hereupon one turns upon you with the inevitable dialectic of our problem itself. Grant hypothetically, if you choose, for a moment, that there is no universal experience as a concrete fact, but only the hope of it, the definition of it, the will to win it, the groaning and travail of the whole of finite experience in the search for it, in the error of believing that it is. Well, what will that mean? This ultimate limitation, this finally imprisoned finitude, this absolute fragmentariness and error, of the actual experi-

ence that aims at the absolute experience when there is no absolute experience at which to aim,—this absolute finiteness and erroneousness of the real experience, I say, will itself be a fact, a truth, a reality, and, as such, just the absolute truth. But this supposed ultimate truth will exist for whose experience? For the finite experience? No, for although our finite experience knows itself to be limited, still, just in so far as it is finite, it cannot know that there is no unity beyond its fragmentariness. For if any experience actually knew (that is, actually experienced) itself to be the whole of experience, it would have to experience how and why it were so. And if it knew this, it would be *ipso facto* an absolute, *i.e.* a completely self-possessed, experience, for which there was no truth that was not, as such, a datum,—no ideal of a beyond that was not, as such, judged by the facts to be meaningless,—no thought to which a presentation did not correspond, no presentation whose reality was not luminous to its comprehending thought. Only such an absolute experience could say with assurance: "Beyond my world there is no further experience actual." But if, by hypothesis, there is to be no such an experience, but only a limited collection of finite experiences, the question returns: The reality of this final limitation, the existence of no experience beyond the broken mass of finite fragments,—this is to be a truth,—but for whose experience is it to be a truth? Plainly, in the supposed case, it will be a truth nowhere presented—a truth for nobody. But, as we saw before, to assert any absolute reality as real is simply to assert an experience—and,

in fact, just in so far as the reality is absolute, an absolute experience—for which this reality exists. To assert a truth as more than possible is to assert the concrete reality of an experience that knows this truth. Hence,—and here, indeed, is the conclusion of the whole matter,—the very effort hypothetically to assert that the whole world of experience is a world of fragmentary and finite experience is an effort involving a contradiction. Experience must constitute, in its entirety, one self-determined and consequently absolute and organised whole.

Otherwise put: All concrete or genuine, and not barely possible truth is, as such, a truth somewhere experienced. This is the inevitable result of the view with which we started when we said that without experience there is no knowledge. For truth *is*, so far as it is *known*. Now, this proposition applies as well to the totality of the world of finite experience as it does to the parts of that world. There must, then, be an experience to which is present the constitution (*i.e.* the actual limitation and narrowness) of all finite experience, just as surely as there is such a constitution. That there is nothing at all beyond this limited constitution must, as a fact, be present to this final experience. But this fact that the world of finite experience has no experience beyond it could not be present, as a fact, to any but an absolute experience which knew all that is or that genuinely can be known; and the proposition that a totality of finite experience could exist without there being any absolute experience, thus proves to be simply self-contradictory.

VIII

SUMMARY OF THE WHOLE ARGUMENT FOR THE REALITY
OF THE OMNISCIENT

Let us sum up, in a few words, our whole argument. There is, for us as we are, experience. Our thought undertakes the interpretation of this experience. Every intelligent interpretation of an experienced fragment involves, however, the appeal from this experienced fragment to some more organised whole of experience, in whose unity this fragment is conceived as finding its organic place. To talk of any reality which this fragmentary experience indicates, is to conceive this reality as the content of the more organised experience. To assert that there is any absolutely real fact indicated by our experience, is to regard this reality as presented to an absolutely organised experience, in which every fragment finds its place.

So far, indeed, in speaking of reality and an absolute experience, one talks of mere conceptual objects, — one deals, as the mathematical sciences do, with what appear to be only shadowy Platonic ideas. The question arises: Do these Platonic ideas of the absolute reality, and of the absolutely organised experience, stand for anything but merely ideal or possible entities? The right answer to this question comes, if one first assumes, for argument's sake, that such answer is negative, and that there is no organised, but only a fragmentary experience. For then one has to define the alternative that is to be opposed to

the supposedly erroneous conception of an absolute experience. That alternative, as pointed out, is a world of fragmentary experiences, whose limited nature is not determined by any all-pervading idea. Such a world of finite experiences is to be merely what it happens to be,—is to contain only what chances here or there to be felt. But hereupon arises the question: What reality has this fact of the limitation and fragmentariness of the actual world of experiences? If every reality has to exist just in so far as there is experience of its existence, then the determination of the world of experience to be this world and no other, the fact that reality contains no other facts than these, is, as the supposed final reality, itself the object of one experience, for which the fragmentariness of the finite world appears as a presented and absolute fact, beyond which no reality is to be viewed as even genuinely possible. For this final experience, the conception of any possible experience beyond is known as an ungrounded conception, as an actual impossibility. But so, this final experience is by hypothesis forthwith defined as One, as all-inclusive, as determined by nothing beyond itself, as assured of the complete fulfilment of its own ideas concerning what is,—in brief, it becomes an absolute experience. The very effort to deny an absolute experience involves, then, the actual assertion of such an absolute experience.

Our result, then, is: There is an Absolute Experience, for which the conception of an absolute reality, *i.e.* the conception of a system of ideal truth, is fulfilled by the very contents that get presented to this Ex-

perience. This Absolute Experience is related to our experience as an organic whole to its own fragments. It is an experience which finds fulfilled all that the completest thought can rationally conceive as genuinely possible. Herein lies its definition as an Absolute. For the Absolute Experience, as for ours, there are data, contents, facts. But these data, these contents, express, for the Absolute Experience, its own meaning, its thought, its ideas. Contents beyond these that it possesses, the Absolute Experience knows to be, in genuine truth, impossible. Hence its contents are indeed particular,—a selection from the world of bare or merely conceptual possibilities,—but they form a self-determined whole, than which nothing completer, more organic, more fulfilled, more transparent, or more complete in meaning, is concretely or genuinely possible. On the other hand, these contents are not foreign to those of our finite experience, but are inclusive of them in the unity of one life.

IX

THIS CONCEPTION OF GOD IN ITS RELATIONS TO HISTORIC PHILOSOPHY AND FAITH

The conception now reached I regard as the philosophical conception of God. Some of you may observe that in the foregoing account I have often, in defining the Absolute, made use of the terms lately employed by Mr. Bradley,¹ rather than of the

¹ F. H. Bradley: *Appearance and Reality*. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1893.

terms used in either of my two published discussions of the topic, *i.e.* either in the book that you have been studying or in my *Spirit of Modern Philosophy*. Such variation of the terms employed involves indeed an enrichment, but certainly no essential change in the conception. The argument here used is essentially the same as the one before employed. You can certainly, and, as I still hold, quite properly, define the Absolute as Thought. But then you mean, as in my book I explicitly showed, a thought that is no longer, like ours in the exact sciences, concerned with the shadowy Platonic ideas, viewed as conceptional possibilities, but a thought that sees its own fulfilment in the world of its self-possessed life,—in other words, a thought whose Ideas are not mere shadows, but have an aspect in which they are felt as well as meant, appreciated as well as described,—yes, I should unhesitatingly say, loved as well as conceived, willed as well as viewed. Such an Absolute Thought you can also call, in its wholeness, a Self; for it beholds the fulfilment of its own thinking, and views the determined character of its living experience as identical with what its universal conceptions mean. All these names: "Absolute Self," "Absolute Thought," "Absolute Experience," are not, indeed, mere indifferent names for the inexpressible truth; but, when carefully defined through the very process of their construction, they are equally valuable expressions of different aspects of the same truth. God is known as Thought fulfilled; as Experience absolutely organised, so as to have one ideal unity of meaning; as Truth transparent to itself; as Life in absolute accordance with idea;

as Selfhood eternally obtained. And all this the Absolute is in concrete unity, not in mere variety.

Yet our purpose here is not religious but speculative. It is not mine to-night to declare the glory of the Divine Being, but simply to scrutinise the definition of the Absolute. The heart of my whole argument, here as in my book, has been the insistence that all these seemingly so transcendent and imprudent speculations about the Absolute are, as a fact, the mere effort to express, as coherently as may be, the commonplace implications of our very human ignorance itself. People think it very modest to say: We cannot know what the Absolute Reality is. They forget that to make this assertion implies —unless one is using idle words without sense—that one knows what the term “Absolute Reality” means. People think it easy to say: We can be sure of only what our own finite experience presents. They forget that if a world of finite experience exists at all, this world must have a consistently definable constitution, in order that it may exist. Its constitution, however, turns out to be such that an Absolute Experience —namely, an experience acquainted with limitation only in so far as this limitation is determined by the organised and transparent constitution of this experience—is needed as that for which the fragmentary constitution of the finite world of experience exists. The very watchword, then, of our whole doctrine is this: All knowledge is of something experienced. For this means that nothing actually exists save what is somewhere experienced. If this be true, then the total limitation, the deter-

mination, the fragmentariness, the ignorance, the error,—yes (as forms or cases of ignorance and error), the evil, the pain, the horror, the longing, the travail, the faith, the devotion, the endless flight from its own worthlessness,—that constitutes the very essence of the world of finite experience, is, as a positive reality, somewhere so experienced in its wholeness that this entire constitution of the finite appears as a world beyond which, in its whole constitution, nothing exists or can exist. But, for such an experience, this constitution of the finite is a fact determined from an absolute point of view, and every finite incompleteness and struggle appears as a part of a whole in whose wholeness the fragments find their true place, the ideas their realisation, the seeking its fulfilment, and our whole life its truth, and so its eternal rest,—that peace which transcends the storms of its agony and its restlessness. For this agony and restlessness are the very embodiment of an incomplete experience, of a finite ignorance.

Do you ask, then: Where in our human world does God get revealed?—what manifests his glory? I answer: Our ignorance, our fallibility, our imperfection, and so, as forms of this ignorance and imperfection, our experience of longing, of strife, of pain, of error,—yes, of whatever, as finite, declares that its truth lies in its limitation, and so lies beyond itself. These things, wherein we taste the bitterness of our finitude, are what they are because they mean more than they contain, imply what is beyond them, refuse to exist by themselves, and, at the very moment of confessing their own fragmentary falsity,

assure us of the reality of that fulfilment which is the life of God.

The conception of God thus reached offers itself to you, not as destroying, but as fulfilling, the large collection of slowly evolving notions that have appeared in the course of history in connection with the name of God.

The foregoing definition of God as an Absolute Experience transparently fulfilling a system of organised ideas, is, as you all doubtless are aware, in essence identical with the conception first reached, but very faintly and briefly developed, by Aristotle. Another definition of God, as the Absolute (or Perfect) Reality, long struggled in the history of speculation with this idea of God as Fulfilled Thought, or as Self-possessed Experience. The interrelation of these two central definitions has long occupied philosophical thinking. Their rational identification is the work of recent speculation. The all-powerful and righteous World-Creator of the Old and New Testaments was first conceived, not speculatively, but ethically; and it is to the rich experience of Christian mysticism that the historical honour belongs, of having bridged the gulf that seemed to separate, and that to many minds still separates, the God of practical faith from the God of philosophical definition. Mysticism is not philosophy; but, as a stage of human experience, it is the link that binds the contemplative to the practical in the history of religion, since the saints have taken refuge in it, and the philosophers have endeavoured to emerge from its mysteries to the light of clearer insight. To

St. Thomas Aquinas belongs the credit of the first explicit and fully developed synthesis of the Aristotelian and the Christian conception of God. The Thomistic proofs of God's existence—repeated, diluted, and thus often rendered very trivial, by popular apologetic writers—have now, at best, lost much of their speculative interest. But the conception of the Divine that St. Thomas reached remains in certain important respects central, and in essence identical, I think, with the definition that I have here tried to repeat; and that, too, despite the paradoxes and the errors involved in the traditional concept of the creation of the world.

For the rest, let me in closing be perfectly frank with you. I myself am one of those students whom a more modern and radical scepticism has, indeed, put in general very much out of sympathy with many of what seem to me the unessential accidents of religious tradition as represented in the historical faith; and for such students this scepticism has transformed, in many ways, our methods of defining our relation to truth. But this scepticism has not thrown even the most radical of us, if we are enlightened, out of a close, a rational, a spiritually intelligent relation to those deep ideas that, despite all these accidents, have moulded the heart of the history of religion. In brief, then, the foregoing conception of God undertakes to be distinctly theistic, and not pantheistic. It is not the conception of any Unconscious Reality, into which finite beings are absorbed; nor of a Universal Substance, in whose law our ethical independence is lost; nor of an Ineffable Mystery, which

we can only silently adore. On the contrary, every ethical predicate that the highest religious faith of the past has attributed to God is capable of exact interpretation in terms of our present view. For my own part, then, while I wish to be no slave of any tradition, I am certainly disposed to insist that what the faith of our fathers has genuinely meant by God, is, despite all the blindness and all the unessential accidents of religious tradition, identical with the inevitable outcome of a reflective philosophy.

II

WORTH AND GOODNESS AS MARKS OF THE ABSOLUTE

A CRITICISM OF PROFESSOR ROYCE'S ARGUMENT

BY

SIDNEY EDWARD MEZES, PH.D.

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS

WORTH AND GOODNESS AS MARKS OF THE ABSOLUTE

CRITICISM BY PROFESSOR MEZES

NOT unworthy of note, in the exercises of this evening, is the fact that nearly all the participants have stood to each other in the relation of teacher and pupil. Only a few years ago, the meeting of such persons in a public discussion would have been nearly impossible; or, at all events, the key-note of the meeting would most probably have been an entirely genuine and yet somewhat monotonous agreement. But a frank independence of thought is the informing spirit of modern teaching in this country. Teachers care comparatively little to have students agree with them, but insist very strongly that they shall think out their own thoughts for themselves. Students are not merely informed of old solutions. They are rather trained and encouraged to think out new solutions, on the chance that the new may supplement some of the imperfections of the old. Some modern teachers even carry this so far as positively to distrust such students as agree with them. Now, Professor Royce is a typical modern teacher; and, indeed, in what I have just said, I am doing little more than repeat what I have often heard him say to his classes. For a long time, as I will now confess, it was desperately difficult to

disagree with him and yet seem to oneself at all reasonable. For he has a way of mounting his facts in a setting of stringent logic, and of driving home his conclusions with the persuasive power of a finished rhetoric. But by dint of long and strenuous effort to look at things for myself, I have succeeded in meeting his requirement that I should disagree with him, and I have some hope of persuading you, and possibly Professor Royce too, that my disagreements are solidly founded. But of that you shall now judge.

I

NO WORTH AND DIGNITY PROVED OF THE ABSOLUTE

In considering Professor Royce's position, as outlined in the address we have just heard, I shall limit myself to two criticisms. My first, in a word, is this: I cannot agree with the Professor that the Being whose existence, as I freely admit, he has fully established, has been proved by him to be a being possessing worth and dignity. When he says, that, under pain of self-contradiction, we must assert that an Ultimate Being exists, that he is fully conscious, that his experience is organised, or, what amounts to the same thing, that within his experience there are to be found no unanswered questions and no unsatisfied desires, I find the reasoning compulsory, inevitable. A confusion, an unanswered problem, a thwarted desire, in order to be such, holds in solution its own clarification, answer, or satisfaction, as the case may be. All this Professor Royce has ex-

pounded at some length, far more convincingly than I can, and I need not repeat it. But what I miss is, his promised proof that there is a real being worthy of the exalted name of God.

The difficulty I experience with his view may be stated in the form of a question: How does he find out what facts, what problems, confront the Absolute?

To this question, the answer is not far to seek. Professor Royce accepts such facts and problems at the hands of current belief and science. That we all do the same, and must do so, is of course true, as a few words would make clear. But the important question, to be considered presently, is: Upon how many facts, thus attained, does philosophy, or rather Professor Royce's philosophy, set its stamp of approval? At the present moment, my words, possibly a few thoughts and problems suggested by them, and what we feel and see, are the only facts directly present to us; and, as you will readily admit, the other moments of our lives are just about as meagrely supplied with directly verified data. That vast sum-totals of facts have existed in past ages, and that others are existing now in the distant stretches of space, we all confidently believe; but, observe, only on *indirect* evidence. We get at absent facts by means of memory, sympathetic thinking of the thoughts of others, and reasoning founded on these two, combined with personal observation. The existence of such a fact as the Crocker Building, we now get at by memory; we get to know the experiences and beliefs of our friends, acquaintances, and scientific co-workers who

verify our results, largely by sympathetic thought; while the scientific historian reconstructs the Napoleonic period by very elaborate processes of reasoning and observation. And so we project idea after idea out of the present into the past, the distant, and the future, holding each to be a fact there, gradually peopling our previously empty world, and extending its bounds in thought till we come to believe in the complicated immensity of the universe of reality.

But observe, once more, that all except the meagre present is reached indirectly, *i.e.* by means of inferences. These inferences no doubt are *justifiable*, as we all most certainly believe; but my present point is, that they must be *justified*; that nothing can be held to be a part of the inclusive experience of the Absolute until its existence is fully proven. Now, it is not the business of philosophy to prove the existence of individual facts; but, on the other hand, it *is* the business of philosophy to establish the truth of such principles as are indispensable for proving the existence of any and every individual fact not directly observed. Further, it is a commonplace of philosophy, that the principle of Causality is the supreme principle of the kind just described. Accordingly, wherever Professor Royce holds this principle to have validity, just there, and nowhere else, can he seek for the items of fact to set in the experience of the Absolute. Now, as readers of his second book, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, will remember, he holds that the principle of Causality is true in the outer world of our senses and of natural science, but is not true in the world of inner experiences, nor

in inferences from the former to the latter and *vice versa*; and, so far as I know, he nowhere offers any other principle to justify such inferences, though he has a theory of their origin.

Let us now remind ourselves, once again, that our fellow-beings' inner experiences are among the facts never directly presented to us. When a man speaks to us, we hear his words, but merely infer his thoughts; when another cries out or writhes in pain, we hear the cry or see the writhing, but the pain, once more, is only inferred. And in like manner, aspiration, hope, doubt, despair,—the whole of the inner life of others, is reached indirectly only. Add to this, that his inner life completely exhausts and fathoms what we mean by our fellow-being, and we see that in failing to offer any principle that justifies inferences from observed facts to inner experiences Professor Royce fails to give any philosophic reason for belief in the existence of our fellow-beings. Let us suppose, now, that the outer or physical universe, in which according to Professor Royce the principle of Causality does obtain,—and whose facts are therefore attainable,—let us suppose, for argument's sake, that its reality is not destroyed by the philosophic annihilation of other beings. What sum-total of firmly established facts is left over to us? At best, the whole outer world and so much inner experience as the present moment affords. Just *now* you can at the utmost assert—and all assertion is in some now—that Reality is composed of so much outer fact as science establishes, *plus* your present feelings, thoughts, puzzles, and aspirations.

And now let us consider the experience-contents of that sort of Absolute whose existence Professor Royce has *proved*. These consist, once more, of the outer world of science, of your present feelings, thoughts, puzzles, and aspirations, and, in addition, of the answers to your present puzzles and the satisfaction of your present aspirations. Now, a being with such an experience, as I should maintain, is not deeply spiritual. His experience consists of a vast physical universe with its myriads of mechanically whirling atoms, and, tucked away in one corner, the least bit of spiritual life, which, to be sure, has its questions answered and its desires gratified.

My only contention, observe, is that unless the gaps I have pointed out in Professor Royce's argument are filled, we are left with the slightly spiritual Ultimate Being I have just described. I maintain that Professor Royce's two books and his address of to-night do not justify us in introducing any more spirituality into the experience of the Inclusive Self. I do not maintain, of course, that he has in reserve no considerations capable of establishing a larger measure of spirituality; still less do I contend that no such considerations exist. On the contrary, I very firmly believe that there are facts at our disposal which will give philosophical justification for the assertion of the completest conceivable spirituality of the Ultimate Being, conceived of in the terms so clearly outlined in this evening's address.

II

ABSOLUTENESS NOT SHOWN COMPATIBLE WITH
GOODNESS

Passing now to my second point, let us recall what Professor Royce said about the attributes of the Supreme Being; or, rather, let us recollect two of those attributes. I refer to Absoluteness and Goodness. In calling God the Absolute, we mean that he is quite *complete*—is a rounded whole; has, so to speak, no ragged edges, no internal gaps. Sleep is a chasm in each day of *our* lives; while, from time to time, we have gaps of unconsciousness. Again, if we try to tear our lives from their setting in the world, we find that the line that bounds them is jagged and broken throughout. At times one feels that his life is exhaustively summed up in relations to other lives, and that what is left over when those bonds are snapped is too poor to be worth saving. Not so the Absolute. His life is completely finished, rounded and whole, and has no relations to any beyond. And now I will ask you to look at this attribute of Absoluteness or Completeness under the conception of time. For, temporally speaking, Completeness is eternal existence.

According to Professor Royce, as readers of his books will readily remember, the whole universe is present to the Supreme Being in one moment, and that moment is eternal. There is for the Supreme Being nothing whatever in the least analogous to what we call the past and the future. What occurred yesterday in

your experience or in mine, what will occur to-morrow for us, or for any other human being whatever, is just as really, vitally, vividly, distinctly present to God as the gentlemen now sitting on this platform are to you at the present moment. And in all eternity this is, for God, true of all facts, whether called by *us* past, present, or future. It is as if all of us were cylinders, with their ends removed, moving through the waters of some placid lake. To the cylinders the *water* seems to move,—what has passed is a memory, what is to come is doubtful. But the lake knows that all the water is equally real, and that, in fact, it is quiet, unruffled, immovable. Speaking technically, time is no reality; things *seem* past and future, and, in a sense, non-existent to us, but in fact they are just as genuinely real as the present is. Is Julius Cæsar dead and turned to clay? No doubt he is. But in reality he is also alive, he is conquering Spain, Gaul, Greece, and Egypt. He is leading the Roman legions into Britain, and dominating the envious Senate, just as truly as he is dead and turned to clay,—just as truly as you hear the words I am now speaking. Every reality is eternally real; pastness and futurity are merely illusions. You look into a stereoscope, and two flat cards variously shaded appear to be a large city spread out before your eyes. But that seeming city is not a *fact*. The two cards variously shaded are the reality. Babylon and Tyre, on the other hand, seem unreal to us; but *those* cities are real, and the throb of life pulses through the veins of their citizens, even now, just as truly and strongly as it does through yours. I do not know how many

of you have caught this view, — this idea of the eternal existence of everything real; but those of you who have, will bear me out that it is perfectly comprehensible, realisable, natural. The illusory unreality of pastness and futurity is an entirely reasonable doctrine; and I have dwelt on it only in order to contrast with it another sense of the word "eternal," also necessary if it is to be synonymous with Completeness as expounded by Professor Royce. For there are two senses essential to the notion of Eternity, if it is to be synonymous with the notion of Completeness. In the sense already developed, it contradicts the notion of time in asserting that past or future experience is as real as present experience. In the second sense, it also contradicts the notion of time, in a way that will presently appear.

And now, if you will kindly give me your very sharp attention for a minute or two, I will try to develope this second sense quite plainly. I will do so by showing that, though past and future coexist, time has not been entirely done away with; the full meaning of Eternity, and therefore of Completeness, has not been attained. Even if past and future are equally real with the present and with each other, does it follow that there is no *distinction* between the past and the future? Does it follow that what we call the completion of a process is in *no* wise different from what we call its beginning? To put it somewhat graphically, could we begin at the end of a symphony, play the notes backwards, and get the same results as if we had begun at the beginning and played them forwards? Of course, the same facts

would be there in the former case as in the latter, and we have already maintained that first and last and intermediate notes are to be coexistent. The first do not cease to exist, the next come into existence, ceasing in turn, and giving place to those that follow. They all exist at once; that has been admitted. The question I am now considering is the possibility of reversing any significant process without utterly destroying its significance; or, if reversing be too strong a word, the possibility of conceiving any whole of facts that appear to us as a succession quite indifferently as regards their order,—backwards quite as truly as forwards. Ordinarily, you see, we view the end as if it were the product of the beginning. The facts are looked upon as having a true order, from A to Z, say, while the order from Z to A is declared unreal. Now, if we are right in maintaining that in some true sense the movement of things is in one direction, we have not done away with time entirely. The full meaning of Eternity is not attained. We still admit a difference between past and future. This difference is not one of *existence*; it is not that the past no longer *is*, and the future *is not* yet. Both past and future most really *are*; and yet, if our ordinary view is correct, the past is not the *same* as the future.

But suppose our ordinary view is *not* correct; what is the penalty for its incorrectness? I answer, in a word, it is death to all significance. The world, as a whole, is emptied of meaning: art is no longer real; morality ceases to be. For morality is victory achieved over temptation, and not temptation following upon victory. Temptation does succeed to victory

in our experience, but the growth of temptation out of victory is not morality. The very life of morality is toil, struggle, *achievement*; we must *overcome* difficulties; the stream of morality must rise higher than its source. Take progress away, and you destroy morality. This, after all, is very obvious, nor would I be understood to say that Professor Royce denies this. On the contrary, he is at considerable pains to assert and illustrate it. He maintains that the Supreme Being is moral for the very reason that he hates and conquers immorality. He maintains that evolution gives a truer view of reality than does descriptive science, for the reason that evolution asserts progress, apprehends the significance of progress, reads the beginning in the light of the end, would, as a completed doctrine (which it is not), uphold what Mr. John Fiske might call Cosmic Morality. But I venture to suggest that Goodness *requires* progress, and of the whole. That there is progress in *bits* of the Inclusive Self, Professor Royce does maintain; but if the Inclusive Self is to be moral, he must be in his *totality* progressive. The *whole* of him must advance without limitation towards some goal. If the universe is moral, it points in one direction; it has grown from a germ, budded out more and more widely, grown ever higher, at no time fully satisfied, ever striving onwards and upwards. But once admit movement in one direction, and all the antinomies—all the antagonistic contradictions—of time are upon us with undiminished force. The arbitrariness inherent in both beginning and end is not diminished by their coexistence. No real beginning or end can be rationally

established; for whatever one we may hit upon as real, the problem *Why this rather than another?* must always, as Lord Bacon would say, be left abrupt.

What I venture to suggest, as you will now see, is that the attribute of Goodness demands progress, growth; and that progress, even though past and future coexist, comes into collision with Completeness, because of the inherent arbitrariness of beginning and ending, of germ and fruition. If this position is well taken, either one or the other attribute, either Goodness or Completeness, as Professor Royce conceives Completeness, must be abandoned. I am far from saying that there is no possible way of so conceiving Completeness that it shall be in harmony with Goodness; nor would I even imply that Professor Royce may not have in reserve some mode of proving the existence of a Complete Reality that would avoid a conflict between its Completeness and its Goodness. What I halt at, is simply the mode of proof that he has actually employed, to-night as well as in his book. Upon that, it certainly seems to me that the Completeness established is quite destitute of consistency with Goodness.

III

GOD, AND CONNECTED PROBLEMS, IN THE LIGHT OF EVOLUTION

WITH REMARKS ON PROFESSOR ROYCE'S VIEWS

BY

JOSEPH LE CONTE, MD., LL.D.

PROFESSOR OF GEOLOGY AND NATURAL HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

GOD, AND CONNECTED PROBLEMS, IN THE LIGHT OF EVOLUTION

REMARKS BY PROFESSOR LE CONTE

I CAN only admire, not criticise, the subtle method of Professor Royce in reaching the conclusion of the Personal Existence of God. I have my own way of reaching the same conclusion, but in comparison it is a rough and ready way. His is from the point of view of the philosopher; mine, from that of the scientist. I am not saying that his is not the best and most satisfactory, but only that it is a different way. He has given you his; I now give you, very briefly, mine — as I have been accustomed to give it.

Suppose, then, I could remove the brain-cap of one of you, and expose the brain in active work, — as it doubtless is at this moment. Suppose, further, that my senses were absolutely perfect, so that I could see everything that was going on there. What should I see? Only decompositions and recompositions, molecular agitations and vibrations; in a word, *physical* phenomena, and nothing else. There is absolutely nothing else there to see. But *you*, the subject of this experiment, what do *you* perceive? You see nothing of all this; you perceive an entirely different set of phenomena, viz., consciousness, — thought, emotion, will; *psychical* phenomena; in a word, a self,

a person. From the *outside* we see only physical, from the *inside* only psychical phenomena.

Now take external Nature—the Cosmos—instead of the brain. The observer from the outside sees, and can see, only physical phenomena; there is absolutely nothing else there to see. But must there not be in this case also, on *the other side*, psychical phenomena—consciousness, thought, emotion, will?—in a word, a Self, a Person? There is only one place in the whole world where we can get behind physical phenomena—behind the veil of matter; viz., in our own brain; and we find there—a self, a person. Is it not reasonable to think that if we could get behind the veil of Nature we should find the same, *i.e.* a Person? But if so, we must conclude, an Infinite Person, and therefore the only Complete Personality that exists. Perfect personality is not only self-conscious but *self-existent*. Our personalities are self-conscious, indeed, but not self-existent. They are only imperfect images, and, as it were, separated fragments of the Infinite Personality—God.

So much for my habitual preference, as contrasted with Professor Royce's, in the matter of proving God to exist; and there seem to be differences between us on other matters too, though perhaps these are more apparent than real.

For instance: Professor Royce accounts it best to state the essential nature of God in terms of Omnipotence, and with this my customary preference of thinking would hardly seem to accord. For Professor Royce, God is *Thought*; conscious, indeed, but

passive, powerless, passionless Thought; Omnipotence alone is fundamental, and all else flows from that. And yet I cannot but think that the difference between us here is more apparent than real. For example, when he denies God *power*, is it not a power like that of man that he is talking about?—that is, an action or energy going out and terminating on something external and foreign? God's power, I grant, is not like that; for there is nothing external or foreign to him. And when he denies him *love*, at least as a fundamental and essential quality, is it not the human form of love that he is thinking of?—that which stirs the human blood, and agitates the human heart? Doubtless the Infinite Benevolence of God is different from that; but is there not a similar difference in the matter of *thought* also? Is it not equally true that "*His thoughts are not as our thoughts*"? All we can say is, that there is in God something which corresponds to all these things in man. The formula of St. John, *God is Love*, or the popular formula *God is Power*, is as true as the philosophic formula *God is Thought*. All of these are truths, but partial truths. A more fundamental formula than either is the formula of the Divine Master, *God is Spirit*. For Spirit is essential Life, and essential Energy, and essential Love, and essential Thought; in a word, essential Person.

Again: On the great question of Evil,—its nature, its origin, its reason,—a question inseparably connected with the conception of God,—there are apparent differences between Professor Royce and

myself; and yet these, too, may be less than they seem. In a general way, certainly, I agree with his explanation of the dark enigma of Evil. Evil cannot be the true meaning and real outcome of the universe; on the contrary, it is the means, the necessary means, of the highest good; and thus it is, in a legitimate sense, nothing but *good in disguise*. This is a necessary postulate of our moral nature. Professor Royce has admirably shown this, in his chapter entitled "The World of the Postulates." Our moral and religious nature is just as fundamental and essential as our scientific and rational nature. As science is not simply passionless acquisition of knowledge, but also *enthusiasm for truth*, so morality is not passionless rules of best conduct, but impassioned *love of righteousness*. And this last is what we call Religion; for religion is morality touched and vivified with noble emotion. Now, the necessary postulate of science, without which scientific activity would be impossible, is a Rational Order of the universe; and, similarly, the necessary postulate of religion, without which religious activity would be impossible, is a Moral Order of the universe. As science postulates the final triumph of reason, so religion must postulate the final triumph of righteousness. Science believes in the Rational Order, or in law, in spite of apparent confusion; she knows that disorder is only apparent, only the result of ignorance; and her mission is, to show this by reducing all appearances, all phenomena, to law. So also Religion is right in her unshakable belief in the Moral Order, in spite of apparent disorder or evil; she knows that evil is only

apparent, the result of our ignorance and our weakness ; and her mission is, to show this by helping on the triumph of moral order over disorder. We may, if we like, — as many indeed do, — reject the faith in the *Infinite Goodness*, and thereby paralyse our religious activity ; but then, to be consistent, we must also reject the faith in the *Infinite Reason*, and thereby paralyse our scientific activity.

So much for a rational justification of the indestructible faith Religion has in the Infinite Righteousness, even in the presence of abounding evil. It is founded on the same ground as our indestructible faith in the Reign of Law in the natural world, and is just as reasonable. Why is it, then, it may be asked, that every one is willing to admit the postulate of science, while so many doubt that of religion ? I answer : Partly because of the feebleness of our moral life in comparison with our physical life ; but mainly because the steady advance of science, with its progressive conquest of chaos, and its extension of the domain of order and law, is a continual verification of the postulate of science, and justification of our faith therein ; while, on the contrary, the progress of morality and religion is uncertain and often unrecognised, the increase of righteousness and decrease of evil doubtful and even denied. In the presence of such uncertainty, our faith is often sorely tried. We cry out for some explanation — for some philosophy which shall show us *how* evil is consistent with the Infinite Goodness. We know it *is*, for that is a necessary postulate. But — *how* ?

In regard to moral evil, or sin, — which, I need not

say, is the really dreadful form, — Professor Royce's explanation (which, by the way, is the same as that given in the last chapter of my book entitled *Evolution and Religious Thought*) is, I believe, the true one. It is, that the existence or at least the possibility of what we call Evil is the necessary condition of a moral being like that of man. There are some things which God himself cannot do, viz., such things as are contrary to his essential nature, and such things as are a contradiction in terms and therefore absurd and unthinkable. Such a thing would be *a moral being without freedom to choose right or wrong*. God could not make man eternally and of necessity sinless, for then he would not be man at all. To make him incapable of sin would be to make him also incapable of virtue, of righteousness, of holiness; for he must acquire these for himself by free choice, by struggle and conquest. Professor Royce brings this out admirably; but it seems to me this view is singularly emphasised by the evolutional account of the origin of man. For if humanity gradually emerged out of animality, then it is evident that man's higher nature — his distinctive *humanity* — was at first very feeble, and that the whole mission of man is the progressive conquest of the animal by the distinctively *human* nature. It has been a long and hard struggle, and even yet, as we all know and feel, is far from complete.

As already said, then, I believe Professor Royce gives a true answer so far as moral evil is concerned, although he misses the emphasis which evolution gives that view. But other evil — physical evil — he

gives up, in his book, in despair. And yet, from the point of view of evolution, this is exactly the form of evil that is most explicable. For as moral evil is a necessity for a progressive *moral* being, just so, and far more obviously, is physical evil a necessity for a progressive *rational* being. As the one form of evil is closely connected with our *moral* nature, so is the other indissolubly connected with our *intellectual* nature. Let me explain: The necessary condition of *any* evolution is a struggle with an apparently inimical environment. For example, the end and goal, the significance, the only *raison d'être*, of organic evolution in general, is the achievement of a rational being — man. The necessary condition of that achievement was the struggle with what seemed at every stage an inimical, *i.e.* evil, environment. But looking back over the course in the light of its glorious result — the achievement of man — we at once see that what seemed evil is really good. Now, it is equally the same with *human* evolution in relation to physical evil. The goal and end, the *raison d'être*, of social progress is the achievement of the *ideal* man — perfect both in knowledge and in character. But the attainment of perfect knowledge is impossible except in the presence of what seems at every stage an evil environment, and by conflict with it. But, evidently, such an environment is evil only through ignorance of the laws of Nature. Evil is therefore the necessary spur that goads us on to increase of knowledge. We are but foolish little children, at school. Nature, our schoolmistress, chastises us relentlessly until we get our lessons. It is quite evident, that, without the

scourge of evil, humanity would never have emerged out of animality, or, having emerged, would never have advanced beyond the lowest stages. It is also evident that perfect knowledge of the laws of Nature would remove every physical evil. Looking back over the course, then, from the elevated plane of perfect knowledge, and perceiving that the attainment of that plane was conditioned on the existence of evil —on punishment for ignorance— shall we any longer call it evil? Is it not really good in disguise?

But it may be answered: "Yes, this is all true if we accept evolution by struggle as a necessary process; but why may not the same result have been attained in some less expensive, less distressing way?" I answer: Because, as already seen, no other process is conceivable that would result in a moral being, and achievement of such a being is the purpose of all evolution. One law, one process, one meaning and purpose, runs through all evolution, and that purpose is only revealed at the end. As in biology the laws of *form and structure* are best studied in the lowest organisms, where these are simplest, but those of *function* are studied best in the highest organisms, because only there clearly expressed, just so the laws of *process* in evolution are best understood in its lower and simpler stages, but the *end*, the *purpose and meaning* of the whole process from the beginning, is not fully declared *until* the end. That end is the achievement of a moral being; and a moral being without struggle with evil is impossible because a contradiction in terms, and the same law must run throughout.

Finally: The true conception of God, as this appears to me, and especially in his relation to us, is closely bound up with the absorbing question of Immortality. And on this I surmise that Professor Royce and I differ; though I am less sure that we do, judging by his hints of what is coming in his more esoteric lectures next week.¹ But in his book he gives up the question of Immortality as insoluble by philosophy. Well,—perhaps it is; but upon this question, as upon that of Evil, I think a great light is thrown by the evolutional view of the origin of man.

Until recently, man's mind was studied wholly apart from mind as appearing in all the rest of Nature. Thus an elaborate system of philosophy was built up without the slightest reference to the psychic phenomena of animals. The grounds of our belief in immortality were based largely on a supposed separateness of man from brutes—his complete uniqueness in the whole scheme of Nature. This is now no longer possible. If man came by a natural process from the animal kingdom,—his *spirit* from the *anima* of animals,—then the psychical phenomena of man should no longer be studied apart from those of animals nearest approaching him. As anatomy, physiology, and embryology became scientific only by becoming comparative anatomy, comparative physiology, and comparative embryology, so psychology can never become scientific and rational until it becomes comparative psychology—until the psychical phenomena of man are studied in comparison

¹ For the substance of what is here referred to, see *The Absolute and the Individual*, pp. 322–326 below. Cf. also pp. 348–353.

with those foreshadowings and beginnings of similar phenomena which we find in animals most nearly approaching him. Evolution is not only a scientific theory; it is not only a philosophy; it is *a great scientific method*, transforming every department of thought. Every subject must be studied anew in its light. The grounds of belief in immortality must be thus studied anew. It is well known that I have striven earnestly to make such a study. I know that many think that this method of study destroys those grounds completely and forever; but I also know that those who think so take a very superficial view of evolution and of man. At the risk of tediousness, I will bring forward, once more, an outline of my view, but in a different way, which I hope will be understood readily by those who have followed my previous writings.

I assume, then, the immanence of Deity in Nature. Furthermore, as you already know, I regard *physical* and *chemical forces*, or the forces of dead Nature, as a portion of the omnipresent Divine Energy in *a diffused, unindividuated state*, and therefore *not self-active* but having its phenomena determined directly by the Divine Energy. Individuation of this Energy, *i.e.* self-activity, begins, as I suppose, with Life, and proceeds, *pari passu* with organisation of matter, to complete itself as a Moral Person in man. Mr. Upton,¹ in his Hibbert Lectures, given in 1893, takes a similar view, except that he makes all force—even physical force—in some degree self-active; and

¹ C. B. Upton: *Bases of Religious Belief*. Hibbert Lectures for 1893. London: Williams and Norgate, 1894.

thence it goes on with increasing individuation and self-activity to completion in man,—as in my view. The difference is unimportant. To use his mode of expression, God may be conceived as self-sundering his Energy, and setting over against himself a part as Nature. A part of this part, by a process of evolution, individuates itself more and more, and finally completes its individuation and self-activity in the soul of man. On this view, spirit—which is a spark of Divine Energy—is a potential in dead Nature, a germ in plants, a quickened embryo in animals, and comes to birth into a higher world of spirit-life in man. Self-consciousness—from which flows all that is distinctive of man—is the sign of birth into the spiritual world. Thus an effluence from the Divine Person flows downward into Nature to rise again by evolution to recognition of, and communion with, its own Source.

Now observe, and this is the main point: The sole purpose of this self-sundering of the Divine Energy is thereby to have something to contemplate. And the sole purpose of this progressive individuation of the Divine Energy by evolution is finally to have, in man, something not only to contemplate but also to love and to be loved by, and, in the ideal man, to love and to be loved by supremely. Thus God is not only necessary to us, but—we also to him. This part of God, self-separated and, as it were, set over against himself, and including every visible manifestation or revelation of himself, may well be called a Second Person of the godhead, which by eternal generation develops into sons in man, and finally into fulness of

gòdhead in the ideal man—the Divine Man—as his well-beloved Son. By this view, there is a new significance in Nature. Nature is the womb *in* which, and evolution the process *by* which, are generated sons of God. Now,—do you not see?—*without immortality, this whole purpose is balked—the whole process of cosmic evolution is futile.* Shall God be so long and at so great pains to achieve a *spirit*, capable of communing with him, and then allow it to lapse again into nothingness?

IV

THE CITY OF GOD, AND THE
TRUE GOD AS ITS HEAD

COMMENTS ON ALL THE FOREGOING THEORIES

BY

G. H. HOWISON, LL.D.

MILLS PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

THE CITY OF GOD, AND THE TRUE GOD AS ITS HEAD

COMMENTS BY PROFESSOR HOWISON

A TASK now falls to me, ladies and gentlemen, and fellow-members of the Union, which for its difficulty I would gladly decline, but which the Union will expect me at least to undertake. As younger students of philosophy, you my associates in the Union have called upon me to be your elder adviser; and on such an occasion as the present, which marks an epoch in your philosophical intercourse, you naturally look for me to put at your service any larger experience than your own that I may chance to possess in these fields, however insufficient it may prove when compared with the wide and deep reaches over which your speakers have carried you to-night.

The impressive close of the argument by the venerated man who has but just now ceased addressing you is such as must awaken a deep response in every human heart not touched with apathy. It is one of those rare outbreaks of accumulated expectation, hope, and longing, into which, at the contemplation of the reason that is apparently struggling to get a footing in the world, human nature pours forth all its commingled doubt and faith. Such is the impas-

sioned force of the argument from analogy, fortified, as it can be in these later days, by the doctrine of evolution. As Dr. Le Conte has so eloquently and so forcibly shown, it does seem clear, through the long and agonising path of evolution,—through struggle, and death, and survival,—that a rational, a moral, a *self-active* being is on the way toward realised existence; and it is true that, unless there is immortality awaiting it, this long and hard advance through Nature will be balked, and the whole process of evolution turn futile. As surely as there is a God, —as surely as eternal Reason and Justice is really at the heart of things,—it is certain, on this showing, that there is everlasting continuance for the being, whatever it may be, that forms the goal toward which evolution is pressing. If in very deed and truth there is a God, then that he “shall be so long and at so great pains to achieve a *spirit*, capable of communing with him, and then allow it to lapse again into nothingness” is indeed incredible,—nay, it is impossible. And I doubt not that your undulled human hearts are so roused by the pathos-laden question with which Dr. Le Conte closed his reasonings—a question almost appalling in its outcry to Justice and to Pity—that it will require all your poise of philosophic will to bring yourselves back into the region of collected thought once more, and look the great problem of to-night steadily in the face again, with what Professor Royce has so fitly named “the calmer piety and gentleness of the serious reason.”

For, in sober truth, the central awe of all such faith-compelling questions and analogies is just this:

that we see the whole matter hangs on the slender thread of the query whether there is indeed a God. If there is, then immortality — yes, the immortality of each particular soul — is certain, by God's own immutable nature; and evolution, though it cannot ascertain it, nevertheless gives premonition of it then, and supports the real proof. But — *what if there is not?* The goal of evolution, as really verifiable by observation, is unfortunately not the preservation and completion of any *single* life, but only of a *kind*, — only of a human *family*, — ever made up, I beg you will notice, of new and wholly different members; a family, moreover, whose abode is only on this globe, and on this side of the grave, with no indication whatever that this its home will or can last forever; nay, with all the *observed* indications steadily against this, and all the metaphysical necessities of physical existence declaring it impossible.

And so we are brought back, perhaps somewhat sternly, to the great questions of our meeting. We have had, from men of such eminence as to command serious attention everywhere, two high efforts to set forth the conception of God and the proofs of his existence; and we have listened to a keen criticism of the first of them by the young but highly qualified pupil of all three of us, — a criticism fascinating by its speculative and almost dreamy subtlety. Now let us gather our calmness and our wits together as best we may, and, during the short period that is left to us, try to discover what abiding store we ought to set by these endeavours. What I say must be, I fear, all too brief — too brief, that is, to do these arguments the

justice that their intricacy, their remoteness, and the long and deep studies which have gone to their making, would in reason demand. But I will set before you, as clearly as I can, the main points on which I think the evening's discussion turns, adding such comments on the conceptions and arguments as my own way of thinking suggests.

I

THE CRITERION OF REALITY IN A CONCEPTION

I am glad I can tell you, first of all, that there is a profound agreement among all the previous speakers in the important matter of the foundation on which all of this evening's reasonings rest; yes, I am confident I may go farther, and say that we are *all* agreed upon this, and, further, as to the entire foundation of philosophy itself. I agree with all three of the previous speakers in the great tenet that evidently underlies their whole way of thinking. Our common philosophy is Idealism—that explanation of the world which maintains that the only thing absolutely real is mind; that all material and all temporal existences take their being from mind, from consciousness that thinks and experiences; that out of consciousness they all issue, to consciousness are presented, and that presence to consciousness constitutes their entire reality and entire existence. But this great foundation-theme may be uttered in very various ways; and your other

speakers, while they go on in agreement with each other very far, at length diverge; and they diverge at a very early point from the way of interpreting idealistic philosophy that I have myself learned to use.

And, if I am not unaccountably mistaken, you have already had presented here to-night two considerably varying *systems* of Idealism, albeit they still go on together far above the foundations common to all idealistic philosophy. I say *two*; for, unless I mistake Professor Mezes, his view accords so nearly with that of Professor Royce as to permit us to neglect the differences and count the pair as one, setting it in contrast to the system of Dr. Le Conte. I speak here with hesitancy, however, and only with such positive evidences as our evening's work has afforded; and I accordingly leave room for the supposition that Professor Mezes covers in his thinking a further variety of Monistic Idealism, though holding with Professor Royce to Monism. For the Professor has exercised such a fine reserve as to speak without much exposure of what his own philosophy is; he has confined himself very rigorously to a criticism of Professor Royce's apparatus of *argument*, and has said next to nothing that tells what is his own conception of the Absolute Reality. Still, when he freely admits that Professor Royce's argument *inevitably* proves an Ultimate Reality, and employs as an engine of criticism the premise that the inner *life* of our fellow-men—their aggregate of inner experiences, their feelings, thoughts, puzzles, aspirations; in short, their successive or simultaneous *states* of

mind—"exhausts and fathoms what we mean by our fellow-being," we naturally put this and that together, and conclude that he, too, holds the central doctrine of his latest teacher,—the doctrine that all existence is summed and resumed into the enfolding consciousness of one single Inclusive Self; that human selves, and other selves, if others there be, are not selves in at all the same sense that the Inclusive Self is, nor in the meaning that moral common-sense attaches to the word. *They* are mutually exclusive groups of empirical *feelings*—merely summaries, more or less partial and fragmentary, of separate items of experience, at best only partially organised. It is *He* that gives vital unity and real life to all, He alone that embraces all, penetrates and pervades all, and is genuinely organic; He alone is integral and one. Yet He is just as unquestionably all and many; his unity is not in the least excludent, not in the least repellent, but, on the contrary, is infinitely inclusive, absolutely *all-embracing*. Literally, "His tender mercies are over *all* his works"; and whatever is at all, is his work, his act, *directly*. His being encompasses alike perfection and imperfection, evil and good, joy and anguish, the just and the unjust. His is the Harmony of discords actually present, but also actually dissolved; the Peace of conflicts at once raging and stilled; the Love that bears in the bosom of its utterly infinite benignity even malice itself, and atones for it with infinite Pity and by infinite Benevolence; his, finally, is the Eternal Penitence that repents of his sin in its very act,—nay, in its very germination,—and provides

the Expiation as the very condition on which alone his offence is possible and actual. Such is the conception of Absolute Reality that has been set forth to us this evening with such resources of subtlety, of acuteness, of comprehensiveness, of possessions in weighty material, of almost boundlessly flexible expression; and we are asked to receive it as the philosophic account, the only account genuine and authentic, of the conception of God. God, we are told, is that one and sole Absolute Experience, the utter union of Absolute Thought and Absolute Perception, of ideal and fact, in which all relative and partial experiences are directly taken up and included, though indeed reduced and dissolved, and to be some part of which is all that existence or reality means, or can mean, for anything else that claims to be, whether it be called material or mental. And that the God thus conceived is the only authentic God of philosophy is declared on the ground — or, rather, on the claim — that upon this conception alone can God be proved real. The conception — so our chief speaker's implication runs — may indeed be far different from what under an experience less organised than the philosophic, less brought to coherence, we had fancied the name "God" to mean; but what that name does mean must be exactly this, no more and no less: *That which rigorous thought, penetrating to its inevitable and final implications, can and does make out to be not merely Idea but Reality.* Our master-question about it, Professor Royce would say, must not be whether we like it, nor whether it agrees with something we had sup-

posed, but whether it is demonstrably true, and alone so demonstrable.

With this last statement every mind sufficiently disciplined in philosophy to appreciate its true nature will of course agree. The philosophical conception of *anything* is the conception of it that thought attains when it takes utter counsel of its own utmost deep. For philosophy, accordingly, utter ideality and utter reality are reciprocal conceptions; complete and final agreement with thought, as thought sees itself *whole*, is the only test of reality, and reciprocally, that alone is sanely and soundly ideal which can be *proved*, — that is, to the total insight turns real. But in another and still more important reference, the definitive question is still to come; in fact, arises directly out of that great first question about every conception. That first, controlling question undoubtedly is: Can we prove the conception *real*, and thus alone show it is the right conception? But the all-important question beyond will be: Are we now at length certain that we take the *ideal* view of the conception — that the light in which we see it is indeed the light of the *whole*, the final unit-vision under which alone our ideal can turn real? Not until we are able to aver securely that this is so, have we a right to assert the conception as philosophic, and the only philosophic conception. Above all must they who have come to the insight that philosophy means Idealism — that mind is the measure of all things, and *complete* ideality the only sure sign of reality — hold themselves rigorously to this criterion.

II

THE CRITERION CONDEMS THE MONISTIC CONCEPTION
OF GOD

And, now, what I have to say about the conception of God that we have had so imposingly set forth this evening,—a conception in which all the previous speakers, varying as they do, seem largely to agree,—what I have to say, at a stroke, is this: It does not seem to me to meet this criterion. As professed idealists, its advocates have come short of their calling. The doctrine is not idealistic *enough*. No doubt it has long gone by the name of Absolute Idealism, the name conferred upon it by Hegel, the weighty and justly celebrated thinker who first gave it a well-organised exposition. But I venture to contest the propriety of the name, and maintain, rather, that an Idealism of this character is not Absolute Idealism at all; that its exact fault is, not waiting for thought to take the fruitful roundness of its entire Ideal before declaring its equivalence to the Real.

In short, greatly as I admire all that has been said here to-night, gladly and gratefully as I recognise the genuinely philosophic temper and the authentic philosophic place it all most certainly has, I am still moved to say that my honoured colleagues, in this their common underlying conception, have to my mind all “missed the mark and come short of the glory of God.” They have not seized nor expressed the complete *Ideal of the Reason*. I agree with them that this Ideal is the sole measure and the certain sign

of what reality is ; I agree with Professor Royce, and with Hegel before him, that reality, in its turn, must be the test of the genuine Ideal,—that “*whatever is real is rational, and whatever is rational is real.*” I agree that the Ideal is *ipso facto* the Real ; but I insist that the vital question is : *Have we stated the Ideal?* I insist, further, that the conception of God expounded with such lucid fulness by Professor Royce, and in various implications accepted by Professor Mezes and Dr. Le Conte, in its fundamental aspect at least,—that of the immanence of God in the world,—I insist that this falls fatally short of our rational Ideal, and is therefore, happily, only so far real as its limitations permit it to be ; for, by every idealist of course, *some* truth, *some* reality, must be accorded to all genuine thought,—it is all true, all real, *as far as it goes.* But the great concern is, just how far such a thought as has been offered us this evening does go on the lofty way to the Ideal ; just what *relative* truth, what measure of *partial* reality, we shall assign it. And so I may restate my comment on this conception of God by saying that, while on the one hand I see it come as far short of God’s verity and God’s existence as earth comes short of heaven, as the creation comes short of the Creator, nevertheless, on the other hand, when expressed as Professor Royce expresses it, it does attain to the real nature of the real *creation*, and, when expressed as Dr. Le Conte would express it, to the real nature of the *phenomenal aspect* in the real creation, besides.

In other words, the conception is a philosophical and real account of the nature of an *isolated human*

being, or created spirit, the numerical unit in the created universe, viewed as such a spirit appears in what has well been called its *natural* aspect; viewed, that is, as the organising subject of a *natural-scientific* experience, marked by fragmentariness that is forever being tentatively overcome and *enwholed*, — if I may coin a word to match the excellent German one *ergänzt*. The *supernatural*, that is to say, the *completely rational* aspect of this being is left out of the conception we are discussing, — the aspect under which it is seen as the subject and co-operating cause of a moral *i.e.* completely rational or *metaphysical* experience. In this last context, the word “experience” has suddenly changed its meaning *in kind*,¹ and the human consciousness is seen to have, in its total unity, the all-encompassing form of a CONSCIENCE, — that Complete Reason, of a truly infinite sphere, in which the primal self-consciousness of the creature *actively* posits the Ideal which is its real world of being. In this complete reason, or Conscience, the single spirit sees itself as indeed a *person* — a self-active member of a manifold *system* of persons, all alike self-active in the inclusive unit of their being; all independent *centres of origination*, so far as *efficient causation* is concerned; all moving from “within,” *i.e.* each from its own *thought*, and harmonised in a society of

¹ The principle here involved is a signal one in language, of vast significance philologically as well as philosophically, and deserves a study which it has never received. By it, words have a power of coming to mean the very opposite of what they were first used to denote. I believe it to be a fundamental law of vocabulary, imbedded in the very nature of language.

accordant free-agents, not by any efficient causation, but by the operation of what has been called, since Aristotle, *final causation* — the attraction of an Ideal Vision, the vision of that CITY OF GOD which they constitute, and in which, reciprocally, they have their being; a vision immortalised by Dante as the Vision Beatific, by which no one is driven, but by which, to borrow the meaning of Goethe's famous line, the Eternal, womanlike, *draws us onward*, —

“Das Ewig-Weibliche zieht uns hinan.”

Now, it is greatly worth your notice, that this ideal is not merely the passing vision or phrased fancy of some poet, nor of some group of human beings in an accidental mood of rapt imagination. On the contrary, it is a great and solid matter of fact, of no less compass of reality than to deserve and require the name of historic. It constitutes the key-conception of historical progress, and is the very life of that highest stage of this which we designate and praise by the name of Western Civilisation. It is at the mental summons of this ideal, that the West as a stadium in historic progress emerges from the hoary and impassive East; and the entire history of the West as divergent from the oriental spirit, as the scene of energetic human improvement, the scene of the victory of man over Nature and over his merely natural self, has its controlling and explanatory motive in this ideal alone. It is the very life-blood of that more vigorous moral order which is the manifest distinction of the West from the Orient. Personal responsibility and its correlate of free reality, or real

freedom, are the whole foundation on which our enlightened civilisation stands; and the voice of aspiring and successful man, as he lives and acts in Europe and in America, speaks ever more and more plainly the two magic words of enthusiasm and of stability—*Duty* and *Rights*. But these are really the signals of his citizenship in the ideal City of God. By them he proclaims: We are many, though indeed one; there is one *nature*, in manifold *persons*; personality alone is the measure, the sufficing establishment, of reality; *unconditional* reality alone is sufficient to the being of persons; for that alone is sufficient to a Moral Order, since a moral order is possible for none but beings who are mutually responsible, and no beings can be responsible but those who *originate* their own acts. The entire political history of the West is accordingly a perpetual progress of struggle toward a system of law establishing liberty, and of liberty habilitated and filled with stable contents by law. The emergence, too, of western religion from oriental is similarly marked by the rise of this consciousness of individual and unconditional reality; we hear its presaging voice in that Hebrew prophet who declares: “*Ye* have said, The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children’s teeth are set on edge; but *I* say unto you, The soul that sinneth, *it* shall die.” And the whole history of western theology, broken and incomplete and apparently tragic as it looks in the stage whither it has now at length come, is but the sincere and devout response of the human spirit to that inward voice of this ideal, which announces the supremacy of reason and declares the

unconditional reality and majesty of human nature as possessing it. Remove this supreme vision of this Republic of God, and western civilisation — nay, the whole of human history, which but culminates in it, is without intelligibility, having neither explanatory source nor goal. The central and real meaning of the Christian Religion, in which the self-consciousness of the West finds its true expression, and which thus far has found no home except in the West, lies exactly in the faith that the Creator and the creature are reciprocally and equally real, not *identical*; that there is Fatherhood of God and brotherhood of men; that God recognises *rights* in the creature and acknowledges *duties* toward him; and that men are accordingly both unreservedly and also indestructibly real, — both free and immortal. In that religion alone, I venture to assert, is the union of this triad of faiths to be found — in God, in freedom, in immortality — faiths that, while three, are inseparably one, since neither can be stated except in terms of the other two.

III

THE MONISTIC CONCEPTION OF GOD NOT THE THEISM OF THE WEST, BUT THE PANTHEISM OF THE ORIENT

We are now led to notice Professor Royce's interesting statement, marked by such candour, at the close of his address. He traces briefly the philosophical and theological genealogy of his view, and expresses his belief that this view is at heart the thought really intended by the faith of the fathers,

and in due time formulated in the conception of God set forth by that greatest and most accredited doctor of the Church, St. Thomas Aquinas. This raises a nice question of exegesis, into which we cannot go with any fulness; but I will say, in passing, that if the statement is correct it only shows how far men's efforts to analyse and to formulate their highest and deepest practical insights fall short of the facts. It is too true that much of the theology which professes and aims to be Christian is in reality only the clothing or wrapping of Christianity in the prechristian garments that have descended to the West as heirlooms from the East, or to the converted West as inheritances from its paganism. And we ought never to forget, therefore, that the real test of the *faith* of Christians is the implications in their religious *conduct*, and not at all their attempts, most likely unsuccessful, or at least unhappy, to analyse those implications and set them formally forth. In these attempts, transmitted beliefs quite below the Christian level, accepted and continued habits of ritual, and modes of feeling, that are nothing but survivals from the faiths which the new vision in Christ would forever put away, will inevitably play a large part. They have in fact played too large a part; a part so large that the thought which Jesus imparted to mankind, and which has survived and flourished in spite of them, has been almost buried from view in the wrappings compacted out of these prechristian materials,—materials for the most part drawn from the Orient, whence they came from the religions and philosophies the very remotest from the Glad Tidings

proclaimed by Christ. The spirit of all these was pantheistic, in the really unchristian sense of that word : they were all preoccupied with the sovereign majesty of the Almighty, the mystery of the Impenetrable Source, and knew nothing of the truly infinite Graciousness or everlasting Love. Their monotonous theme was the ineffable greatness of the Supreme Being and the utter littleness of man. Their tradition lay like a pall upon the human spirit,—nay, it lies upon it to this day,—and it smothers now, as it smothered then, the voice that answers there to the call of Jesus: *Son of Man, thou art the son of God. Rouse, heart ! put on the garments of thy majesty, and realise thy equal, thy free, thy immortal membership in the Eternal Order!* Under the suffocating burden of the old things that should have passed away, the Christian consciousness forgets, at least in part, that all things are become new, and that man is risen from the dead.

It is not enough, then, for vindicating as Christian the conception of God offered us to-night, to show, for instance, that St. Thomas held it, if so be he did. In my own opinion, which you must take for what you will, he quite escapes its objectionable traits in some regards, and, were he here to explain himself, would disclaim that interpretation of the Divine immanence in the world, and the reciprocal immanence of the world in God, which is characteristic of both the philosophies expounded here this evening. At the same time, his resting his own conception of God on the foundations of Aristotle, in the form which the great Greek succeeded in giving them,—a form

which comes so short of Aristotle's greatest philosophical hints,—is occasion enough for thinkers like Hegel and our chief speaker to see a great resemblance between St. Thomas's view and theirs, and to overlook the contradiction between these aspects of his doctrine and those in which he reflects the Christian *aperçu* of genuine *creation*, and the consequent distinctness of the world from God. This *ought* to carry as a corollary the unqualified freedom of men in the City of God; and if St. Thomas fails to draw that corollary, the explanation must be sought in his prepossession by the older and prechristian tradition. Aristotle, after justifiable criticism of Plato's course with the world of Ideas, unquestionably struck into a new path more thoroughly idealistic. Had he explored this far enough, and with close enough scrutiny, it must have led him beyond Pantheistic Idealism. But his doctrine that the criterion of deity is Omnisience, and that creation is simply the divine Still Vision — *θεωρία* — had its discussion arrested too early to admit of that achievement. The descent of the doctrine we have heard to-night is correctly traced from Aristotle's; and the doctrine does not get essentially beyond his, nor attain any distinction between the Creator and the creation sufficient to make out creation as *creation* at all. *Unless creators are created, nothing is really created.*

I venture, you see, to dissent from Professor Royce when he claims that the conception of God—if God we may name it—afforded by his Monistic Idealism is distinctly theistic instead of pantheistic. Unquestionably, “it is not the conception of any *Unconscious*

Reality, into which finite beings are absorbed; nor of a Universal *Substance*, in whose law our ethical independence is lost; nor of an Ineffable Mystery, which we can only silently adore." But we do not escape Pantheism, and attain to Theism, by the easy course of excluding the Unconscious, or the sole Substance, or an inscrutable Mystery, from the seat of the Absolute. We must go farther, and attain to the distinct reality, the full *otherhood*, of the creation; so that there shall be no confusion of the creature with the Creator, nor any interfusion of the Creator with the creature. Above all, we must attain to the *moral* reality of the creature, which means his self-determining freedom not merely with reference to the world of sense, but also with reference to the Creator, and must therefore include his imperishable existence. The conception set forth to-night is certainly not that of an Unconscious; it is certainly not that of a mere Substance, to which our independence is subjected by sheer physical law; and it is certainly not a Mystery, in the sense of having a nature made up of traits wholly strange to our human cognition. For its essence is intelligence, and that omniscient; and hence its activity is not by transmission in space; and, finally, consciousness—or, as Professor Royce apparently would prefer to say, experience—is the very thing we are most experienced in, and so best acquainted with. But if the Infinite Self *includes* us all, and all our experiences,—sensations and sins, as well as the rest,—in the unity of one life, and includes us and them *directly*; if there is but one and the same final Self for us each and all; then, with

a literalness indeed appalling, He is we, and we are He; nay, He is *I*, and *I* am He. And I think it will appear later, from the nature of the argument by which the Absolute Reality as Absolute Experience is reached, that the exact and direct way of stating the case is baldly: *I am He*. Now, if we read the conception in the first way, what becomes of our ethical independence? — what, of our *personal* reality, our righteous *i.e.* reasonable responsibility — responsibility to which we *ought* to be held? Is not He the sole real *agent*? Are we anything but the steadfast and changeless modes of his eternal thinking and perceiving? Or, if we read the conception in the second way, what becomes of *Him*? Then, surely, He is but another name for *me*; or, for any one of *you*, if you will. And how can there be talk of a Moral Order, since there is but a single mind in the case? — we cannot legitimately call that mind a *person*. This vacancy of moral spirit in the Absolute Experience when read off from the end of the particular self, is what Professor Mezes pertinently strikes at in the first of his two points of criticism. Judging by *experience* alone, — the only point of view allotted by Professor Royce to the particular self, — judging merely by that, even when the experience is not direct and naïve but comparatively organised, there is no *manifold* of selves; the finite self and the Infinite Self are but two names at the opposite poles of one lonely reality, which from its isolation is without possible moral significance. This is doubtless a form of Idealism, for it states the Sole Reality in terms of a case of self-consciousness. When read

off in the second way, it has been known in the history of philosophy as Solipsism.¹ To read it so is a harsh *reductio*, and rather unfair, as it can equally well be read in the other way. But that other way is the only way of escape from what our moral common-sense pronounces an intolerable absurdity. It bears the more dignified name of Monistic Idealism, or Idealistic Monism. If it is to be called a conception of God at all, it is the conception that presents God as *All and in all*. If the syllables "theism" can be affixed to it at all, they can only be so as part of the correcter name Pantheism. And so it seems to me that we should by no means assent when Professor Royce is disposed to insist that every ethical predicate which the highest religious faith of the past has attributed to God is capable of exact interpretation in terms of his view. Where is the attribute of Grace, the source of that Life Eternal which alone, according to the Fourth Gospel, knows God as the *true God*, and which is freedom and immortality?

IV

WORTH OF MONISTIC IDEALISM AS AGAINST AGNOSTICISM: ITS FAILURE AS A RELIGIOUS METAPHYSIC

But, after all, what we have now for some minutes been saying amounts only to a contrast between different conceptions, and, at last, to a mere dispute over names. For philosophy, nothing is settled by

¹ From *solus ipse* (he himself alone), as the appropriate name for the theory that no being other than the thinker himself is real.

settling any number of such things. The real question is, not whether we like or dislike the view before us; not whether it is Christian, or Thomistic, or Aristotelian; but, simply, Is it true? Professor Royce or Hegel might well turn on us and ask : "Is not 'God' a name for the Ultimate Reality; and is it not demonstrable that the conception in question *is* the Ultimate Reality? — has it not been so demonstrated here and to-night? If this is the conception of the Absolute; if the Absolute must be the Omniscient, or, in other words, the Absolute Experience, — has not this ideal of an Absolute Experience demonstrated itself to be *real*, by the clear showing that the supposition of its unreality, if affirmed *real*, commits us to its reality? — in short, that the real supposition of its unreality is a self-contradiction, and therefore impossible to be made?"

To this, I will venture to say, as the first step in a reply: The gist of the proof is the proposition, that a supposition which turns out to be impossible, or, in other words, which cannot really be made, — and hence never is *really* made, — affords no footing for a dispute; in such case, the opposite supposition is the only one tenable; we are in presence of a thought which our mind thinks in only one way, so that it cannot, and in reality *does* not, have any alternative or opposed thought at all. Such a thought is sometimes called "necessary"; and then the question will inevitably arise: Is the necessity objective, or is it merely subjective? — is such a thought the infallible witness of how *reality* has to *be*, or merely the unimpeachable witness of how the *thinker* has to *think*? —

is it the sign of real *power* and genuine *knowledge*, or only of *limitation* and impenetrable *ignorance*? Here, the agnostic says it is the latter; the idealist, it is the former; and then the idealist undertakes to show, once more, that the supposition of thought being really limited and merely subjective is a flat self-contradiction, a proposition inevitably withdrawn in the very act of putting it. Then, to clinch the case finally, if his Idealism is only of the type here emerging, he makes haste to add: *The fact is*, you see, *the thinker, to think at all, unavoidably asserts his thinking to be the exhaustive and all-embracing Reality, the Unconditioned that founds all conditions and imparts to things conditioned whatever reality they have, the Absolute in and through which things relative are really relative and relatively real, the immutable IS that is implied in every IF.* In short, reality turns out to be, exactly, the thinker *plus* presentation to the thinker; but then, *and let us not forget it*, says this species of idealist, the thinker is reciprocally in immutable relation to this presentation, this detail, this fragmentary serial experience, these contents of sense. Thus we come to what Hegel called the Absolute Idea, as the absolute identity of Subject and Object, and the inseparable synthesis of the single Omniscient Mind, and its system of ideas, with its multiplicity of fragmentary *i.e.* sensible objects. And so the inevitable and everlasting truth is, not Agnosticism, but Absolute Idealism — the *ism* of the Absolute Idea; not the Unknowable Power, but the Self-knowing Mind who is at once One and All, the One Creator inclusive of the manifold creation.

And now let me continue such reply to this as I would make, by saying, next, how altogether acute and sound I think it is as a supplement to that phase of merely subjective Idealism which now goes by the name of Agnosticism — a supplement exposing the misnomer in virtue of which such agnostic Idealism calls the Ultimate Reality the Unknowable, when yet it has no footing upon which to affirm the reality of the Inscrutable Power except the self-asserted authority of thought, — the “inconceivability of the opposite,” as Mr. Spencer calls it, — by which he undoubtedly means, as we all see after his famous discussion of this Axiom with Mr. Mill, the *unthinkableness* of the opposite. The real meaning of the situation is, — as I believe Professor Royce to have shown unanswerably, and more pointedly than anybody else has shown it, — that the thinker is just unavoidably affirming his own all-conditioning reality as critic, as judge, as organiser, and as appraiser of values, in and over the field of his possible experience; the thinking self is seen to be the very condition of the possibility of even a fragmentary and seemingly incoherent or isolated experience, and the all-coherent unity of its inevitable reality passes ceaseless sentence on the mere phenomenon, declares the isolation and fragmentariness of this to be *only* apparent, supplants the incoherence of its immediate aspect by coherence that marches ever wider and higher, and so places the phenomenon in a real *system* that takes it out of the category of illusion by giving it a continual and endlessly ascending approximation to unqualified reality. Thus the Ultimate Reality

actually posited and possibly positable by this procedure is, indeed, the Unconditioned Conditioner with reference to a possible *experience*, but is unwittingly miscalled when called the Unknowable, for it is in precise fact just the Self-knowing Knower,—the comprehensive and *active* Supreme Judgment in whose light alone the things of experience are as they are; since they are, *as they are*, only as they are presented at its bar and there get ever more and more *known*.

But now I ask you to notice, next, how this argument, unanswerable as it is for displacing the phantom of the Unknowable and discovering the Idealism concealed in the philosophy that calls itself Agnosticism, nevertheless leaves us unrescued from an Idealism still merely subjective, though subjective in another and a somewhat higher sense. I mean, that the argument, taken strictly *in itself*, supplies no reason for reading off the resulting Reality from the point of view of its infinite inclusiveness, its supposed universal Publicity, rather than from that of its finite exclusiveness, its undeniably particular Privacy. Here I agree, as I have already once indicated, with the brunt of the first criticism made by Professor Mezes, and with his ground for the criticism: the argument of Professor Royce is so cast and based that no provision is made for a *public* of thinkers. In terms of this form of Idealism, no *manifold* of selves is provided for or can be provided for; and this I would conclude, not only as Professor Mezes does, from the limited scope assigned by Monistic Idealism to the illative principle of Causality, but also from the in-

compatibility of Self-Completeness, as Professor Royce by his argument has to conceive of this, with the Goodness that he would vindicate for his Absolute. In short, I agree with Professor Mezes again, in his second criticism,—that the Self-Completeness reached by this argument cannot amount to Goodness; though I may say, in passing, that I would not argue this on that fascinating but dreamy ground of the illusion declared inherent in time, the validity of which I very much doubt, but on the ground, once more, that such Self-Completeness fails to provide for any manifold of selves either phenomenal or noumenal, and that the very meaning of Goodness, if Goodness is *moral*, depends on the reality of such a public of selves. While I should dissent, too, from Professor Mezes in his implication that absolute Goodness must have the trait of progressive improvement, I hold that its very meaning is lost unless there is a *society* of selves, to every one of whom Goodness, to be *Divine*, must allot an unconditional reality and maintain it with all the resources of infinite wisdom. I repeat: My point against Professor Royce's argument, and against the whole post-Kantian method of construing Idealism, summed up by Hegel and supplied by him with organising logic, is this: By the argument,—as by many another form of stating Hegel's view,—reading off its result as Idealistic Monism (or Cosmic Theism, if that name be preferred) rather than as Solipsism, is left without logical justification. The preference for the more imposing reading, it seems to me, rests on no principle that the argument can furnish, but on an instinct

tive response to the warnings of moral common-sense. No matter what show of logic may drive us into the corner, our instinctive moral sense prohibits us from entertaining the theorem that the single self who conducts the argument, albeit he is its cause, its designer, its engineer, and its authority, is the sole and absolute Reality,—the only being in existence having such compass, such sovereign judgment, such self-determining causality. By spontaneous moral sense we doubtless believe, indeed, that we are each entirely real, and a seat of inalienable rights; but this feeling of rights, though it be no more than a resentment at invasion, points directly to our belief that there are other beings as unreservedly real as we, with rights alike inalienable, who lay us under *duty*. Still, this uncomprehended instinct, ethical though it be, is not philosophy. Until we shall have learned how to give it in some way the authority of rational insight, we have no right to its effects when we are proceeding as thinkers; so far as we merely accept them, we do not *think*, we only feel.

Moved by this feeling, I say, we evade reading the result of this strange but striking dialectic as Solipsism, and, reading it from the reverse direction, we are fain to call it Cosmic Theism, under the silent assumption that its real contents are thus enlarged so that its embrace enfolds a universe of *minds*, or *persons*. And yet these so-called persons are rightly designated as only *finite* selves, mutually relative and phenomenal merely, since the reality of the unifying Organic Experience, as reached by the argument, requires that it shall be strictly one and

indivisible, and that the supposed manifold of finite selves shall none of them have any real and changeless Self but this. One single Infinite Self, the identical and sole active centre of all these *quasi-selves*, which are severally made up of specific groups of experiences more or less fragmentary, as the case may be, none of them with any inner organic unity of its *own*,—this is the theory; and even for this hollow shell of a personal and moral order we have no logical warrant, but have silently carried it in, over our argument, on the hint of moral sense that of course there are manifold centres—or, at any rate, manifold groups—of experience besides our own.

You will not, I hope, mistake my point. Like Professor Mezes, I am by no means saying that Professor Royce may not have, somewhere in the rich and crowded arsenal of his thinking, some other means of dealing with this question of the moral contents of the Absolute than the means presented in his address and his books. I am only saying that, so far as I can see, the required means is not provided anywhere in the books or the address. Especially is it not furnished in the curiously impressive argument which he has now restated so lucidly for us, and which makes, one may say, the very life of the philosophy that he sets forth in print.

In this last assertion, I reach the gravamen of all I have to say, in the way of criticism, about that very interesting and exceedingly hitting piece of dialectic. So I feel that I am in duty bound to support the assertion by an analysis of the argument as exact and close as I am able to make.

V

PRECISE ANALYSIS OF PROFESSOR ROYCE'S ARGUMENT:
ITS MYSTIC AND ANTI-ETHICAL TENDENCY

Accordingly, let us look for a moment at the exact structure of that argument, and determine, if we can, precisely what it does make out. It may be put in two different ways, each brief and telling:

(1) Our human *ignorance*, once confessed to be real, brings with it the reality of an Absolute Wisdom, since nothing less than that can possibly declare the ignorance *real*; if the ignorance is *real*, then Omniscience is real.

(2) Our human *knowledge*, that indirect and organised experience which constitutes science, once admitted to be real, brings with it the reality of an Absolute Experience, since nothing less than that can possibly give sentence that one experience when compared with another is *really* fallacious, and this is exactly what science does; if the "verdict of science" is *real*, then an Absolute Experience is real.

Now, the question that unavoidably arises, on exactly considering these two unusual reasonings, is this: *Whose* omniscience is it that judges the ignorance to be real?—*whose* absolute experience pronounces the less organised experience to be really fallacious? Well,—whosoever it may be, it is certainly acting in and through *my* judgment, if I am the thinker of that argument; and in every case it is *I* who pronounce sentence on myself as really ignorant, or on my limited experience as fallacious. Yes,

— and it is *I* who am the authority, and the only direct authority, for the connexion put between the reality of the ignorance or of the fallacious experience on the one hand and the reality of the implicated omniscience on the other. We can perhaps see the case more clearly as it is, if we notice that the argument is cast in the form of a conditional syllogism, and runs in this wise: If my ignorance is *real*, then Omniscience is real: but my ignorance assuredly *is* real; and, therefore, so also is Omniscience. Now we ask: Who is the authority for the truth of the hypothetical major premise, and who is the authority for the truth of the categorical minor? *Who* conjoins, in that clutch of adamant, the reality of the ignorance with the reality of the omniscience? And *whose* omniscience makes the assertion valid that my ignorance *is* real? Is it not plain that *I*, who am convincing myself by that syllogism, am the sole authority for both the premises? Though there were a myriad other omnisciences, they were of no avail to *me*, in the lone inward struggle to my own conviction through that argumentative form, unless they interpenetrated *my* judgment, and so became literally *mine*; or, if you prefer, unless my judgment vanished upward and was annulled into that Infinite Judgment. In using either premise as *proof* of the conclusion, and *a fortiori* in using both, I implicate myself in actual omniscience; I am verily guilty of that effrontery, if effrontery it really be. So must the great argument of this evening be read, it seems to me, or else it must mean nothing. In short, it is the introversive act of a reasoning being, discovering the real infinity

that lies implicit in his seeming finitude. It is just *I* in my counter aspect—my reverse instead of my obverse, my other-side of infinite judicialness—coming forward to execute my proper act of infallible certainty. In such an “affectation of omniscience,” unquestionably, does any and every least assumption of *certainty* in a judgment involve the thinker who makes it. This, to my mind, is the exact and whole meaning of Professor Royce’s proof, unless we grant him the gratuitous assumption of an indefinite multitude of simultaneous or successive thinkers; and this, surely, we must not do when we are professing the philosophical temper of “proving all things.”

There are those, no doubt, who would see in the phase that the argument is now made to assume, only a fine occasion for very knowing smiles. Chief among such, of course, are the agnostics in whose especial behoof the argument was contrived out of their own chosen materials, with the benign intent of disciplining them out of their scepticism, through chastening supplied by exposed self-contradiction. They are likely now saying to themselves: “The argument has proved a little too much; it reinforces our point very happily: he who would not cut the absurd figure of claiming omniscience must take the lowly rôle of our humble philosophy—the rôle of confessed ignorance and incurable uncertainty.” But such is not the way in which I would read the lesson. Indeed, I hear in fancy, even now, the author of this singular argument saying to these jubilant doubters: “Well,—*confessed* ignorance, and uncertainty *really* incurable it is, is it? Here’s at you again, then! And

there you go round in the resistless dialectical whirligig once more! And so will your cheerfully obdurate negative send you whirling on perpetually!" And in that saying I should quite agree, and I am sure that you would, also. It is not to the force or validity of the argument that I object, but to the misinterpretation of its scope. It is a clinching dialectical thumb-screw for the torture of agnostics; yes, with reference to them and their unavoidable stadium of thinking, it is even a step of value in the struggle of the soul toward a conviction of its really infinite powers and prospects; but I cannot see in it any full proof of the real being of God. Strictly construed, it is, as I have just endeavoured to show, simply the vindication of that active sovereign judgment which is the light of every mind, which organises even the most elementary perceptions, and which goes on in its ceaseless critical work of reorganisation after reorganisation, building all the successive stages of science, and finally mastering those ultimate implications of science that constitute the insights of philosophy. If I call that active all-illuminating judgment,—which is indeed *my* life and my light, and which shines, and will shine, unto my perfect day, and is for me in all the emergencies of experience an ever-present and practicable omniscience, or fountain of unfailing certainty,—if I call that God, then assuredly I am employing the mood of the mystic; nay, I am taking literally what he took *only* mystically; I am translating into the cold forms of logic, where it becomes meaningless, what his religious poesy and enthusiasm made a practical medium of exalted religious feeling, though

philosophically it was nought. This light within may indeed prove to be the *witness* of God in my being, but it is not God himself.

It is often said of the mystics, whether within Christendom or in Egypt or in the elder Orient which was and still remains their proper home, that they have the high religious merit of bringing God *near* to us,—as if they met the saying of St. Paul: *Though He be not far from every one of us: for in Him we live, and move, and have our being.* But nearness may become *too* near. When it is made to mean absolute identity, then all the worth of true nearness is gone,—the openness of access, the freedom of converse, the joy of true reciprocity. These precious things all draw their meaning from the *distinct* reality of ourselves and Him who is really other than we. When mysticism plays in high poesy on the theme of the Divine Nearness, in the mood that “sees God in clouds and hears him in the wind,” it quickens religious emotion, but affords no genuine illumination in theology. When we turn that mood into literal philosophy, and cause our centre of selfhood to vanish into God’s, or God’s to vanish into ours, we lose the tone of religion that is true and wholesome. For true religion is built only on the firm foundations of duty and responsibility; and these, again, rest only on the footing of freedom. Hence the passing remark of Dr. Le Conte on the nature of religion, though indeed beautiful and noble, is yet, I think, neither noble enough nor beautiful enough. It certainly ascends beyond the famous saying by Matthew Arnold, of which as a ladder it makes happy use,—

that "religion is morality touched with emotion"; for Dr. Le Conte rightly reminds us that the emotion which is religious must not merely touch and kindle but must vivify, and must be not simply emotion but noble emotion. But it seems to me that his saying, like Arnold's, still leaves the true relations inverted. Yes, as much as inverted; because, in truth, religion is not morality touched and vivified by noble emotion, but, rather, religion is emotion touched by morality, and at that wondrous touch not merely ennobled but actually raised from the dead—uplifted from the grave of sense into the life eternal of reason. For life eternal is life germinating in that true and only Inclusive Reason, the supreme consciousness of the reality of the City of God,—the Ideal that seats the central reality of each human being in an *eternal* circle of Persons, and establishes each as a free *citizen* in the all-founding, all-governing Realm of Spirits. So is it that religion can only draw its breath in the quickening air of moral freedom, and our great poet's word comes strictly true,—

"So nigh is grandeur to our dust,
So near is God to man,
When duty whispers low, *Thou must,*
The youth replies, *I can.*"

And thus I am led to repeat, that the main argument of this evening, striking as it is, does not establish any Reality sufficingly religious,—does not establish the being of God. This will continue true of it, for the reasons just pointed out, even if we grant that the Infinite Self is a unity inclusive of an indefinite

multitude of *quasi-selves*. Accordingly, for the sake of argument, this grant shall be made during the rest of the discussion.

VI

CRITICISM OF THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSOR LE CONTE

And now, in view of the phase last assumed by our question, we naturally turn to the other system of Idealism offered us—that of Dr. Le Conte; for its very object seems to be, to provide for the desired world of freedom. It certainly accepts one aspect of the theory from which we have just parted—the immanence of God in Nature; interpreted, too, pretty much in the way that Professor Royce and other Hegelians interpret it. But, this accepted, Dr. Le Conte's view is apparently an attempt to supplement it by such a use of the theory of evolution as shall establish a conception of the Ultimate Reality which will thoroughly answer to the Vision Beatific—the conception of a World of Spirits, all immortal, and all genuinely real because themselves centres of origination and thus really free; not that they *now* are so, in the present order of Nature where we see them, but that the evolutional account of their origin clearly indicates that they will become so. Characteristic of this new form of Idealism, is its effort to unite the Hegelian form with the form that I have been trying to set before you,—the monistic form with the pluralistic. Its means for this union is, the method it takes to prove the coming reality of the

City of God—the Realm of Ends. This is presented as the goal toward which cosmic evolution is seen unmistakably to tend; and its reality is argued partly by induction, partly by appeal to that moral reason which would pronounce evolution futile, should its indicated goal not be fulfilled in an endless life whereby the self-activity only presaged here could be realised in the hereafter. This large reconciling office is what I suppose Dr. Le Conte to intend; and before taking our final look at the theory of Professor Royce, we must pause to see whether this attractive new scheme may not have supplanted it; or whether, perchance, this too is to prove disappointing.

I confess that by the lucid force of Dr. Le Conte's reasonings, and the great beauty of his conclusions, I am constantly tempted to yield him my entire assent. It is only by the low murmurs of half-suppressed conviction, that I am roused from that state of fascination, to take up again the task of rigid thought. But if I may venture at all upon criticism of a thinker so justly distinguished, whose mind I sincerely revere, then I will say that the stability of his system depends, I think, on two things: (1) Whether it provides a sufficient proof that the Immanent Energy which is the cause of evolution is indeed a Cosmic Consciousness; (2) whether a Cosmic Consciousness, even if real, having—as it must have—the attribute of immanence in Nature, is compatible with the freedom and the personal immortality at which the system aims.

Regarding the first of these, I feel bound to say

that the proof offered for the Cosmic Consciousness seems to me insufficient. All I am able to make of it is this: The analogy in the case of each of us, who knows that he is conscious, though to the outside observer there is nothing of him discernible but phenomena purely physical; still more, the analogy of the reasoning by which each extends this assurance of his own reality, to interpret similar physical phenomena into the existence of other persons, animating bodies like his own,—these analogies would, in all reason, lead us to say that there *might well be* a Cosmic Mind animating all Nature, but by no means that there *is* such a Mind. True enough, there is the same *kind* of reason for believing in such a Mind as for believing in the minds of our fellow-men,—if, indeed, the real warrant for this belief *be* only the warrant of analogy. But, even on that warrant, the value of the analogy will finally depend on the *degree* to which we can match, in Nature as a whole, the test-phenomena that prompt us to conclude the existence of human minds besides our own. The chief of these tests are speech and purposive movement; and, Bishop Berkeley's captivating metaphors about them notwithstanding, the literal fact is that Nature answers to neither; or, rather, we have no means of ascertaining, *from her*, whether she does or not.

Coming to the second question, I find myself in still greater difficulties. I cannot see how a Cosmic Consciousness, with its intrinsic immanence in Nature, can be reconciled with real freedom at all; and its consistency with an immortality truly personal is

to me beset with obscure alternatives, between which either the certainty, or else the value, of the life to come vanishes away. Whether we take the immanence of God in Nature to mean his omnipresence *in* and *throughout* Nature,—which is something unintelligible,—or whether we say, in consonance with Idealism, that Nature is immanent in God, the doctrine implies that God operates evolution, including the evolution of man in every aspect of his being, by *direct causation*—by his own immediate *efficiency*. Any secondary causes that may operate—though according to the theory of evolution these are indeed real and infinitely complex—are only mediate or transmissive, and are not *true causes*; God must ever remain the only *real agent*. In short, we have again a system of Monism; and all the hostilities to the strict personality of created minds that we found in the doctrine of Professor Royce are on our hands once more. And if it be said that just here it is that the philosophic virtue of evolution displays itself, by showing us that the world of *efficient causation* is only a means to an end coming beyond it, to whose realisation it surely points,—showing us that full self-activity, real freedom, is the plain goal, which moreover can only be won through immortality,—then I am led to ask: How will the goal be attained? I ask myself: So long as man remains a term in Nature, how can he ever escape from that causal embrace in which Nature is held immanent in God? This very immanence in God will no doubt maintain in existence some form of Nature, as long as God himself exists; and thus I can easily conceive of the

human spirit as going on in its share of the everlasting existence of Nature. But I also see that this must be at the cost of its freedom. For in the one and only life of the Cosmic Consciousness, brooding upon Nature and upon all her offspring alike, there is after all but one real agent, and that is the Consciousness itself. On the other hand, were I to suppose—as some of Dr. Le Conte's writings have at times seemed to mean—were I to suppose that death is the sublime moment in which our connexion with Nature at length comes to a close, and is thus in its truth the moment of birth for the freed spirit, so that by death the long toil of spirit-creation is completed, I should indeed be at first rapt away by this surprising suggestion; especially by the Platonic afterthought, that now the soul, set forth in her self-sufficing independence, is proof against all assaults forever, and has become indeed imperishable. But a second afterthought would follow, and I should ask: What must be the nature of this life dissevered from Nature,—bodiless, void of all sense-perception? What would be left in it except the pure *elements* of reason, the pure *elements* of perception, the pure *formularies* of science, and pure *imagination*? But what are these, altogether, but the common equipment, not of *my* mind or of some other individual mind, but of the universal human *nature*? And what is that universal nature but just the nature of the eternal Cosmic Consciousness? Yes, my personality has vanished; and death, in dissolving the tie to Nature under the alluring prospect of an existence for me wholly self-referred and self-sustaining, has

resolved me back into the infinite Vague of the Cosmic Mind, as this might, perchance, be fancied to be *in itself*, apart from Nature and creation,—

“—— that which came from out the boundless Deep
Turns again home.”

Shall I ever issue forth again from that Inane? Will that unfathomable Void ever create again? — ever again enfold an embosomed Nature, to repeat again through her fertility the stupendous drama of evolution? To ask such questions is to realise how utterly we have left the native regions of our occidental thinking; how lost we are among the most shadowy conceptions of the Orient. And no matter which alternative we take; no matter whether we maintain Nature everlasting, and as parts of Nature win an endless continuance, but remain forever destitute of freedom, mere aggregates of “inherited tendency” organised and moved by some new and heightened touch from the ever-immanent God; or, on the other hand, by severance from Nature win the empty name of freedom, and vanish in a nominal immortality that only means absorption into the Eternal Inane; — in either case the so-called God is not a Personal God, since in neither does he stand in any relations of mutual responsibility and duty with other real agents. Thus I cannot see that this Evolutional Idealism makes any secure advance beyond the Monism which it seeks to amend. We appear to be left to that, after all; and for proof of it, to some such argument as that of our evening’s chief speaker. Let us return, then, to that argument once more.

VII

THE FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTION IN PROFESSOR
ROYCE'S ARGUMENT: ITS KANTIAN BASIS

What, now, are we to say of this argument, finally? What are we to say to the claim that the surprising but in some sort irresistible conception reached by it must be accepted as the *philosophical* conception of God, be our spontaneously *religious* conception of that Being as different from this as it may? This claim is rested on the two premises, (1) that no conception of God can have any philosophical value unless it can be proved real, or, in other words, unless it is the conception that of itself proves God to exist; and (2) that the conception discussed before us is the only conception that can thus prove its reality. The first of these, as I have already said to you earlier, nobody with a proper training in philosophy would deny. The second has a very different standing, and I take but little risk, I am sure, when I question its truth entirely.

Why, then, should such an assumption be made? I answer: Because of a still deeper assumption; namely, that, since the thinking of Kant, the sole terms on which thought can be objectively valid are settled beyond revision. The thinking being, it is here said, cannot possibly get beyond *itself*; there is no way, therefore, by which thought can reach reality,—unless, indeed, reality is something within the whole and true compass of the thinker's own being, as contrasted with its merely apparent and partial

compass. Thought, this view goes on to say, must either surrender all claims to establish reality and to know it, or else it must cease to regard reality as a "thing in itself"; so "things in themselves" are dismissed from critical philosophy, and henceforth thought and reality must be conceived as inseparably conjoined. But how alone is such a conjunction *conceivable*?—how alone is the validity of thought *specifically* possible? To this it is answered: There is no way of having the required conjunction but by presupposing the unity of the thinker's self-consciousness to be intrinsically a *synthetical* unity—a unity, that is, conjoining *in itself* two correlated streams of consciousness. These are, the abstractly ideal and the abstractly real, mere thought and mere sense, mere idea and dead "fact." Torn from the life-giving embrace of this true unity of self-consciousness, neither of these correlates has any true reality at all,—any meaning, any growth, any *being*. And, reciprocally, there can be no real unity of self-consciousness apart from its living expression in this pair of correlates. No *knowledge*—no objective certainty—is possible, if once this magic bond be broken. The price of knowledge, the price of certitude, is this inseparable union of concept with percept, of thought with *sense*. Sever the idea from its sensory complement, and it vanishes in the inane. The only true Ideal is the Real-Ideal, is the unity presupposed in this correlation, and embracing it,—the unity implied in every item of *experience*, which is always just a case of this synthesis,—the unity still more profoundly implicated in every colligated group of experiences and in that progressively organised

experience which ascends the pathway of science by perpetual criticism of experience less organised, and perpetual detection of ignorance. The Real-Ideal thus turns out to be that Omniscience which is the eternal clutch holding together the two sides of experience, and holding all possible forms and stages of experience in its life-giving, knowledge-assuring, reality-building grasp. Grant the accuracy and the necessity of the fundamental premise,—grant the truth of this inseparable union of pure thought with sense, of this interdependence of the rational and the sensory,—and the case is closed. The immanent Omniscience *is* then shown “real,” in this overspanning meaning of that word, and nothing but such an *immanent* Omniscience can be made out real.

There is the whole anatomy of the argument, in brief. *If* its fundamental premise is true, it is certainly unanswerable; and we shall be compelled to put up with this as the true account of the Absolute, whether we choose to give it the title of God or not; nay, we shall have perforce to call it God, or else confess that this name has nothing answering to it but a baseless figment of fantasy. And yet I think it not too much to say, that, while this conception is thus made to appear as the only sound result of reason, its real meaning is no sooner realised than reason disowns it. By some slip, through some oversight, a changeling has been put into the cradle of Reason, but Reason, when she sees it, knows that it is none of hers. Professor Royce rightly says that it is not the conception of an Ineffable Mystery, which we can only silently adore. For, in very fact,

it is not the conception of a being that we can adore at all. The fault of it at the bar of the religious reason is, that by force of the argument leading to it all the turmoil and all the contradictions and tragic discords belonging to experience must be taken up directly into the life of the Absolute; they are *his* experiences as well as ours, and must be left in him at once both dissolved and undissolved, unharmonised as well as harmonised, stilled and yet raging, atoned for and yet all unatoned. Contradiction is thus not only introduced into the very being of the Eternal, and left there, but its dialectic back-and-forth throb is made the very quickening heart of that being. It is impossible for the religious reason to accept this, no matter what the apparently philosophical reason may say in its behalf. In that fealty which is the true "substance of things hoped for," the religious reason firmly avers there must be some flaw in such philosophising, and in the name of *all* reason, protests against the claim that this conception of God is "the inevitable outcome of a reflective philosophy."

VIII

SUGGESTIONS TOWARDS TRANSCENDING THIS KANTIAN ASSUMPTION

Is there really, then, an impassable chasm between the logical consciousness and the religious consciousness? Can the *ought to be* ever yield its autonomous authority to the mere *is*?—can the mere *is*, simply because it *is*,—nay, can the *must be*, simply because

it *must be*, — ever amount to the *ought to be*? Is the religious judgment, *Whatever is, is right*, a merely *analytical* judgment, so that what *is* is right merely because it *is*, and the predicate “right” is merely an idle other name for what is already named by its true and best name “*is*”? Or is it a *synthetic* judgment, whose whole meaning lies in the complete transcending of the subject by the predicate, of the “*is*” by the “right,” and in the shining of the Right by its own unborrowed radiance? There can be no question how the religious reason will answer. And there will be, and will ever remain, an impassable gulf between the religious consciousness and the logical, unless the logical consciousness reaches up to embrace the religious, and learns to state the absolute *Is* in terms of the absolute *Ought*.

And whether this upward and all-embracing reach can be made by the logical consciousness depends entirely — as I said a few moments ago — upon whether that fundamental premise brought into philosophy by Kant is true or not. If it *is* true, — if there is no knowledge transcendent of sense, and can be none, — then the absolute *Is* is tied up in the Being that Professor Royce has described to us, and no refuge is left to the unsatisfied Conscience but the refuge of faith: the religious consciousness will fain still believe though it cannot know, and will maintain a stainless allegiance to the City of God though this be a city without foundations. It was in this attitude of faith as pure fealty to the moral ideal, that Kant left the human spirit at the close of his great labours. It was the only solution left

him, after his thesis of the absolute limitation of knowledge to objects of sense. But surely that thesis has a strange sound, coming from the same lips that utter with equal emphasis the lesson of our really having cognitions that are independent of *all* experience. This is neither the place nor the time to expose the oversight and confusion by which Kant fell into this self-contradiction; I must content myself with saying that the contradiction exists, and that I think the oversight is exactly designable, and entirely avoidable. There is a truth concealed in Kant's thesis of the immutable conjunction of thought and sense, but there is a greater falsehood conveyed by it. And there is a stranger contradiction still, between his two main philosophical doctrines — between his *Primacy of the Practical Reason* and his *Transcendental Ideality of Reason* as an account of Nature and of science. Let it be as true as it may — and I suppose it is demonstrably true — that a predictive science of Nature is *impossible* unless Nature is construed as strictly phenomenal to the cognising mind, and is consequently taken entirely out of the region of "things in themselves," it by no means follows that such a science becomes *possible* by that supposition alone. The withholding of the supposition *prevents* science; but the greatest question is: Can the granting of it *establish* science? May not far other conditions have to be met, besides the required synthesis of sense with Space and Time and the Categories, before we can declare science to be a *real* possibility? Or, again, because a concentration of reason upon its pure sense-forms and their sense-contents is *pre-*

requisite to science, does it follow that this is *sufficient* for science? May not the non-limited use of the Categories be requisite before science is made out,—requisite quite as unquestionably as their concentration upon perceptions, and even more significantly?

Suppose they do have to be “schematised” in Time, or else be useless for science: does it follow that they will *produce* science just by being schematised?—may not a conjoined use of them in an utterly unrestricted meaning be needed, in order to establish judgments of absolutely universal and necessary scope, over even the course of Nature? But what are the Categories, taken thus without restriction, but just the elements of the moral and religious consciousness? Kant himself can find no better name for the moral reason than “Causality with Freedom,” nor any fitter name for primary creativeness. In short, the question really is: Can science be shown in *secure* possibility, *can* the logical consciousness ever reach objective reality even in the natural world, without the direct aid of the moral and religious consciousness?—without this consciousness adding itself into the very circuit of logic, as the completing term by which alone the circuit becomes solid, self-sustaining, and incapable of disruption? For if it *can*, then the asserted primacy of moral reason is merely nominal, and only means that moral reason has an ideal province of its own, out of all organic connexion with any world determinably real. But if it *cannot*, then moral reason is really primate, the reality of the scientific thinker as a moral being becomes the supreme condition and the demonstrating basis of science and of

Nature itself, the world of the Vision Beatific becomes the one inclusive all-grounding Fact, and a real God amid his realm of real Persons becomes the absolute reality. Kant, in his provisory "thing in itself,"—set aside as a problem for further determination, on the solid psychological evidence that we have not within ourselves a complete explanation of sensation,—left open the door for answering this question of the total conditions essential to science. But he did not use that door. Yet, of course, he could not aver that the reality of science was made out, and the order of Nature securely predictable, so long as the nature of that co-agent "thing in itself" was undetermined. He also warned the philosophical world that there was no secure path to the realm of religion, his Realm of Ends, the realm of God and souls, of freedom and immortality, except by the way of the moral reason. But he made no further use of that warning than to declare the absolute autonomy of that reason. He should have followed the path he indicated, and he would have found in its course the solution for the unknown nature of his "thing in itself." This would have been found as soon as he had noted the gap still remaining in the logic of science, and had seen, as he might have seen, that nothing but filling the void of the "thing in itself" with the World of Spirits, the sum of the postulates of the Practical Reason, could close that gap.

When we shall have gone back to where he paused, and completed the work which he left unfinished, then fealty will be translated into insight, our faith will have a logical support, our moral common-sense will

receive its philosophic confirmation, and the reality of the World of Persons, and of God as its eternal Fount and Ground and Light, will be made out. Then genuine and inspiring religion—the religion not of submission but of aspiration, not of bondage but of freedom, of Love rather than of Faith and of Hope—will have passed from its present stage of anxious conjecture to the stage of settled fact,—

Now abideth Faith, Hope, Love, these three; but the greatest of these is Love.

NOTE

THE DISCUSSION RECAPITULATED IN QUESTIONS

For the sake, particularly, of readers unfamiliar with philosophical technicalities, I may here recapitulate my criticisms of the evening's addresses, suggest a few others, and hint a little more fully at my own answers to the problems discussed, by means of the following questions:

ON PROFESSOR ROYCE'S ADDRESS

1. Does a Supreme Being, or Ultimate Reality, no matter how assuredly proved, deserve the name of God, simply by virtue of its Reality and Supremacy? Is simple Supremacy divine, even if made out in idealistic terms—in terms, say, of Omniscience?
2. Can the attribute of Omniscience amount to a criterion of Deity until we determine the nature of the objects contained in the total sphere of its cognition, and find there real *persons* as the supreme and all-determining objects of its view?

3. To put the preceding question in another way, Can an Omniscient Being amount to a Divine Being unless the core and spring of this Omnidiscience be proved to be a *Conscience*?

4. Does the argument to an Omniscient Reality from human ignorance, taken in its precise reach, provide for *persons* as the prime objects of Omnidiscience, or for Conscience as its central spring?—does this argument make Omnidiscience involve Love in any other sense than that of Content with its own action, and with its self-produced objects, merely as forms of that action?

5. Is it reasonable to speak of God as having an *experience*, even an absolute experience? Or, if it is, what change in kind in the meaning of "experience" is involved?—is not "experience," thus taken, a name for the self-consciousness of pure Thought and pure Creative Imagination? In the natural and unforced sense of the words, can there be an absolute *experience*?—an absolute *feeling one's way along tentatively*, or any absolute, i.e. wholly self-supplied, contents *received*—facts of *sense*?

6. Is the reasoning to an Absolute Experience and an Absolute Thought by means of the implications inevitable in asserting our limitation to be *real*, capable (1) of making out an Ultimate Reality in any other sense than that of an *Active Supreme Judgment* as the grounding or inclusive being of the single thinker who frames the argument; (2) of combining this ultimate reality of this single thinker with that of other thinkers equally real?

7. To put the foregoing question in less cumbrous, though less explanatory terms: Can an argument like Professor Royce's prove an Absolute Mind *distinct* from each thinker's mind, or an Absolute Mind coexisting with other genuine *minds*, unquestionably as real as itself? What is the true test of *reality*?—and how alone can finitude coexist with unabated reality? Is not that test *self-active intelligence*?—and, in order to our being real notwithstanding our finitude, must not Nature be conceived as *conditioned* by human nature, instead of *conditioning* it?

8. To put the question in still another way: Must not the convincing force of every such method of reasoning to the Absolute be necessarily confined to a *monistic* view of existence? That is, will not the method of proof confine us to a single and

sole Infinite Inclusive Self, and reduce all particular so-called selves merely to modes of his omniscient Perceptive Conception? Does the argument not require us to accept God, so called, as the one and only real agent—the *vera causa sola*?

9. Is such a view of existence compatible with the true *personality* of human beings, or with a *true* personality of God?

10. What is the real test of *personality*? Is it just *self-consciousness*, without further heightening of quality, or must it be self-consciousness as *Conscience*? What is *Conscience*? Is it not the immutable recognition of *persons*—the consciousness of self and of other selves as alike unconditional ENDS, who thereby have (1) *Rights*, inalienable, and (2) *Duties*, absolutely binding?

ON PROFESSOR MEZES'S CRITICISM

1. Is it true that the relativity of pastness and futurity must be taken to mean that they are illusions? Is Cæsar *really* dead and turned to clay, and also *really*, in the one Eternal Moment, now conquering Gaul and Britain, and dominating the envious Senate?

2. Can Eternity be adequately stated in terms of time at all? Is there not an Eternal Order, and *also* a Temporal?—a Noumenal and a Phenomenal?

3. Must the *ideal* being answering to the moral conception contain the trait of progressive improvement? Is not this the characteristic of minds marked with *finitude*? — that is, having in their consciousness an aspect that is finite?

ON PROFESSOR LE CONTE'S REMARKS

1. Does Dr. Le Conte's argument to God from the footing of science show that there *is* a Cosmic Consciousness, or only that there *might well enough be* such a Consciousness?

2. Is not a Cosmic Consciousness, reached by such an argument (*if* reached by it), necessarily to be taken as having a *monistic* relation to the Cosmos? Does not its Omnipresence, too, take the form of a universal pervasion of space as well as of

time?—and is there any meaning in the statement, taken literally, that a Mind *pervades* space, and *fills* time? Besides, in the strict sense, has Space any extent to be pervaded, or Time any duration to be filled?

3. Is such a doctrine of the “Divine Immanence in Nature” compatible with the *real* freedom of human beings? If not, does it leave such beings truly *real*? Does it not make the so-called God the sole real *agent*? If so, does it not make a Moral Order impossible?

4. Can a Being without a Moral Order and a *moral* government—that is, without associates *indestructibly free*—be a person at all?—much more, an Infinite Person, a GOD?

5. Can God, the *Ideal of the Reason*, the Being whose essence is *moral* perfection, be adequately conceived as being immanent in the creation, or as having the creation immanent in *him*, if this be taken to mean, in the one case, pervasively present and directly active within the entire creation, and, in the other case, directly embracing or enfolding it in his own life?

6. In what sense, only, can God rightly be said to be immanent in his creation?—is it not in this, that his Image, his *nature* or *kind*, not his own *Person*, is ever present there, as the effective result of his Creative Omniscience, so that his creation, too, in its inclusive unity, *proceeds of itself*, as well as he?

7. Can a process of evolution, through Nature and in time, possibly give rise to a being really free, and personally immortal?—to a creation indeed *self-active*, and therefore indestructible?

8. Is an evolutional origin of man, then, compatible with a *Divine* creation? If so, in what sense, only, of the word “man”? Is it not man the *phenomenon* merely—man the experience-contents, physical (governed by Space) on the one hand, and psychical (governed by Time) on the other, instead of man the *noumenon*—the completely real man who is the Inclusive Active Unit that embraces and grounds all its being in its own *active* self-consciousness?—in short, is not the field of human evolution just the human *body* and the human *states* of mind?

9. What can the fact be, that has caused so many of the prominent minds of our time to stumble at the notion of an In-

finite Person, as involving a self-contradiction?—is it not the difficulty of reaching the true conception of the Real Infinite?

10. Ought we not to discriminate between two vitally different meanings of this ancient word “infinite”?—which is primary and determinative, and which only derivative? Is not *every* Person infinite in this first and profound sense?

V

THE ABSOLUTE AND THE
INDIVIDUAL

*A SUPPLEMENTARY DISCUSSION, WITH REPLIES
TO CRITICISMS*

BY

PROFESSOR ROYCE

THE ABSOLUTE AND THE INDIVIDUAL

INTRODUCTION

THE public discussion at Berkeley, whose documents the Philosophical Union published shortly after the event, in pamphlet form, was, as a fact, immediately succeeded by several more private meetings, in which the leader of the original debate had ample opportunity to reply to his critics, and to expound further consequences of his theses. The proceedings of these meetings remained unprinted. More than a year has since passed. The Philosophical Union now desires to give the whole discussion a more permanent form, and in doing so kindly invites the present writer to put on record his replies to his critics, to extend and confirm, at his pleasure, his main argument, and to expound some further developments of his doctrine.

In accepting, once more, the hospitality of the Union, and in using it in the following pages, I feel it all the more my duty, as the guest thus invited to return to such pleasant company, not to mar a controversy, whose principal interest lies in the instructive contrast of the points of view adopted by the speakers,—not to mar this controversy, I say, through any idle effort to make, as it were, an end

of my friendly opponents by limiting myself to a hand-to-hand contest with their theses. In particular (to refer here to one of these theses), the antithesis between Monistic Idealism and Ethical Individualism, upon which Professor Howison, in his important paper, has laid such stress, reveals, as a fact, a very deep and instructive antinomy of Reason; an antinomy which, as I believe, we must all recognise before we can hope to solve it or transcend it. In my own former paper, I made no mention of this antinomy,—not because I failed to recognise it, but because I conceived that I had there no space for it. Professor Howison has given it the first place in the discussion. To me it has always been a problem that, despite its vast importance, is secondary to the central problem of philosophy. On the other hand, I have profited greatly by Professor Howison's brilliant vindication of Ethical Individualism, and I hope to show, before I am done, that I have thus profited. To be sure, I am still unable to alter either the thesis or the essential process of reasoning expounded in my original discussion. Both can be stated in countless ways. But in their essence, I must still hold each to be valid. Accordingly I also have still to maintain that every estimate of the place of the Individual in the universe must be made *subject to the validity* of some such argument for the Absolute, and subject to the supremacy, the unity, and the all-embracing sole reality of the Absolute as defined by this argument. But on the other hand, an argument concerning the grade of reality possessed by ethical individuals has its place in the

development of an idealistic philosophy, and its place is in some ways well defined by Professor Howison's paper. I shall accordingly seek, in what follows, reconciliation rather than refutation. I shall try to show, not that Professor Howison is wrong in the stress which he lays upon the ethical importance of his individuals, but that the Absolute, as I have ventured to define the conception, has room for ethical individuality without detriment to its true unity, or to the argument that I advanced for its reality. I shall also try to show that the very essence of ethical individuality brings it at last, despite the mentioned antinomy, into a deeper harmony with the concept of the Absolute that I venture to maintain; so that, as I shall try to explain, just *because* the ethical individual is sacred, therefore must his separate life be "hid," in a deep and final sense, in the unity of the system to which he is freely subordinated. For his ethical life is, as such, a life of free subordination. He cannot be ethical and undertake to exist separately from God's life. On the other hand, as I shall try to maintain, the unity of this system, *i.e.* of the Absolute, as defined in my thesis is not a dead unity, — a night that devours all, — but precisely the unity of many, where the many are; but the unity is still supreme, while the unity is supreme just because the many exist, over whom and in whom it is supreme.

Such phrases are obscure enough, apart from the argument that alone can give them meaning. I use them here only by way of indicating that I desire not to refute Professor Howison's essential views, but to define individuality in a way that may tend to

bring his views and mine into harmony. In much the same sense I desire to make use of the views of my other two critics. And still further, I wish to use this opportunity to give the whole conception of the Absolute which I am permitted to defend a more careful statement, a more minute examination, a fuller defence, and a more extended development than I have heretofore had the opportunity to do.

I regret only that the situation in which the present opportunity puts me is thus so necessarily that of restating and defending what appears as my own thesis; as if it were in any sense my own property, or a cause in the least dependent upon me for just this present defence. "What can I clearly see?" — this is the ceaseless question of the student of philosophy. In this sense, and in this only, he seeks, as such a student, for self-consciousness. But otherwise, ideally speaking, he ought as a philosopher to have no personal property in ideas, no private cause to defend, no pet thesis to maintain, no argument for whose fate he fears, no selfish concern whether he refutes or is refuted, no author's fondness for his past productions, no advocate's pride in maintaining his old notions. Naked of all private treasures, he ought to seek, each time anew, the priceless pearl of truth. This, in fact, is the model that Plato's dialogues set before the thinker. However often one might win this pearl of truth, one's frailty, and one's fleeting moments, would ever again turn the possession of it into a mere memory of former insight; and so one must ever seek afresh. This is the thinker's ideal. If fortune makes him a poor professor, telling over and over again his

old tale in lectures; an anxious author, unready to deny his former books; a human disputant, eager not to be worsted in his dialectics,—well, these are the doings of fortune, and of his wretched earthly self. His only worth as philosopher lies, not, in the last analysis, in his consistency, or in his skill in defence, but purely in the transparency, if such they have, that permits the light occasionally to shine through his defects. In such a spirit I desire the following, which is in form a defence of my private thesis, to be estimated. However much I employ anew old material, the only worth of the task must lie in the present unity of the insight developed, whether in the author's or in the reader's mind.

This supplementary discussion will consist of five parts. In the first, I shall re-examine the general argument for the reality of the Absolute. In the second, following lines indicated in one of the supplementary and more private discussions of the Union at Berkeley, mentioned above, I shall endeavour to develope the relation of the notion of Will to the concept of the Absolute. In the third, I shall attack, in general terms, the logical and metaphysical problem of the nature of Individuality; or, to use the well-known scholastic phrase, I shall study the "Principle of Individuation," in its general relations to the concept of Reality. In this division I shall dwell upon considerations which have grown upon me, in part, since the first publication of Professor Howison's paper. In the fourth part, I shall apply both of the foregoing discussions, namely, that of the Will and that of the Principle of Individuation, to the problem

of the definition of human, *i.e.* self-conscious, Individuality in its metaphysical implications, referring especially to the problem of Freedom, and, incidentally, to that of Immortality. Here I shall again make some use of material presented to the Union in 1895. In the fifth part, I shall bring together the views advanced in the foregoing parts, in such fashion as to indicate, before I close, some of my relations to the objections of my critics.

PART I

THE CONCEPTION OF REALITY

THE conception of Reality is one which philosophical writers of all schools and tendencies must face and consider.¹ In the present day, when popular philosophy is largely under the influence of more or less decidedly agnostic traditions, it is customary to make light of attempts to say anything positive about the Absolute; but it is all the more popular to say: "Oh, we modern men, discarding the fantasies of the past, rejecting *a priori* constructions, trusting solely to experience,—we seek, in our philosophy, for the Real." "And the Real," one continues, "is not something that metaphysical dreaming can make out. It is something forced upon us by the irresistible compulsion of experience. We know regarding it, not its ultimate structure, but its appearances in our individual experience. Ultimate truth is a dream of the philosophers."

In the argument with which this debate opened, I attempted some dealing with just such relatively

¹ Throughout the whole following discussion the reader may notice, from time to time, the influence of various special discussions that occur in Mr. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*. I acknowledge this influence the more readily in view of the fact that after all, as will appear, I often dissent from Mr. Bradley's conclusions. But there is space only for this general acknowledgment.

“agnostic” tendencies; and I tried to show that, whether they will it or not, the thinkers referred to cannot consistently deal with the Real, as experience shows it, without, in the end, coming face to face with the Absolute, so that every assertion of the compulsion which forces upon us finite Facts, must in the end imply, with an equal necessity, the unity of all facts in one Absolute Reality, whose nature we can in general determine, despite our ignorance of the details of its life. But in developing this argument, I was necessarily forced, by the lack of space, to ignore many of even the most familiar efforts to state the more ordinary type of Realism in such fashion as to avoid accepting my definition, or in fact any definition, of the Absolute. The questions that have been raised by my critics, however, as to the true scope, meaning, and outcome of my argument, can best be answered through a careful review of the essence of the argument itself. And this careful review, in its turn, can best be accomplished, less by a direct onslaught upon my idealistic friends than by a more minute comparison of my notion with those realistic arguments in conflict with which it was, in the first place, developed. I myself came into this field, originally, not to war with fellow-idealists, but to criticise the Realism of ordinary tradition. A contrast with the metaphysical views of our common opponents will therefore help us, who are engaged in this discussion, to comprehend better the scope and implications of our own theory.

On the other hand, here as everywhere in philosophy, refutation is never our whole business. Even

the most unreflective and popular Realism embodies a truth, which it is our duty as idealists to comprehend, and to include within a larger truth. Moreover, as I hold, that truth upon which realistic doctrines lay a falsely one-sided stress is intimately related to the very truth which Professor Howison seeks to bring into such prominence; and Professor Howison himself, in declaring that the concept of "things in themselves" must ultimately receive an ethical interpretation, has explicitly pointed out a deep relation between the realistic and the ethical theories of Being. In short, Professor Howison's thesis might be called an Ethical Realism quite as fairly as an Ethical Idealism. It becomes me, therefore, in the re-examination of the concept of Reality to give some of the fundamental conceptions of Realism the fairest scrutiny that space here permits. For of course no Idealism can in the end be acceptable which is not just both to those "external facts" upon which the realist usually lays such stress, and to those moral realities to which Professor Howison devotes his attention. And the thesis that the true basis of the so-called "external facts," the real meaning of the "things in themselves," lies in the moral world, is one that for me, as for Professor Howison, has great philosophical importance.

I shall therefore, in the present part of my paper, first scrutinise some realistic interpretations of the meaning of the concept of Reality; then, as I proceed, I shall restate and defend my idealistic interpretation of this concept; and thus I shall prepare the way for an effort, in the later parts of this paper,

so to develope Idealism that it may include the truth both of ordinary Realism and of the ethical interpretation of reality.

I

THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF REALITY

One sees, hears, touches, — in general, one experiences, — “the real world.” One thinks of the “real,” is subject to the laws of the real, is in fact constantly in a compulsory bondage to this reality. This is the “fact,” the “simple fact,” upon which, again and again, popular forms of Realism base themselves. If you ask: But what means this word “reality,” as applied to characterise what one sees, hears, touches, thinks about, and finds oneself compelled to submit to? the answer comes: “Reality connotes *independence* of the experience and thought and will of the being who deals as we do with the real.” Thus, that I know, feel, and am bound by, the presence of reality, is a fact in me, a modification of my experience, of my thought, and of my will. But that the real *is*, this is something independent of me, and this fact is there whether I know it or not, whether I think so or not, whether I want it or not. What thus compels me, is beyond me and independent of me. What is my object, needs, as such, not at all the plastic and submissive presence of me as subject.¹ As subject, I am, to be

¹ Sigwart, *Logik*, 2d ed., I, 90: “Was ‘ist,’ das ist nicht bloss von meiner Denkthätigkeit erzeugt, sondern unabhängig von derselben, bleibt dasselbe, ob ich es im Augenblick vorstelle oder nicht.” *Id.*, I, 44: “Der Satz: Kein Objekt ohne Subjekt, ist im demselben Sinne wie

sure, in relation to an object; the real that I experience or think, then and there stands in relation to me. But this relation is non-essential to the reality of either the subject or the object. The object is real, in so far as it needs me not, but is independent; just as I too am real, in so far as I should still be I, even if I knew not just this object that I at any one moment know. Knowing subject and known reality, the object, are related, to use Sigwart's expression just cited in the foot-note, somewhat as are horse and rider. The rider is, in his own being, independent of the horse; although, while he rides, he exists in this relation to the horse, which, on its part, is then subject to the rider's compulsion.

What I know, then, when I touch, see, think, is that there is somewhat that is independent of me, and that compels me to know, at each moment, thus or thus, or to modify my will in this way or in that. This is the general presupposition of Realism. And in considering it, a realist usually first points out that this is the universal presupposition of the natural human consciousness. Whoever questions this presupposition, thus has, as they say, the "burden of proof" upon his hands. "Consciousness" seems to "bear witness" to the presupposition that one thus constantly knows an independently real object-world to be present. The questioner, the sceptic,—yes, as the realists insist, the idealist,—must first show how he dares, as a being who knows only through

der Satz: Ein Reiter kann nicht zu Fuss gehn." These are typical expressions of realistic presuppositions, taken from a representative modern book.

the light of consciousness, to doubt the "testimony of consciousness." Is not every such doubt doomed from the start to contradiction? What can guide the doubt concerning the "testimony of consciousness" except consciousness itself? Who can cross-question or refute this "witness" without appealing to the very witness in person?

But whether one calls it doubting or not, it seems certain that we have a right, as students devoted to reflection upon first principles, to ask, a little more precisely, what the "testimony" in question *means*, to what sort of independence it bears witness, and in what sense the testimony is supposed to be presented in or through consciousness. To ask such questions is to begin the course of reflection which leads to Idealism. In my original paper I treated these questions in a fashion necessarily very summary. Let us here examine some of them a little more closely, for the sake of later comprehending more clearly the implications of our own position. For, I repeat, the presuppositions of ordinary Realism have a close relation to those which Professor Howison opposes to my thesis.

There is, in everybody's consciousness, the evidence of somewhat whose existence is independent of this consciousness itself. Here is the thesis. If we examine consciousness to find of what nature this evidence is, we meet with a well-known difference of opinion. Some thinkers teach, as Reid no doubt in the main meant to teach, that this evidence for the independent reality is simply "immediate." That is, this evidence, in its direct character as mere feeling,

is superior to all reflection. One does not first reason towards any realistic result. One just feels the world to be independent, as one feels red to be red. Others teach that this evidence, although certain and unquestionable, is "mediate," or in other words is an evidence that comes by means of a certain process of interpreting facts in accordance with principles, or of reasoning from data. The teachers of this latter thesis, again, vary in their expressions. Some declare that the certainty of the independent reality of the object-world is mediated by a general and *a priori* "intuition" of some sort, a principle more or less obviously innate, whose deliverance is the unquestionable assertion that there must be *some* external basis, *some* independent truth, behind the mere fact of consciousness. Others appeal to a character found each time afresh, in the individual data of perception, but experienced as having a mediate or indirect significance. This character is a certain tendency of the experienced facts to refer beyond themselves, not by virtue of any general intuition on the part of the knowing subject, but by virtue of a stamp or mark of "reference" which some of the data themselves empirically possess, just as one's desires are often said to be experienced as referring to their own, perhaps distant, fulfilment. One experiences the presence of this "reference" in each new fact of external experience. Others, still, declare that we first experience, within ourselves, the genuine though limited efficacy of our own active wills in directing some of our own states, and that, hereupon, perceiving that this efficacy is limited, that this inner

activity is held in check, by the presence of our external experiences, which come and go whether or no we wish them to do so, we secondarily, and by a process of mediate reasoning, conclude from this our own relative impotence the existence of causes which limit us, and which are therefore independent of us, although their power is expressed in those of our experiences which are beyond our own control.

These and other realistic interpretations of the facts of experience have in common the recognition of one very important character of our present consciousness, namely, its essentially fragmentary, its immediately unstable character, in so far as it is regarded with reference to its meaning. That our consciousness, as it comes, means more than it presents, and somehow implies a *beyond* for which it insistently seeks,—this indeed is a central characteristic of our experience, and one upon which all insight and all philosophy depend. The anxiety of ordinary thought to interpret this reference in terms of an “independently real” world, which shall “transcend” all consciousness whatever, is due to manifold motives, and in part to relatively unphilosophical motives, whose origin I take to be largely social.¹ But no idealist can doubt the presence in consciousness of those primary tendencies upon which realists of all types have laid such stress. The question is as to the interpretation of such motives. In what sense is it that our consciousness is always pointing beyond itself?

¹ I may here refer to my paper on *The External World and the Social Consciousness*, in the *Philosophical Review* for September, 1894.

II

THE POSSIBILITIES OF EXPERIENCE

The easiest way to begin a comprehensible answer to this question is, as I must forthwith insist, the way that I indicated in my first paper—the way upon which idealists have so often insisted. When any experience refers beyond itself, what it at the very least *may* refer to, what it *may* aim to grasp and to know, what it *may* regard as valid independently of its own contents, may well be, and in our lives often explicitly is, *other possible experience not here presented*. One has an experience of a blue object that seems to be “yonder on the horizon.” One’s experience herewith undertakes to refer to a reality that exists independently of just this experience. But the reality in question may be explicitly regarded, not as any *Ding an sich*, but solely as other, “really possible,” experience. “If I approach,” one may mean, “if I move towards yonder mountain, I shall cease to experience a mere patch of blue on the horizon. I shall ere long see bold outlines, the forms of crags, of valleys, of forests. In the end, if I approach near enough, I shall experience what I shall call the touch of the solid objects yonder. Now in saying this I at least may abstract from all reference to the “transcendent” objects of the realist. I may be meaning simply, that, whereas I now experience such or such visual contents, it is permanently possible that I should experience other contents, visual and tactile, if I performed certain acts. These permanent possi-

bilities of experience I may conceive as independent of my present visual experience, as valid even if I died, still more if I closed my eyes or slept. To this independent validity of the possibilities of experience I *may* be referring, when I talk of something which is independent of my present experience. In talking of the way in which consciousness can refer "beyond itself," we must not ignore, then, the cases where this reference beyond self is to possible contents of consciousness not here realised, but regarded as permanently realisable. This sort of reference is, as before shown, by no means free from obscurity; but it seems to be a reference often made, and we must take it into account when a realist lays stress upon the tendency of consciousness to look for something independent of its own contents. This independent something *may* be the independent validity of a "permanent possibility of experience," in the sense of Kant's "*mögliche Erfahrung*," and of Mill's famous chapter.

But this reference to the permanent possibilities of experience does not exhaust the sorts of reference to independent reality which we often find in consciousness. At any moment I may think of the past or of future experiences. When I think of them, I refer to what transcends the moment. Yet I do not refer to what transcends all experience, but I refer to what, in its supposed truth, is indeed conceived as independent of the contents of this my momentary memory or expectation. Hope as I will, regret as I will, my past deeds, my future destiny (say, my future experience of growing old), have aspects which are viewed

as quite independent of my present hopes and of my present regrets. The latter are experiences that imply a reference to what both transcends them and is true independently of them. But this transcendent and independent reality of past or of future is still not the realist's *Ding an sich*, but is a content of experience. Finally, when I converse with another man, and suppose myself to be comprehending what he says, my experiences refer beyond themselves to a reality supposed by me to have an aspect quite independent of my experience, but this independence is still only the independence belonging to an experience other than mine,¹ namely, my fellow's experience.

When an experience refers beyond itself, it *may*, then, be referring to "other experience, actual and possible, not here presented." Mysterious as all such reference appears when first critically examined, there can be no doubt of the presence and of the frequency of just such forms of appeal to the "transcendent." There can also be no doubt, that every such appeal from one moment of consciousness to other experience, actual and possible, presents itself as a reference to a *reality*. The past and the future, my neighbour's mind, and the whole range of the "genuine possibilities" of experience,—these are, for any moment of experience that refers to any of them, as really "independent" realities, which one knows or does not know, truly

¹ Concerning the concept of "experience not my own," compare discussions both in my article cited p. 148, note, and in an article entitled *Self-Consciousness, Social Consciousness, and Nature*, which I printed in the *Philosophical Review*, July and September, 1895.

grasps or falsely reports, finds mysterious or regards as clear and certain,—as really independent realities as if they were “things in themselves.” Only, in the case of these types of objects, however hard the individual object may be to know with assurance, the *type* of object itself seems in one respect knowable enough. For it is no “thing in itself.” It is explicitly an object in so far as it either is or may be the content or the existence of some experience. The problem therefore arises: “Can other types of objects than these be defined or accepted?” The ordinary realist says, Yes. For the idealist, all depends upon confining his real objects to the objects of the foregoing types, in so far as, after criticism, these types can all be reduced to his own sort of rational unity, and the relative independence of their objects can be explained accordingly.

But let the realist now continue his parable. Other sorts of “independent” objects there are and must be, he declares. Why? First, to follow one type of Realism, because we “immediately know” that there are such transcendent objects independent of all consciousness. But, so one replies, how can consciousness *immediately* know what is by hypothesis immediately determined as *not* present to consciousness, namely, precisely the independent aspect of the object, or the fact that *if* the consciousness were not, the object would still be as it is? “I see immediately in front of me that there is something behind my back.” “I feel immediately that if I did not feel, there would still be something there to feel.” No; immediate knowledge is of what is felt, not of what is not felt.

The existence of the object, when it is not felt, is ipso facto something not felt. This existence, as for argument's sake we may momentarily admit, may indeed be "known," that is, it may be believed in, from the start, it may be accepted as a "postulate," it may be concluded from signs, from intuitions, from reasonings long or brief; but, in any case, it cannot be a matter of merely immediate knowledge. For immediate knowledge, if it means anything, means knowledge of what is present in feeling.

One turns, then, to the other forms of Realism. Consciousness somehow, although not in a *merely* immediate way, bears witness to the presence of a transcendent object, which is independent of all consciousness. But, once more, How?

Amongst the numerous answers to this question attempted by philosophical realists, there are three which here especially concern us. They form the genuine basis of the more reflective sorts of Realism; and together they actually express a truth.

III

THE FIRST ARGUMENT FOR REALISM

The first of these three answers runs: The data of our experience, and in fact of all consciousness, viewed just as the data of consciousness, present themselves in such form as to call for *explanation*. The explanation called for cannot be furnished by other data of consciousness; for these, again, being such data, would themselves require explanation.

Therefore, that which explains the data of consciousness must lie beyond all consciousness, and so must be a transcendent object.

But this answer is itself capable of taking various forms. Its most common form lays stress upon the conception of Causality, and calls for a causal explanation of the conscious data. Our consciousness, so one asserts, does not cause its own data, except in the case of our acts of spontaneity (if there be such acts). In general, the data of sense come to us with a certain *Zwang*, a compulsion, over which our will is powerless. This compulsion, which binds our experience, is, then, not explained by anything within the limits of this experience itself. But explanation is needed. Something must cause the data to be what they are. Shall this something be another state of consciousness? Or shall it be a fact of a real and transcendent world, independent of all consciousness? The first of these two answers, one says, would only postpone the problem. Consciousness nowhere shows us enough self-explained facts to form a basis for the causal explanation of the other facts. Consciousness is full of data that come in a compulsory fashion; but consciousness nowhere presents to us as a part of its own content anything adequate to furnish us the source of the compulsion. Consciousness, as such, is dependent. The transcendent objects alone can be causally independent — the sources from which our data proceed.

Other hardly less favourite ways of stating this insistence upon explanation demand either logical or teleological explanations of the conscious data, in such

fashion as to lead to the assumption of the transcendent objects. Conscious data are "appearances." Appearances imply "*Etwas das da erscheint.*" Where there is so much smoke, there must be fire. Experience is the smoke. Only what transcends consciousness could be the fire, *i.e.*, here, the logically intelligible basis of the appearances. Again, were there nothing transcendent, experience would be a dream, without even a dreamer. These various ways of attempting to show that the denial of the transcendent would involve a denial of a "necessary logical implication of the very existence of a world of appearance," thus gradually pass, through the metaphor of the "dream," to a stage where the "explanation" called for, the "implication" insisted upon, is rather teleological than either causal or logical. To deny the transcendently real world would be to make experience "meaningless," by depriving it of "good sense," by leaving no true difference between dream and waking, between science and madness. "*Ein gesunder Realismus,*" as some recent German writers love to call it, could alone so explain experiences as to give significance to our conscious data, which "amount to nothing" unless there are transcendent realities behind them. Hence, only the dreamy men of the closet can be idealists. Practical men, and men wide awake, believe in transcendent realities. In fact, it is more or less immoral not to believe in such transcendent realities. Thus in the end our realist may approach as nearly as you please to the arguments, and, as we shall see, to the theses, of Professor Howison.

Into the manifold motives expressed in these various efforts to explain the data of consciousness by the existence of transcendent objects, we cannot here further look. Our business is not with what makes such arguments so plausible as they are, but with the general question of their validity. It is enough here to observe, in passing, that the true motives, and the popular plausibility, of all such arguments can be understood only when you consider the essentially social basis upon which, in the last analysis, the usual realistic explanations of the data of consciousness rest. These explanations are, namely, appeals, in one form or another, to conceptions more or less essential to the stability and to the definiteness of human social intercourse. They are, accordingly, efforts to interpret ultimate realities in forms suggested by the special canons and categories of human social intercommunication. This essentially conventional basis of the popular Realism of those who "explain" the data of consciousness by transcendent objects, renders the arguments of such Realism as psychologically interesting, in their history and in their various formulations, as they are inadequate to the task of formulating any ultimate philosophical theory of reality. But we have here to do with their validity, and not with their natural history.

Their validity, however, can be easily tested, and in a way that applies equally to all their various forms. One has data, *a*, *b*, *c*, etc. One says: "There is known to us some principle of explanation which declares that wherever any fact, *p*, of the type to which *a*, *b*, *c*, etc., belong, is presented, there must

exist a fact behind or beyond ϕ , namely x , such that x explains ϕ by standing to ϕ in the known relation R ,—say, the relation of cause to effect, or of logical condition to consequent, or of teleological explainer to that whose sense or meaning it explains. And, in general, the relation R is such as to require x to be of another type than ϕ . Now, in case a, b, c , etc., are data of experience, then the x which stands to any one of them in the relation R does not, by hypothesis, belong, in general, to the series a, b, c , etc. Hence, in general, it must be transcendent."

I reply, in the usual idealistic fashion: What do you mean by this relation R ? I care not how you know that such a relation is necessary, or must exist. This your knowledge may be a human convention or a primal "intuition." That here concerns us not. What I ask is, how you express to your mind the nature of this relation R , whatever it is, and wherever it may exist or be known to exist. Do you or do you not mean, by this relation R , a relation which you at once conceive as capable of being presented to you in some possible experience? You say: "The relation is real." You mean something by the assertion, and something said to be well known to you. For the relation R is by hypothesis especially clear to you. You are so sure of it that you use it to prove the presence of that otherwise unknowable and transcendent x ; and you define x as that which stands in the relation R to any fact ϕ of our experience. Is not, then, this relation R clear to you just because, however it is supposed to be realised, a possible experience could present to you the known situation

that the relation expresses? For instance, let the relation R be the causal relation. You know, by hypothesis, what causation means. Surely this implies that in your experience you have already met, or could meet, with cases of what you would recognise as causal relation; and that wherever a causal relation exists, it is like in its nature to what you experience, or get presented to your intelligence, when you know particular instances of causation. The causal relation, if thus clear to you, is *ipso facto* clear to you as something that could be instanced, presented, and comprehended in a possible experience. So too with any other relation whose nature is now clear to you. Now, if this be true, how can p , which is a fact of experience, be viewed as standing in a certain relation R (which also is, by hypothesis, a fact of a *possible* experience) to something, x , whose very nature is that it is *no* fact of any possible experience, being a reality that is utterly transcendent? This is as if you should say: "I know quantities, a , b , c , etc.; and I know a relation R , viz., that of equality. Hereupon, however, I declare that a , or b , or c , stands in this known relation R , viz., in the relation of equality, to a certain x which is expressly defined as something which is no quantity at all." This would be absurd. It is precisely as absurd to say: Contents of experience stand in a known and clear relation, that itself is, as such, an object of possible experience, to something that is to be expressly defined as no object of any possible experience whatever. If the relation is, as such, an object of a possible experience, then its terms are so too.

But a realist may try to escape this consequence. He may say: "No, the relation R is itself, to my mind, something sure, indeed, but transcendent. I do not regard causality in itself, or explanation in itself, as capable of being presented to the mind in any possible experience. What I say is, that the facts of the type exemplified by p are known to stand in a transcendent relation R to a transcendent basis x . This is sure. But R is as transcendent as x ."

I reply: Thus you but open the door to a fatal infinite progress. One asks you, again: What evidence can you give for this transcendent and unexperienced existence, beyond consciousness, of R ,—say, of causation, or of some other form of explanatory relation? Afresh you must answer, if you still cling to the present line of argument: "Because the facts of experience demand, for their explanation, the existence of some such transcendent relation to transcendent realities." But this new demand for explanation introduces a *new* relation, R' , between the facts of experience, a, b, c , etc., and the first relation R , which was to be that relation to x whereby they were explained. All our questions as to R now recur as to R' , the new mediator that is to bring us to the assumption of R . For instance, if you first had said: "The data of experience need causation to explain them," one has now asked you, as above: What sort of causation?—the sort of causation known within experience, and, by its very definition, known as a datum of possible experience? Our realist is now supposed to have replied: "Not so. The causation whereby I explain the data of experience is itself a

transcendent sort of causation, that, as a relation existent outside of experience, links us to the transcendent objects which cause experience in us." Hereupon, however, one asks, at the present stage: What, then, leads you to believe in the existence of that transcendent sort of causation? The realist hereupon may reply: "Why, some of the data of consciousness are such as demand, as their sufficient cause, the existence of just such transcendent causality. For our idea of this transcendent causality is an idea that in itself needs a cause. And of this idea the transcendent causality is the only sufficient cause." I answer, at once: The infinite regress is under way. You are no whit forwarder. You have not begun to show how the transcendent explains anything. For you explain the data by a transcendent *x* only because the relation of causality is said to be sure and to imply *x*. Asked, however, to explain your assurance of this transcendent causality, you say that there surely must be some transcendent cause for our experienced assurance of causality. And thus you may continue as long as you please.

IV

THE SECOND ARGUMENT FOR REALISM, AND ITS
IDEALISTIC INTERPRETATION

The first argument of our realist, when closely viewed, thus involves either an infinite regress, or else an appeal to conceptions which our former account of reality as being "the content of actual and of pos-

sible experience" has already included and defined. If, by saying that *an experience, p, needs an explanation in the existence of some fact x, which stands to p in the relation R*, one refers to a relation *R* identical with an already known and experienced relation, one inevitably implies the assertion: "If the fact *p* were properly known, it would be experienced as in the relation *R* to *x*"; and hereupon *x*, as well as *p*, must be viewed as the object or content of a possible experience. Thus *x* ceases to be anything that we have so far regarded as a transcendent object. But if one regards the relation *R* itself as a transcendent relation, a new mediating relation, *R'*, is needed to make valid any argument for the transcendent reality of the first relation *R*; and an infinite regress becomes necessary.

The first argument of the realist accordingly fails. But he has ready a second and more cogent consideration. Instead of permitting this *x* to become essentially a fact of experience as before, by virtue of the conception of the real as the "content of possible experience," he now directly undertakes to use this latter conception as an argument for his own, and to absorb whatever is implied by a "content of possible experience" in his own notion.

This second and more cogent realistic argument runs as follows: It has been admitted by the supposed opponent of Realism that he himself is unable to state in terms of experience that is altogether concrete and actual, or that, in other words, is the experience of somebody in particular, the whole constitution of the truth to which he appeals. He is

forced, as has been seen in the foregoing, to appeal to "possible experience." He asserts that beyond the confines of what anybody does experience there are an indefinite number of "possibilities of experience." Now these possibilities of experience are either genuine facts when and while they are not experienced, or else they are mere illusions, just in so far as they are called mere possibilities, and are not the contents of anybody's actual experience. To admit the latter of these alternatives would be to deprive the opponent of Realism of all that makes his doctrine popularly plausible, or even rational. For it is admitted by the opponent of Realism, that our concrete experience implies much which does not now get presented to it. And the supposed "possibilities of experience" are intended to supply the place of what is thus implied. If they are illusions, then this place is not supplied. On the other hand, the first of the alternatives mentioned admits that the possibilities of experience have some sort of being when nobody experiences them. And such being, outside of any concrete experience, is precisely what the realistic hypothesis demands. In vain, so the realist now urges, does the opponent endeavour by the phrase "possible experience" to cloak the fact that a possibility of experience, when it is real but unexperienced, as much exists wholly beyond the range of experience as if it were frankly reduced to a "thing in itself," of the sort that the realist himself defines.

It will be unnecessary here to analyse at any length the cogency of this argument. In my original paper,

I expressly pointed out that the "possibilities of experience," in so far as they remained bare possibilities, are as unintelligible as the realist's "things in themselves." Idealism cannot pause half-way without falling a helpless prey to the counter-dialectics of the realists. Our Idealism, as we *first* stated it, both in the original paper and in the earlier portion of the present review, is just such a half-way Idealism. In presence of the realistic counter-arguments, it is helpless to defend its positive assertion. It is only able continually to reassert its own kind of objection to the positive thesis of the realist. But it is indeed fair to say, that the objection of the half-idealistic to the positive realistic thesis in question is precisely as cogent as the realistic rejoinder. Each theory, as a fact, is, so far, helpless to defend its positive assertions against an opponent's criticism. The realist asserts: "Beyond all our experience, there is something wholly unlike experience, the 'thing in itself.'" To this thesis our half-idealistic always rejoins: "What do you *mean* by your 'thing in itself,' — by the reality, and by the nature, that you ascribe to it? And in what relation do you mean it to stand to experience? As soon as you tell, you interpret your supposed reality wholly in terms of experience. You never define that transcendent beyond, of which you speak. You say, only: 'If we looked further into the nature of what our present experience implies, we should get other experiences in addition to those that we now have.' Into such possibilities of experience your 'thing in itself,' as well as all its relations, causal and other, to our present experience, is transformed, in

so far as you tell what you mean. Whatever you assert as existent beyond our experience, without telling what you mean by the assertion, that, by hypothesis, you have not really and rationally asserted. For a meaningless assertion is no assertion at all. You want to say that beyond our experience there is something transcendent, whose nature is never experienced, whose contents always remain outside of the world of experience. But you can never tell what you mean by this beyond, precisely in so far as it remains a beyond. Telling what you mean is transforming your beyond into something within the world of experience. Therefore I reject your beyond altogether. Experience is all. Yet I admit that much experience remains to us indeed only a ‘possibility.’”

“Yes,” retorts the realist, “but in your last word you have admitted the very essence of my whole contention. For within the range of what individuals do experience you admit that we cannot remain. You admit the possibilities of experience as somehow genuine. You cannot do without them. Yet, as soon as you admit them, you admit an element transcending concrete experience. You admit something whose presence you cannot escape, but whose nature you find it as hard to define as I find it hard to tell precisely what I mean by that transcendent something which my theory frankly admits, and glories in, but which your theory grudgingly recognises, even in trying to conceal the fact of the recognition. Your possibilities are either mere illusions, or else facts. If facts are not experienced, they are beyond experience. And such beyond is all that I

maintain. I should indeed prefer to say that what you call ‘possibilities’ exist beyond experience as *grounds of possibility*, unknown *natures of things*, which determine in advance what our experience shall be when it comes. Such a fashion of statement appears to me a franker admission of the inevitable transcendence.” And our half-idealist can now only retort once more: “But what do you mean by the beyond, whether of the possibility or of its ground, known or unknown? Tell what you mean, and this beyond becomes no longer unknown, no longer transcendent. It becomes content of experience.” And thus the endless conflict may go on.

Now, what possible way of escape is there from this dilemma? I submit: The half-idealist must become a thoroughgoing idealist or nothing. He must assert: “Beyond experience there is, if anything, *further experience*.” And this further experience, so he must assert, is just as concrete, just as definite, as our own, and is real in the same sense in which our own is real. The proof that such experience exists beyond our own must rest, for the true idealist, in the first place, upon just the considerations that lead both half-idealist and realist to assert that our own experience, as something fragmentary, cannot be accepted alone, but implies its own complement. More deeply stated, the thesis of the idealist must be:—That our experience, as essentially imperfect, that is, as not fulfilling the very ideas which we ourselves have acquired in presence of this experience, demands from us statements as to whether these ideas are truly fulfilled or not. For instance, we have an

idea of the whole world, as whole. No matter how we came by this idea, the question inevitably arises: Is there any whole world of fact at all, or is this fragment of experience before us all the fact that there is? Or, again, we have the general idea of experience, as such. The question arises: Is this experience before us the only experience? Or is there, as a matter of fact, other experience than this which is now presented? All such questions involve the general considerations upon which I laid stress in my chapter on "The Possibility of Error" (*The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, Chap. XI). Such questions have a definite answer, or they have no definite answer; and this is true, whatever our present state of knowledge. In other words, such questions, in themselves considered, can either be truly answered in one way, and in one way only, or they would admit, however much we knew, of no definite answer whatever. But in the latter case, the impossibility of giving any answer to them would become manifest to us, upon a large knowledge of truth, by virtue of facts that would then get presented to our insight, and that would then make obvious to us that there is something meaningless about the questions. Such facts could only get presented, however, to one who actually knew a larger whole of experience than is presented to us. And thus we can at least say, that already, at the present time, there is "possible experience" which, if presented, would throw light upon the meaninglessness of our questions concerning actual experience beyond our own. *A fortiori*, if our questions admit of definite answer, there is now

"possible experience" that, if attained, would throw light upon the question as to what contents are actual beyond the now presented contents. Still more certainly can we say that either a true or a false answer to our questions, if now given, would be true or false by virtue of its agreement with contents that, if presented, would confirm or refute the supposed answer. Just so as regards the question concerning the present fulfilment of any other idea, such as the idea of the completeness of the world of experience, or the idea of a whole world of facts. All such questions, whether just now a definite answer for any one of them is true or false, or whether any one of them is a meaningless question, imply beyond our own experience a present "possibility of experience," such as even now warrants the truth of some assertion in reply to each question. It is in this sense that our experience implies a beyond, and a beyond that, in the first place, appears as a world of definite "possible experience," having a determinate, and in the end inevitably a true, total constitution. This total constitution it is impossible, however, to leave finally in the shape just given to it, without recognising, first, that our realist is right in demanding that all possibility shall have its ground in something beyond the mere feeling or assertion of the possibility itself; and, secondly, that the idealist is right in maintaining that nothing viewed as being beyond experience, in its wholeness, can be rationally asserted as a reality. The inevitable result is that the total constitution of the world of fact must be presented to a concrete whole of actual experience, of

which ours is a fragment. The intimacy of the relation of our fragmentary experience to this total experience is indicated by the way in which our experience implies that total.

Thus the second argument of our realist is of actual service to the idealistic cause. The realist asserts that when one says: "A given experience is possible, but not here presented," one inevitably holds that there is fact, both beyond the range of the fragmentary experience that is here and now present, and beyond the range of the bare assertion of the possibility itself. The realist is right. On the other hand, the half-idealistic of our first statement of the case is right in maintaining that as soon as you define the beyond, and tell what you mean by it, you cannot make its nature incongruous with the conception "content of experience," present or possible. The solution of the antinomy lies in asserting that *the beyond is itself content of an actual experience*, the experience to which the beyond is presented being in such intimate relation to the experience which asserts the possibility, that both must be viewed as aspects of one whole, fragments of one organisation. The realist, in so far as he is opposed to the half-idealistic, is merely a thoroughgoing idealist who does not know his own mind. He rejects bare possibilities, in favour of something beyond them which is their ground. He is right. Only, this beyond is the Concrete Whole of an Absolute Experience, wherein the thoughts of all the possibilities of experience get their right interpretation, their just confirmation, or their refutation,—in a word, their fulfilment.

It must be observed that what is here said about the interpretation of experience in general, must inevitably apply to the ethical experiences and ideas upon which Professor Howison lays so much stress. An ethical fact, *qua* fact, possesses no advantage in logic over any other fact. When I assert the real variety, the moral independence, or any other sort of relative separation of the individuals of the moral world, I assert a fact which, whatever be the reasons for its assertion, must, as fact, be viewed either as beyond anybody's experience or else as present to some experience; say, to the Absolute Experience. The former hypothesis leads me once more through all the stages of the foregoing argument. The latter hypothesis alone solves the logical problem of the real facts in question. However diverse, or separate, the moral individuals may be, the reality of their very separation itself is a fact which must be present in and for the unity of the Absolute Experience. This their separation is only relative. When Professor Howison asserts that, for any moral individual, his fellow, namely, any other moral individual, is a beyond, and as such inaccessible, he asserts precisely what an ordinary realist asserts concerning the nature of every fact not presented in concrete human experience. As against a half-idealistic, who should attempt to reduce the contents of his neighbour's inner life to *mere* possibilities of his own personal and private experience, Professor Howison is unquestionably right. But as against an Absolute Idealism, which admits that fact transcends the bare assertion of any real possibility of experience, but which recognises,

for that very reason, that all fact, as such, has to be present to an Absolute Experience, Professor Howison's ethical enthusiasm is logically defenceless. I agree that Individuality is a fact. I agree that it is an ethical fact. I agree that the fact of other individuality than mine is to me, *in my private capacity*, something transcendent. But such transcendence has many other examples, doubtless not so important, but nevertheless logically instructive. What happened last year, now has a reality which entirely transcends any moment of present experience,—inaccessibly transcends it, so that one in vain tries to state the true essence of the real past by converting it into mere present possibilities of experience; as, for example, by saying that the past means that if I were back there now, I should experience so and so. Such possibilities of experience do not express what the past as such is, and always henceforth will be, namely, essentially irrevocable. Even so, no attempt to transmute my neighbour's real inner life into possibilities of my own experience is or can be successful, in so far as I am taken in my own finite and individual selfhood. But just as past and present, from an idealistic point of view, are fragments of the eternal Now,—of the Absolute Experience,—so the fact of the relative finite isolation of individuals is a real fact in so far as the Absolute Experience finds it to be such. What the source and ultimate nature of Individuality is, and whether the whole truth of Individuality is well expressed by calling it *merely* a fact present in the content of the Absolute Experience, is a question to be later considered. I agree with Pro-

fessor Howison that there is another aspect to the world, in addition to the aspect upon which I have so far laid stress in this review. That the Absolute Experience is organically linked with an absolute Will and Love; that the contents of this Experience are not only facts, but chosen fulfilments of ideals; and that individuals are not only facts of the Absolute Experience, but expressions, embodiments, cases,—forms, if you will,—of the Absolute Love itself; all this I shall hereafter have occasion to consider. But here I am considering the world of fact in so far as it is fact, not in so far as it has value, or expresses the divine Will. And I insist that, viewed merely as fact, Individuality logically resembles any other fact, and that the real variety of individuals logically presupposes and depends upon the unity of the Absolute Experience, precisely as does any other real fact. Ethical Realism must stand or fall, just like other Realism; namely, as a relatively true, but fragmentary, expression of what an Absolute Idealism alone can express in truth.

V

THE THIRD ARGUMENT FOR REALISM: TRANSITION
TO ABSOLUTE IDEALISM

I now pass to the last of the realist's three arguments. Ignoring both the contents of the foregoing discussion and the conclusions which we have drawn from it, the realist may now insist upon another aspect of our ordinary experience, as implying the existence of transcendent objects beyond experience.

"The most characteristic feature of our consciousness," he may say, "in so far as our consciousness is rational, appears in our tendency to refer again and again, in our various successive thoughts, to what we call the 'SAME' object. To-day I see a house. I leave it, and to-morrow I return to the 'same' house. My friend whom I meet to-day is the 'same' man whom I met yesterday. I myself am the 'same' person at various times. These are ordinary assumptions of common-sense. Nor is it possible to deal at all with our experience without making such assumptions. One may be a sceptic, and may assert that possibly what I call the 'same' house or the 'same' man, on various occasions, is only in seeming the same. Notoriously more difficult it is to suppose, even in a sceptical mood, that I myself am not the same self as I was. But scepticism often can and does extend to at least a formal doubt or denial of some aspect of the 'unity of apperception' in various successive thoughts. Yet even such scepticism must come to a limit somewhere. When I say 'A given proposition is now true,' even if it be only the proposition that 'I feel warm,' or that 'rain falls,' I am able to assert that this proposition *will always be true* of that moment in which its truth was experienced. And this implies at least the possibility that, whether or no memory ever afterwards accurately serves me, an assertion should later be made which shall have this moment for its object; so that many assertions are thenceforth possible which shall refer to *this same* moment, although the assertions themselves may be made at very various times. Now,"

as one may continue, "there is nothing about the later judgments and their contents which of itself contains or explains this *relation of reference* of the later judgments to the *same* object. The object may, by hypothesis, be one that, in its time, was a presented content of experience. But neither the original object or content, nor the later judgments about it, can be said to contain, as parts, — that is, as facts of experience, — that relation of reference which makes them all judgments about the *same* facts. Still more impossible is it to reduce to any mere contents of human experience the relation that we have in mind when we say, or conceive, that, as a fact, many people can at the *same* time refer to the *same* objects, or, at various times, can think of the *same* objects. An idealist may undertake to say, as much as he pleases, that what, in its time, was called the Battle of Marathon was a mere mass of contents of experience in the minds of the Greeks and Persians concerned. He may try to deny that the swords, javelins, and horses present were in any sense transcendently real objects, external to anybody's experience. But what the idealist cannot explain, or even express in his terms, is how various schoolboys to-day, various poets and orators in successive ages, various historians, scholars, archæologists, can all think, read, learn, dispute, about the same event, namely, the Battle of Marathon itself. For the battle, when now thought of, is no longer presented experience for anybody. Nor (and this is of special importance) is one man's inner thought or experience, which in him represents the Battle of Marathon, in the faintest degree identical with the thought

or experience which another man has in mind when he refers to the Battle of Marathon. Thus many think of the same battle, but the contents of experience in many minds are not the same, and need not even be very similar. In vain," so our realist may add, "does an idealist attempt, in such cases, to take refuge afresh in scepticism, and merely to doubt whether we all are really referring to the same Battle of Marathon at all. For, as said, scepticism of this sort must find in the end its limit. One is unable to reason through the whole of even one sentence—one is unable to state even the most extreme of scepticism—with any coherence, without assuming that many successive thoughts can refer to the same object. And one is unable to carry out the least act of social intercourse without assuming that A and B, the persons concerned, see, touch, pass from one to another, or otherwise deal with, the same object. Experience, as such, is indeed a world of Heraclitean flux. But the conditions which make many moments of experience, many thoughts, or many people, refer to the same content or moment of experience, or to the same fact in any sense, are not themselves, as conditions of the sameness of reference, contents of anybody's experience, or part of the flow of its ceaseless stream. These conditions, then, presupposed in all rationality, are *ipso facto* transcendent. In brief, then: The sameness of the objects of experience, in so far as these objects can be thought of at various times, can be referred to by various subjects, can be objects for many points of view, demands that at least the relations whereby this same reference is secured, if not the facts themselves

to which reference is made, should transcend the stream of experience itself, and should be really external to it. Into the stream of experience, as into the flux of Heraclitus, nobody descends twice at the same point. If, however, the sameness of reference is still possible, whereby many experiences bear upon, many thoughts portray, the same content of fact, existent beyond them all, then the relations of reference, if not the facts referred to, must be real beyond all experience."

Our realist might combine the present line of argument with the one which, in the foregoing discussion, he used to expound his second consideration. He might insist that whoever speaks of an object of possible experience not now presented, implies that this object is such that, were it converted into presentation, this presentation would somehow be knowable as identical with, as the same as, the object defined before presentation. If I see the light yonder on the horizon, and guess that it is a fire, the half-idealist of the foregoing discussion defines my object as my possible further experience of flame or heat in case I should approach the light. But, as our realist may now maintain, the experience which I should have if I approached the fire would not fulfil the defined possibility of experience, asserted by one who sees the light upon the horizon, unless one could say that, upon approach, he found the *same* light gradually expanding into the expected experience of fire, and unless he found that the fire later experienced was somehow the *same* as the fire expected. Without the category of Sameness, in the objects of concrete ex-

perience, and in the objects of our thoughts about possible experience at various times, the whole theory about possibilities of experience would be meaningless. Yet nowhere in our flowing experience does the sameness, which the half-idealistic also presupposes, ever get adequately and finally presented. Nor could it be presented to any temporal experience similar to our own. Thus afresh may the realist maintain that the sameness of our objects logically involves their transcendence.

This argument from the sameness of the objects of various experiences and thoughts—a sameness required indeed by all rationality—is probably the strongest, and, properly viewed, the most enlightening, of realistic arguments. It is not, like the earliest arguments mentioned in the foregoing discussion, a mere appeal to common-sense prejudices. It is an appeal to something that the utmost scepticism, if articulate, not only admits, but asserts; namely, that various judgments and moments of experience can mean the same objects. Without this assertion, no criticism of a thesis, no sceptical rejection of a theory, no doubt about the power of our thought to know truth, can be seriously stated or definitely maintained. If one wants the ultimate truth regarding what motive it is that forces us to transcend our fragmentary experience, in idea if not in fact, and to seek in the beyond for something missing in the stream of consciousness, nowhere can one better satisfy one's curiosity than in taking account of this aspect of experience and of this motive in favour of transcendence. On the other hand, no one of the realistic

arguments is more adapted for an immediate transformation into the form, not of the half-idealism above considered, but of the Absolute Idealism maintained in my original paper, and in the immediately previous section of the present argument. The situation is this: Moments or persons, experiences or thoughts, themselves numerically different, can refer to and mean the same object external to them all. Now, wherein consists this sameness of reference? Is it conceivably a fact that can transcend *all* experience? By hypothesis it does transcend *our* experience, as such. But is ours all? The moments in question have, in themselves, by hypothesis, only a fragment of a meaning present to them. The rest of this meaning, and (be it noted) of their own meaning, is beyond them. But a meaning, *as the meaning of a thought referring to an object*, is a sort of fact that, by definition, can have no meaning, cannot be this sort of fact, except for consciousness, *i.e.* except when it is experienced as a meaning. A fact supposed to be transcendent to all consciousness might well be an *x*, but could not well be that unique and definite *relationship* which is presented to us whenever the meaning, or objective reference of our thoughts, is not fragmentary, but is, relatively speaking, within our own range of experience. Moments, or persons, or thoughts, *a*, *b*, and *c*, mean, let us say,—that is, refer to,—the same object *O*. That is, in nature, a perfectly obvious kind of relation. For if *a*, *b*, and *c* are present with the object *O* as moments or factors in the same whole unity of consciousness, then indeed we are aware what the relation is. In our own experience we are sufficiently

accustomed to such cases. Thus, for example, in one conscious moment I may observe two thoughts of mine referring to the same object; as when, in logic, I compare two judgments, or, in a considerate mood, balance two opinions relating to the same subject-matter. What the relation that thus constitutes the common meaning of two thoughts is, I in such cases directly observe. But, now, how could such a relation exist, unobserved by any consciousness, and forming no content of any experience? *Here* surely, if anywhere, is a sort of fact whose *esse* is *percipi*, whose nature it is to be known. If it is the universal presupposition of rationality that just *such* a relation may, and in practice constantly does, bind many moments in my own flowing experience to the same object, not presented in any one of those moments, then the only way in which this relation can be interpreted is to suppose that all these moments are really fragments of one Unity of Consciousness, of a Unity not bound to the limitations of our own flow of successive and numerically separate experiences, although inclusive, both of this flow, and of these various experiences themselves,—in their very fragmentariness,—but also in their relationships.

It is indeed common enough for the realist to conceive his transcendent objects as remaining the same objects through a long series of moments of time. Time flows, and they, he says, persist as the same “things in themselves.” This view is indeed, in any of its forms, a hopeless abstraction so long as the objects are mere “things in themselves.” But its abstractness becomes peculiarly manifest when this

so-called *same object* is explicitly defined as being the *same for many* thinkers or knowers; that is, as being the same just in so far forth as many moments stand to it in the relation of meaning it, despite their own supposed mutual separateness, and their isolation from this their common object. For the relation of meaning, or referring to, an object is confessedly unique. It is a relation whereof one fragment is presented as a fact of experience in the very inner intent of the moment that knows or refers to the object. This, so to speak, is the moment which possesses the empirically conscious end, or aspect, of the supposed meaning. And the relation of reference or meaning is such, in its objective capacity, and in its wholeness, as to fulfil that subjective intent of the moment. But how? Answer: In precisely *such* wise as such an intent is fulfilled when, in an empirical unity of consciousness, a moment that means an object is found present together with the object meant, and is found to be related thereto in the well-known fashion that exemplifies this unique relation of reference itself. To suppose *such* a relation objectively realised without a transcendent objective unity of consciousness in which it is realised, is to suppose a question answered without an answer being given, a wish fulfilled without any concrete fact of fulfilment. In brief, an objective relation of meaning or reference, existing apart from any unity of consciousness, is precisely like an unfelt pain or an undesired object of desire.

The value of the realist's argument is here once more the fact that its consideration forces Idealism

to become absolute. Nor is the present argument without application to the considerations suggested by such an Ethical Realism as Professor Howison's. In the definition of the ethical significance of the independent individuals that constitute Professor Howison's "City of God," it is evident that much stress must be laid upon the fact that any ethical individual remains, as to his independence and as to his rights, logically the *same* eternal object for all the various other beings that constitute his fellow-citizens. In Professor Howison's account, moreover, the "City of God" itself, to which the various subjects, rejecting all monistic frivolity, retain what Professor Howison calls a "stainless allegiance," is obviously, both as ideal and as eternal ethical reality, the *same for all*, being both their object, to whose laws they mean to conform, and the reality wherein their moral aims are fulfilled. Now this, as it stands, is Realism. The ethical dignity of the contents of the real objects, whose independence and sameness is presupposed, does not alter in the least the logical character of the category involved. Logic is not ethics, but the ethical categories must be logical. And the logical status of the foregoing concept is obvious. One independent moral agent is, by virtue of his independence, no mere object *in* the experience of any other agent. The "City of God," as such, is nobody's experience, not even God's. But, in the moral world, various free-agents can and should unite in recognising the rights of any one moral agent as the *same for them all*. And the "City of God," as reality, is the *same for all*, gods and men. The consequence

is, that the objects so far referred to in this statement of Professor Howison's Ethical Realism are essentially transcendent objects. The free-agents, and the constitution of their "City," belong to the realm of "things in themselves." The "stainless allegiance" aforesaid is, logically speaking, nothing but an ordinary Realism. The ordinary materialist has his own kind of "stainless allegiance" to "matter in motion." Spencer entertains similarly devout sentiments towards the "Unknowable," and all such thinkers show in common with Professor Howison a tardiness in defining what they mean by their ultimate relation to that very object which, as they aver, they above all do mean. To be "unstained" by reflective definition may be an ethical virtue, but cannot be a logical recommendation of a fundamental philosophical concept.¹ As a fact, all this Realism, when duly considered, becomes either Absolute Idealism or nothing. The "things in themselves," whether they are atoms, or Unknowables, or free-agents, or the "City of God," must be in one unity of consciousness with the thoughts that mean them, with the acts of devotion that offer allegiance to them, with the ideals that strive after them, with the agents that undertake to serve them. For if not, the concept of Reality has no meaning, philosophy has served us no whit, and we are yet in our sins.

¹ [Professor Howison heartily accepts this principle, but rejects its applicability to his position. He has not the least wish to have allegiance to the City of God unstained "by reflective definition." His use of this allegiance (see pp. 123-125 above) is simply as a stubborn Warning that any logical system which fails to satisfy it is defective, and requires revision. — ED.]

PART II

THE CONCEPTION OF WILL AND ITS RELATION TO THE ABSOLUTE

In the foregoing discussion, as well as in my original paper, a theory of the Absolute has been defined whose essence can now be briefly restated thus: Our experience, as it comes, is essentially fragmentary. This fragmentariness is not an accidental defect of an experience such as is ours. It is an essential defect of all finite experience. In other words, you cannot suppose our experience, as it is, to be, or to contain, the whole of what we refer to when we speak of the real, unless you are willing to fall prey to a logical contradiction.

A sceptic might indeed be supposed to say: "What I now and here immediately experience may be the whole of reality." But such a sceptic, if he tries to state this view coherently, finds the hypothesis in question simply contradictory. For what he means may be, first, the well-known assertion: "I can mean to refer, in genuine truth, to no object except what is now present to me *as* the object here meant. Hence I can never really think, much less verify the thought, of an object beyond, *i.e.* not now present to me." But hereupon we at once reply to the sceptic, that in raising his question he already

has thought of the beyond, or has *meant to mean*—that is, to refer to—that very sort of object which he sceptically calls in question. If the sceptic retorts: "One may *imagine* that one is referring to the real beyond, but in fact one can only refer to contents immediately presented in consciousness," then we reply that the very admission of the sceptic is fatal to his own thesis; for if one can imagine that one means what one does not really mean, the incongruity between an imagined meaning, present to consciousness, and one's real meaning, which is not present to consciousness so long as the imaginary meaning takes its place, already implies the reality of meanings when they are not present to this single moment of consciousness; and this implication already involves the sceptic in the admission both that the beyond can be, and that it can be meant even while it is beyond. If the sceptic hereupon admits that one may really mean the beyond, but may not know whether in truth there is a beyond, this reference to *what is in truth* is itself an admission of a real beyond; namely, precisely *that which is in truth*.

The beyond, then, is logically implied in the presented, and so far the realist is right. As we have seen, the half-idealist of our earlier statement is equally right in insisting that whatever beyond you admit or define must be interpreted in terms of possible experience. Now the beyond that we are actually forced to define as the content of reality has appeared in the foregoing discussion (1) as that which, if presented in experience, would answer truly all rational questions. It has appeared (2) as that

whose constitution, as a true constitution, must furnish an object which is ultimately the same for all points of view, and which fulfils the meaning of all assertions that may be made regarding reality. We have seen that both these definitions of the beyond require that its contents and character and meaning should be present in one unity of consciousness with all the moments and contents of finite thought and experience. Reality thus, so far, appears as Absolute Experience, together with all that content and constitution which shall prove to be necessary for the definition of an Absolute Experience.

The concept of an Absolute Experience, thus generally defined, has been further sketched, although briefly, in my original paper. It is a conception as inevitable from one point of view as it is naturally open to inquiry and more or less plausible objection from another point of view. The problem how to conceive an Experience sufficient unto itself, involving and including not only such experiences as ours, such thoughts as we frame, but a complete system of finished thought, a wealth of contents such as to fulfil this system of ideas in the completest manner logically conceivable, — this problem is obviously an extremely difficult one. It is one thing to show the necessity of such a conception, another to develope positively its implications. As a fact, it will not be surprising if in this development new aspects, besides those of thought and experience, prove to be necessary in order to complete the very conception of an Absolute Experience conceived as a concrete whole. In fact an Absolute Experience, in order to be such,

must unquestionably involve other aspects than those which are directly suggested by the word "experience." And, in my original paper, I expressly observed that this must be the fact; or, in other words, that the divine Omniscience must involve other attributes than Omniscience alone.

The essential feature of the foregoing account may be expressed by saying that all facts, all thoughts, all fulfilments of thoughts,—in a word, all truth,—must be present to and in the unity of one Divine or Absolute Consciousness, precisely as, in one of our own moments, many data and many aspects are together in the unity of such a moment. But this concept of the "Eternal Now," of the "One Moment," as the character of the Absolute when viewed as the All-Knower, is so far an extremely abstract conception. One has every right to ask: Has the Absolute no other characters than this? Does the Absolute only know? Or does he also will? Is our Absolute a purely theoretical being? Or does perfect knowledge imply more than mere knowledge?

The purpose of this Second Part of my present paper is to answer in part this very question, by considering the relation of a conception, first carefully generalised from our concept of Will, to the now defined conception of the Absolute. The discussion will here consist of two subdivisions. In the first, I shall consider the general conception of Will, trying to distinguish therein the most essential from the more accidental features of our human experience of what we call Will. In the second, I shall reconsider the conception of an "Absolute Experi-

ence," or of "a complete knowledge of all truth in the unity of a single moment," in order to discover whether such a conception does not involve the presence of some generalised form of Will as a factor in the Absolute Experience itself.

To define the Absolute as the Omniscient Being, or as the All-knowing Moment, or Instant, is, as I hold, the best beginning for an idealistic doctrine. But I do not regard such a definition as other than a beginning. Our mode of progress must, however, be as follows: We must develope our already attained conception of the Absolute, not by arbitrary external additions, but by essentially immanent methods. As the implications of ordinary experience led us to the conception of an Absolute Experience, so the implications of this latter conception must lead us to look for factors or moments whereby we may complete the purely theoretical definition. As a fact, the conception of an experience wherein an absolute system of ideas gets a fulfilment, and wherein all truth forms the content of a single whole moment, demands, for its own completion, the presence of a factor whereby the Individual Whole of the Absolute Moment gets a more positive definition than we have yet given it. This new factor, whereby the unity of the Absolute Consciousness gets its positive definition and its individuality, we shall see reason to call the Absolute Will.

I

THE ESSENTIAL AND THE NON-ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS
OF THE WILL

The popular conception of Will, derived from our inner experience, contains, amongst others, *three* groups of elements that I here wish merely to mention at the outset. The relation of these elements is a matter about which our ordinary consciousness is not very clear, and people differ a great deal as to what element they regard as essential to the conception of the will. These elements are respectively: Desire, Choice, and Efficacious Effort.

Desire is a name for feelings that can arise in our minds with very various degrees of vigour and clearness. I can desire without knowing what it is that I desire. I can have contradictory desires. I can desire without the least hope of being able to satisfy my desire. I can desire unreasonably. I can desire capriciously. On the other hand, unless I first desire, I shall never get any of the more complex and rational processes of the will. Desire is related to developed will in rational agents as sense-data are related to perceptions.

Choice is a name for a much more rational and derivative mental process. Plainly, we must *learn* to choose, and that, too, very slowly. When I choose, I must have desires. I must, however, already know something about what I call the worth, the rational relations, the significance, of these desires. Only through experience do I get the data for such know-

ledge. And so my choice is never identical with any primary desire as such. Choice is a mental process that involves the presence of plans for the satisfaction of desires, a foreknowledge of relatively objective ends that constitute the conscious aims of these desires, a more or less reasonable estimate of the value of these aims, and then some process which involves the survival of some, the subordination, or perhaps the suppression, of other desires.

So much for the second element of the human will. For some writers, choice has seemed the essential element of the will. The *Effectiveness* of one's choice such writers have regarded as a fact relatively external to the will. Kant's "man of the good will" would be a being of rational choices, but he would remain just as reasonable, and so just as much a man of good will, if Nature were henceforth always to thwart his intents. But many others have regarded the will's actual Effectiveness, our third element, as belonging, in a measure, to the essence, rather than to the accidents, of the voluntary process. Those countless writers who have regarded our voluntary bodily acts as the primal instances, in our experience, of the true relation of cause and effect, seem to regard the will as primarily a phenomenon of Efficacious Effort. And as a fact, in normal cases, to will and to observe that our efforts are to a certain degree efficacious, at least in controlling bodily movements, or in directing the course of our inner life, are actually very closely related processes. Thus, for instance, I cannot now will to celebrate next Christmas, since I cannot by present deeds

transport myself to next Christmas. That I can only desire. But I can will to begin planning and preparing for Christmas. And just so I can now will to express myself in these words, and behold, in one popular sense of the word "will," the will is the deed.

Here is no place for a psychological analysis of these three aspects of what is popularly regarded as volition. But one may say, at once, that all three aspects come to us, primarily, as facts of human experience, coloured through and through by the special conditions of our human mental life. For instance, the phenomena felt by us as the phenomena of efficacious effort are, as is now known, not the phenomena that cause our voluntary acts, so much as the mere effects of conduct. The sense of efficacious effort is very largely, if not wholly, due to kinæsthetic sensory states, of widely varied peripheral origin,—muscle, joint, skin sensations, visual experiences, sensations of breathing, of general bodily movement, etc.; states which really result either from the acts that they seem to produce or from our mere memories of the results of former deeds. Such states no more throw light upon any metaphysical efficaciousness of the will than the sense of smell informs us as to the doings of the archangels. But the numerous writers who have conceived our experiences of efficacious effort as in themselves apt to reveal the very essence of the relation of cause and effect have too readily applied these same human experiences to the purpose of conceiving even the very essence of the Divine Will, and the relation between the Creator's act and the world's processes, as seen from

the Divine point of view. For such writers, God's Will, through an unconscious misuse of the psychological facts, actually often gets predominantly defined in terms of our muscle and joint sensations,—a process as enlightening as if you should attribute to the All-seeing Eye the possession of our systems of after-images.

In brief, then, while it is perfectly true that our conceptions of an Absolute Thought and Experience, as well as the conception which we now seek to define, are all attained through a process of generalising from the types of thought and experience and will that we know, it is necessary to be careful in finding the motives that can warrant any such generalisation. Our right to our earlier generalisations in this paper has been as follows: Of the characteristics of our own inner life, there are two which primarily lend themselves to generalisation when we try to form the conception of some experience more inclusive or exalted than our own. These characteristics are the possession of thought, and the presence of contents or of data such as fulfil the ideas of thought, and give them concreteness. A being higher than ourselves in conscious grade must know,—of that we seem at once sure. And to know, is, on the other hand, to find ideas expressed in contents. For truth means idea fulfilled in fact. And one who knows, knows truth. But while such a formal generalisation of the essence of our own experience is common to all efforts to define the Absolute as above us in conscious grade, it is much harder to generalise accurately the phenomena of such a complex and

human a structure as is our will,—this labyrinth of desires, lighted by choice, and illustrated by a constantly accompanying language of bodily deeds, which in their turn are coloured by a normal, but in us certainly largely illusory, sense of power and of free control. Surely, if any being above our grade is to be conceived as having Will, we must not expect to find his will as confused an affair as is our own, and we must know why we attribute to him any such attribute at all.

As a fact, however, no one of these three aspects, as such, makes clear to us the deeper essence of the will. Another aspect, the frequent topic of a now pretty familiar psychological analysis, will be still more useful to us when we proceed to an effort to re-examine the conception of the Absolute with an ultimate reference to its possession of Will. Despite the complexity of the product that we call "the will," there is still *one* element of it which is constantly present in all grades of volition, and which has a central significance in our voluntary experience. And this is the element which we call ATTENTION.

Our voluntary processes, as we may here take interest in observing, are, in all their grades, selective rather than inventive. You can will nothing original,—no novel act,—nothing except what you have already and involuntarily learned to do; and that, however much you may desire or wish to be original, You can will to do, I say, what you have already somehow learned to do, before your will acts. I am indeed popularly said to be able to will to commit an absolutely new act; as when a lover first wills to win his

beloved, or a man in despair wills to commit suicide. But in such cases one really wills an already familiar deed,—such as jumping into the water, or making to a lady such pretty speeches as one already knows how to make. In these cases, it is the situation that is novel, not the act really willed. I repeat, the will is wholly unoriginal. But, on the other hand, when you will, you turn possibility into actuality by dwelling upon one or another various already known and abstractly conceivable possibilities. The essence of the will is here not inventiveness, but attention. Choice is explicitly an attentive selection of one conceived possibility as that upon which you dwell, as against opposing possibilities. Even Desire, in its least rational forms, involves this element of attentive favouring of one conscious content as against a more or less dimly recognised background of other contents. In case of efficacious bodily efforts, you always attend closely to the deed that you most try to perform. Surely if one defined Will, apart from its endless human complications, as *a process involving attention to one conscious content rather than to another*, or, on higher levels, as *the preference of a datum attended to, as over against data that remain, relatively speaking, merely ideal or possible objects of attention*,—one would have a preliminary definition that would promise most as a basis for wider generalisation.

Our conception of Will thus once generalised, it remains to re-examine our conception of the Absolute, in order to see whether the conception of a complete Whole of Experience does not involve, as one of its moments, a factor worthy of the name “Will.”

II

THE RELATION OF THE WILL TO THE ABSOLUTE

Our finite experience, as it comes, is theoretically incomplete in two senses: (1) in that it does not contain the contents which would be needed to meet the ideas and ideal questions that it arouses in us; and (2) in that the contents which it already contains are not, in general, sufficiently clear to our judging thought. On the one side, then, in our experience the contents are not enough to satisfy the ideas which they actually arouse, and we ask: What else is needed in order to complete this collection of contents? On the other side, our ideas are not yet adequate to the present contents, and we ask: What else is needed in order to give us a complete account of what is presented?

Now the World-Consciousness, which, in our foregoing account, we have defined as inevitably actual, cannot be incomplete in the second of these senses. For it experiences, so we have said, all that is real regarding its own contents; in other words, it must know its own contents through and through. Its ideas must be adequate to its presentations. But one may still ask: Is it not inevitably incomplete in the first sense? Must it not have ideas of possible contents that it does not possess? Must not its ideas go beyond its contents?

At a first glance, this would seem indeed logically inevitable. It is of the nature of pure or abstract thinking to deal with endless possibilities, with ideas

which transcend all finite actuality of presentation and which so remain bare possibilities. Of this character of abstract thought the higher mathematical sciences are one long series of examples. Let a line be given; abstract thought can define in this line points as places where the line would be broken, mere positions without magnitude. The presented continuity of the line often seems to threaten to disappear into the endless multitude of these points. How many such points are there on a line? No possible presentation could exhaust this number. The mathematical ideal limits, of the type well known in higher mathematics, are other examples of the way in which thought can define the infinitely remote goal of a process which can never be constructively presented as a complete whole. Experience always determines the infinite universals of thought to concrete individual examples. Thought, on the other hand, even when it defines the contents of experience, always does so by viewing them as individual cases of an infinite series of possible cases.

So then, apparently, thought would transcend any possible whole of experience. There could be no experience to which was presented the concrete realisation of all that thought could and would regard as possible. For such an experience would have, for instance, to view a line as an infinite aggregate of points, adequately composing, despite their discreteness, that continuity of the line in which thought now declares that they could always possibly be found, as filling every place in it. Such an experience, exhausting all thought's possibilities, would have to

experience all the consequences that would have followed had the Persians won at Marathon, or had the Turks overrun Europe. Endless would be the enumerations of even the possible types of possibility that thought would seem to be capable of presenting to an experience which undertook the task of tracing out every infinite regress, every chasing of an ideal limit, every altering of a variable of experience such as thought can declare to be possible. No, surely, there can be no concrete experiences capable of exhausting thought's possibilities.

On the contrary, however, one may indeed argue, as we have already done, that a true thought, even about a bare possibility, is simply an expression, in thought's terms, of something which, just so far as it is true, must be somewhere presented to a concrete experience. This result is in fact inevitable unless, indeed, one is prepared to abandon the fundamental propositions: (1) that experience is an eternally real aspect of truth, and the highest court of appeal when ideas seek for facts, and (2) the accompanying proposition, that whatever is, is somewhere presented.

Here, then, are two views of the relation of thought to experience in the unity of a World-Experience. Are they reconcilable? The one asserts that a World-Experience, since it would inevitably think of possibilities that were not realised in its presentations, would transcend its own content by virtue of its own ideas, and so would be, from an ideal point of view, a relatively incomplete experience. The other asserts that, since bare possibilities are as good as impossibilities, and since true thoughts are true because they

express the nature of something that experience realises, and since even a possibility, if it is genuine, must be represented in experience, an Absolute Experience would have concretely to fulfil all possibilities whose essence was not illusory. Here is a new antinomy in our concept of the Absolute. How shall we deal with it?

The actual reconciliation of these two abstractly opposed points of view is rendered easier by the fact that our experience already, in its measure, exemplifies their reconciliation. And first, here, let us note that a truth manifest in experience can often have its very essence expressed by a hypothetical judgment whose hypothesis is contrary to the fact expressed. "If wishes were horses, beggars might ride." This is not an idle speculation, but a quaint expression, in relatively abstract terms, of the experienced fact that to desire a horse is one thing, to have a horse is quite another. Two facts of experience, *m* and *n*, stand before us in sharp contrast. We want to express the contrast. But the facts, as given, are complex. We analyse their structure, and thoughtfully discover that while *m* contains the elements *p* and *q*, *n* contains the related but contrasting elements *p'* and *q'*. We also observe that *p* and *q*, *p'* and *q'*, are couples, whose respective members are closely linked by some law. We express our discovery by the hypothetical proposition that if *p*, in *m*, were transformed into *p'*, then of necessity *q* would be transformed into *q'*, and our experience would contain not the contrast between *m* and *n*, but a pair of *n*'s, very much alike. The hypothesis is contrary to fact; but the nature of the

actual contrast has been expressed by its assertion. The hypothetical judgment is now experienced as true, although the possibility that it asserts is experienced as unreal.

Still more obvious is the matter, when we treat of an intention. "If you ask me no questions, I will tell you no lies," says a person more concerned to be discreet than to be truthful. Here, in experience, the possibility suggested may or may not be realised. But in either case the hypothetical judgment may express the essence of this person's intent. "I could not do that," says a conscientious man in presence of a rejected temptation; "that, if I did it, would be a crime." Here is the very contrast between what the intent expresses, as the purpose of this man, and the actions, perhaps common enough in other men, with which he contrasts his intent,—it is this very contrast, I say, which is expressed by an hypothesis whose possible reality, if given, would destroy this contrast.

In general, if I am describing situations or other really experienced data, whose characters are relatively individual, that is, unique, and are sundered out from a background, so that the individual objects that I am describing are to be contrasted definitely with other individuals, then I can and do express one aspect, at least, of the very nature of this individuality, of this contrast, by making hypotheses contrary to fact concerning the way in which this contrast might be reduced or annulled, and this individuality lost in the mere background of universality from which it is differentiated. And the more completely

unique the individuals in question are, the more I may be limited, in my thinking, to this negative method of characterising them. In fact, the hypothesis contrary to fact might be called, logically, the judgment of differentiation, or of at least one aspect of definite individuation. For how can I better express at least one aspect of the contrast, the sundering, between individuals of the same species, than by showing that, if such and such discoverable characters of these individuals were varied so and so, the sundering of these individuals would tend to disappear, and their present individuality would tend to lapse into a merely specific resemblance? If "Dorothy Q." had said No on a certain occasion, the poet would have been, at best, just such and such a fraction different from what he now is. But what he now is, his individuality, is involved in the world in which "Dorothy Q." said Yes. If the Persians had won at Marathon, then, as far as we can see, Europe might have become politically less distinguishable from Asia. But the individuality of European civilisation involves, as one differentiating feature, the fact that the Greeks won at Marathon.

If, then, hypotheses contrary to fact can be present as expressions of concrete truth to an experience that faces truth, the presence of such hypotheses contrary to fact is not excluded from an Absolute Experience, even in so far as it is absolute. And now the presence of such hypotheses as elements of an Absolute Experience would, in the next place, reconcile our two conflicting views as to the relation of idea and content in such an Absolute Experience. Ideas must

always transcend content, even in an Absolute Experience? Yes, as abstract or unreal ideas, for the reason before pointed out. No actual experience could adequately fulfil, or present contents adequately expressing, the infinite regresses, the infinitely infinite groups of possible examples of every universal, whose abstract possibility a merely abstract thought demands. Ideas, then, must indeed in one sense transcend data even in an Absolute Experience. But how? Answer: *As hypotheses contrary to fact*, not as expressions of genuine and unfulfilled truth. But what sort of Absolute Experience would that be, in which there were ideas present as hypotheses contrary to fact, as bare or unreal possibilities?

I answer, it would be an experience of fact as individual cases, exemplifying universal types in such a fashion as to embody a knowledge of the essence both of these facts and of their types. So far, it would then be an experience of a concrete and individual fulfilment of all genuine ideas. On the other hand, this fulfilment would embody universals, not in all abstractly or barely possible cases,—since that would be, concretely speaking, impossible,—but in contents sharply differentiated from one another, and thereby preserved from lapsing into the bare continuity which would link together the series of abstractly possible contents such as could be defined through mere ideas. To exemplify: You know the nature of a geometrical line only when you know that it does contain series of points. This you can only concretely know in so far as you construct actual points on the line. But the points that you actually

construct are a few only of the infinitely infinite series of abstractly possible points. Your idea of these possible points transcends any actual series. Yet the actually constructed series of points (1) exemplifies or embodies the nature common to all the abstractly possible points, and (2) furnishes to your experience a discrete series of points, between which other points would be possible in idea, while in concrete fact they are not experienced. Now an Absolute Experience of the points on the line could in the end do nothing but exemplify, on some level, just this same process of experience.

So, then, an Absolute Experience could and would at once find its ideas adequately fulfilled in concrete fact, and also find this fulfilment as an individual collection of individuals exemplifying these ideas, while, as to other abstractly possible fulfilments of the same ideas, the Absolute Experience would find them as hypothetical or ideal entities, contrary to fact.

But to say this is to attribute to the Absolute Experience a character apparently identical in essence, not with the psychological accidents of our volitional experience, or even of our attention, but with one of the aspects that make our attention rationally significant. To attend involves, apart from the psychological accidents of the process, this rationally significant act, viz., the act of finding a universal type, or idea, exemplified by a datum of experience, while other possible data, that might exemplify this general type, are, relatively speaking, ignored. The idea of seeing is exemplified in seeing this object at the centre of the field of vision. The better one sees this individ-

ual object, the better is one's general power of vision. "*In der Beschränkung zeigt sich erst der Meister.*" In general, attention, in one aspect of its significance, is an ignoring of possible experiences for the sake of fulfilling, in sharply differentiated individual experiences, ideas that could not be fulfilled except through the ignoring of such possibilities. Attention is thus sacrifice of ideal possibilities for the sake of realising ideas. It is losing to win — losing bare abstractions to find concrete life. But the concrete life found is a life full of contrasting individuals, of sharply differentiated fact, of discrete realities.

To the Absolute Experience, then, we should attribute just such a generalised form of the process that in us appears, clouded by countless psychological accidents, as the process of attention; just such an individuation of its contents, just such an attentive precision, whereby its universal types get discrete expression. Yet one comment is still needed in this connexion. This generalised form of attention, which we attribute to the Absolute Experience, is now conceived by us as that aspect of this Absolute which, in the total movement of the world's unity, determines the ideas to find this concrete realisation which they do find. It follows, that, while the attentive process or aspect of this Whole Experience has to be conceived as fulfilling ideas, and so as counter to no idea, — and therefore as in this aspect absolutely rational, — on the other hand, this attentive aspect cannot be conceived as determined by any of the ideas, or by the thought-aspect of the Absolute in its wholeness, or as necessitated by thought, to attend

thus or so. In this sense the attentive aspect of the Absolute Experience appears as itself possessed of absolute Freedom. That it shall realise or adequately fulfil the ideas, is, from our point of view, when we define it, necessary. Nor can it leave unfulfilled any true idea. But on the other hand, what individual fulfilment it gives these ideas, the ideas themselves cannot predestinate. In this sense, the individuality, the concrete reality, of the contents of the Absolute Experience must be conceived as on the one hand fulfilling ideas, but as on the other hand freely, unconstrainedly,—if you will, capriciously,—embodying their universality in the very fact of the presence of this life, this experience, this world.

In this completion of our conception of the Absolute Experience, we now see sufficient reason to speak, in a generalised sense, of a World-Will, as absolutely free, and still as absolutely rational. This Will we can regard, if you choose sufficiently to spiritualise your term, as the World-Creator, but not as if the creation were an abstractly separable act, existent apart from the world's existence, and not as if this creation were, properly speaking, a causal process. The Divine Will is simply *that aspect of the Absolute which is expressed in the concrete and differentiated individuality of the world*. Hereby the world appears, not as a barely abstract world of pure ideas, but as a world of manifested individuals, known in the unity of the one transcendent moment of the Absolute Experience, but there known as a discrete and clearly contrasted collection of beings, whose

presence everywhere expresses, amid all the wealth of meaning which the whole embodies, an element of transcendent Freedom.

III

GENERAL REVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT

Our proposed supplement to our conception of the Absolute invites a fresh review of the whole argument in a somewhat new light. For the foregoing effort to introduce into our conception of the Absolute the element of Will differs from the customary effort in several noteworthy ways. No stress is laid, for instance, in this deduction, upon the ordinary forms of the category of Causation. That is, we do not regard the Absolute Will as primarily something that is required in order to explain the causal source or origin of the world of fact. All conceptions of source, of origin, and of causation are relative conceptions, which apply only to specified regions or spheres within the whole of reality. The conception of causation does not apply to the whole of reality itself. The same thing could be remarked as to the question whether the element of Will is an objectively necessary factor in the Absolute, *i.e.* whether the Absolute *must* will. For, from an absolute point of view, necessity, causation, determination, and all other forms of relative dependence appear as partial facts *within* the whole. In the last analysis, in fact, one cannot say: The world, or reality, or the Absolute, *must be*; but only: The reality, the Absolute, the world, *is*. Fact is always superior to necessity, and

the highest expression of truth in terms of thought is inevitably the categorical judgment rather than the hypothetical, the assertory judgment rather than the apodictic. For that very reason all assertions such as "*A* requires for its explanation, or for its cause, something else, namely, *B*," must be subordinate to the ultimate assertion, "The whole world of given fact is." When, in the first section of this paper, we interpreted the implications of finite experience, and found that, in order to avoid contradiction, all finite experience *must be regarded as* a fragment of a whole, whose content is present in the unity of consciousness of one absolute moment,—in all this we did not assert that the contents of finite experience need an external cause, or that the Absolute is the cause of the relative. We declared that the Absolute is the whole system of which the finite experience is a moment or a fragment. Therefore, our Absolute in no sense explains the world as a cause, but possesses the world of fact, precisely as fact. In this sense, the constitution of reality is indeed, from the absolute point of view, something that, despite all the mediations, the relationships, the dependencies present *in* the world, is in its wholeness immediate—a datum, underived from anything external to itself. In this sense, then, we are not arguing that the Absolute *must* will, but only that it *does* will. For it *is*, and its being includes Will.

In general, it is characteristic of the idealistic point of view, first, that you are able to say of any finite fragment of experience, that, in order to be fact, it *must* stand in a certain more or less definable relation

to other finite facts; and, secondly, that, in consequence of the presence of such mediation and relationship amongst the finite facts, the reality, as the Absolute sees it, simply *has* a definable but immediately actual constitution. In other words, the *must* of our mediate reasoning holds primarily of the finite in its relation to other finites, and not, except indirectly, of the Absolute itself. "Since the finite *must* be related thus or thus to other finites in order to be a part of the real, therefore, *as we must conceive*, the Absolute *has* a given constitution": such is our reasoning. Now our *must*, in such reasoning, expresses precisely the finite point of view, not the absolute point of view, as such. Our *must* defines primarily the relation of our finite experience to other finite facts, as for instance to that "experience other than ours" to which we appealed in our former discussion. We apply, indeed, formally, our *must* to the Absolute, in so far as the Absolute is viewed as the object of our conception; that is, precisely, not yet as the Absolute for itself, but as the Absolute defined from our finite point of view. But the Absolute finds fact in its wholeness, where we find only mediation, or where we appeal from our experience to "experience other than ours," and so see necessity and not immediacy. Therefore, it is indeed true that every conception of the Absolute is, when you take it barely as thought, inadequate to its object. What we say is: "The whole of experience has precisely the sort of unity that any moment of our own conscious life inadequately presents to us." But such unity is the unity of fact, not of our *must*, not of any

mediately conceived necessity. Precisely because we mean the Absolute Whole to be above mere mediation, we in our finite thoughts have to use expressions of mediation which involve, and in fact explicitly state on occasion, their own insufficiency, their inadequacy to their objects. Still otherwise put, our whole argument for the Absolute implies that just because every thought of an object involves a beyond, as well as its own inclusion in the unity of the experience which embodies the beyond, therefore every thought is a moment in a world of fact which, in its wholeness, transcends mere thinking. Or, again, thought in itself is a mere abstraction *from* and yet *in* the whole of experience. But all this means that there *must* be, above every *must*, that which includes, indeed, the necessity expressed by the *must*, but transcends such necessity. There *must be* what is beyond every *must*. The *must* is our comment. The *is* expresses the ultimate fact.

Wrong therefore, in so far, was that older metaphysics which defined God as the "absolutely necessary being." Fact includes necessity, since necessity in its very relative and finite forms is part of the world of fact. But fact in its wholeness is above necessity, and the last word about the world would be, not "it must be," but "it is." Now the older definition for the Absolute Will, as the "cause of the world," generally ended by making this cause, or Will, at once external to the world of facts which it produced, and, by itself, such as to have a necessary constitution; as, for instance, a necessary efficaciousness, frequently called Omnipotence. Our own theory de-

pends, on the contrary, upon recognising fact as supreme, and merely asking: What constitution of fact in its wholeness has to be asserted if you are to avoid contradictions?

The basis of our whole theory is the bare brute fact of experience which you have always with you, namely, the fact: *Something is real*. Our question is: What is this reality? or, again, What is the ultimately real? As we saw in our earlier section, scepticism tries to reply: "The contents of this experience, as present contents, are alone real." We found this reply self-contradictory. Why? Because the question, "What is here real?" inevitably involves ideas that transcend the present data. Hereupon our half-idealistic asserted: "Real beyond the present are possibilities of experience." But hereupon the half-idealistic fell prey to the realist, who pointed out that, just in so far as the possible experiences transcended the data, they were *ipso facto* his transcendent "things in themselves," wholly beyond experience. The realist, however, could himself give no consistent account of these facts as "things in themselves," because his conception of transcendence was itself a mere abstraction. The only way of consistently defining the situation proved to be the assertion: "The ultimate reality is here, as everywhere, the whole of experience, viewed as Whole."

This Whole, as such, now proves to have a definable constitution. For it is, first, that to which every finite thought refers in so far as, rightly or wrongly, in truth or in error, it raises any question as to the reality implied in any experience, however fragmen-

tary. The Whole of Reality is, as such, the "Same Object," whoever in the finite world thinks of it, or, for that matter, of anything. There is no other object but this. This at once implies a certain well-known constitution, both for the finite world of thought in its relation to objects and for the world of experience viewed in its character as a whole of immediate fact. This constitution, expressed in terms of pure thought, is defined by the thesis that all possible ideas, since they refer, consciously or unconsciously, to the same object, form a System, and a single system; and that the Absolute, in so far as it is Absolute Thought, has this system of ideas present to it. In other words, all possible thoughts, taken together, form what the mathematicians call a single Group. The concept of the Group, in modern mathematics, precisely corresponds, in particular instances, to the idealist's conception of the Total System of possible thoughts. A Group is a system of ideal objects such that, by a definite constructive process, you can proceed from any member of the Group to any other, while this process, if exhaustively carried out, defines all possible objects that fall within the Group. Thus the members of the Group form, as it were, an ideal body; as, for instance, in case of the numbers, a definite Group of them, defined by a given constructive process of the nature indicated, would be called a *Zahlkörper*, or Body of Numbers, in the terminology of certain mathematicians. Well, just so, for the idealist, all the logically possible ideas form such a Group, a system of interrelated members, all referring to the one Ultimate Object, viz., the Whole of

Experience, and exhaustively definable, in all their relations, by one constructive process, which, if you knew it, would enable you from any one to construct all the rest. It is to such a system, and to its inter-relationships, that the conception of "necessity" primarily applies. Plato first conceived of such a system of ideally definable contents, although his Ideas are not identical with those of the modern idealist. Hegel's Logic was an effort to define just such an absolute Group of ideas, a closed circle of categories, although the effort indeed was imperfect enough. The idealist's thesis is that such an absolute Group is definable, and, from the absolute point of view, is defined.

On the other hand, our thesis maintains that the Absolute Experience, viewed in its wholeness, fulfils this System, or Group, of ideas. This fulfilment, as we have said, is for the Absolute immediate fact. *We* define this fact, to be sure, in terms of our necessity. Our necessity means merely that we *must be* consistent, else we shall have asserted nothing. But the whole experience of the Absolute, in its wholeness, is above that necessity. And our proof, once more, goes back to that brute finite experience: "Something is real." Yet, to use once more the inevitable formula of our finite thinking, we *must assert* that the Absolute Experience has such constitution as is implied in its fulfilment of the system of ideas. Hence the Absolute Experience, so we assert, is no chaos. Since perfection, worth, significance, fulness of life, organisation, are ideas, the Absolute Experience *must present*, that is, *must be asserted by us as presenting*, or, viewed in itself, simply

does present, an organised, significant, purposeful or teleological, worthy, perfect whole of fact; and that, however much of ill, or imperfection, the finite world seems to contain when fragmentarily viewed. So far, we define, then, the Absolute Thought and Experience in their organic relationships, as, on the one hand, we *must assert them to be*, and, on the other hand, as, according to our thesis, they themselves *are*. Of the two, the Experience names the factor which at once, when viewed as whole, includes the thought-aspect of the world, while, so long as you view the thought-aspect abstractly, the Experience appears precisely as the aspect whereby the Thought gets fulfilled. The best expression, so far, might be: "The Absolute experiences that its system of Thought is fulfilled in and through the constitution of the data of its Experience," — an assertion which makes explicit the self-conscious moment in our whole theory of the Absolute.

But if into this conception of the Absolute the new moment which we have called the Will is to be introduced, there must be some motive present to our thought besides the motives involved in our first deduction of the Absolute. The new motive has been furnished in the foregoing account by a very simple reflection upon what the Absolute, as defined, not merely *must be*, but, for our definition, and for itself, also immediately *is*. As defined, it is not merely perfect, significant, and the rest, but it is a Whole; its contents form one Moment. Its unity is the unity of a single Instant. It is that which, as such, neither requires nor permits a beyond.

Yet neither as barely abstract thought nor as mere contents of experience is the Absolute yet definable as a positive Whole. On the contrary, although the ideas form a Group, there is nothing as yet about the nature of this Group, when abstractly viewed, which defines, so far, how often, or in what cases, it shall find realisation or fulfilment. On the other hand, the contents of experience, in so far as they are immediate data, simply serve to present the fulfilment of the system of ideas, and not to limit their fulfilment to a single case. In other words, one may so far declare, if one prefers, that there is one Idea which *ipso facto* does not belong to the original Group of ideas, as abstractly defined; namely, the very Idea of the wholeness of the system of experience in which that Group is to find its fulfilment. Once more, then, an antinomy has presented itself. The Absolute Experience, on the one hand, is that system in which the Group of ideas is realised, and, as absolute experience, forms one Whole. On the other hand, as mere fulfilment of ideas in contents, it is not yet a Whole at all, since other fulfilments so far appear as abstractly possible. The solution of the antinomy must lie in the incompleteness of our account as thus far rendered; namely, of the account in terms of mere thought and mere immediacy of contents. A new element must be added — not that, from the absolute point of view, the new element is an element that embodies an objective necessity, but that, from the absolute point of view, the whole world of facts actually *has* another aspect, a third aspect, in addition to the immediacy of the

data and the completeness of the system of ideas. This new aspect may be defined as an aspect of *Arrest*, of fulfilment by free limitation. That fulfilment *could not otherwise be obtained*, is our comment. The fact is, that fulfilment *is* thus attained, namely, by what we have to express as the choice, or attentive selection, of the present world of fact from the indefinite (or infinite) series of abstractly possible worlds, which, by virtue of this choice, *are not actually possible*. We cannot express this situation better than by saying: "The world forms a Whole because it is as if the Absolute said (or, in our former terms, attentively observed) that, since the absolute system of ideas is once fulfilled in this world, 'There shall be no world but this,' *i.e.* no other case of fulfilment; and therefore other abstractly possible fulfilments remain not genuinely possible." It is this aspect of the ultimate situation which defines the world as a Whole, and which, without introducing an external cause, or a mere force, does as it were colour the whole unity of the Absolute Consciousness with a new character, namely, the character of Will. As psychology already knows, the will, even in us, is no third "power of the mind." It is an aspect of our consciousness, pervading every fact thereof, while especially connected with and embodied in certain of the facts of our inner lives. Just so we now say, not: "The Absolute first thinks, then experiences, then wills in such wise as to fashion its experience." We rather say: "The unity of the Absolute Consciousness involves immediate data, fulfilment of ideas in these data, consciousness of the adequacy

of this fulfilment, and Will, whereby not merely this adequacy is secured in general, but also the adequacy is concretely secured in one whole and single content of the total experience."

One might again illustrate our conception by supposing any one of us to ask himself: "What would be *my* state were my conscious aims to be completely fulfilled, and, above all, were my knowledge to become absolute?" The natural answer would be: "In that case, (1) my thoughts would form one whole system, with no uncomprehended ideas beyond the system. The contents or data of my experience would then (2) fulfil these ideas, so that there would be no object that I thought of without possessing it as present,—for instance, no wish ungratified, no ideal unfulfilled. But hereupon a difficulty would arise. For I should still be able, however many objects of experience exemplified my ideas, to think always of other logically possible fulfilments of any or of all once defined ideas. For such abstract limitlessness is of the essential, the logically necessary, nature of bare thought as such. However much experience gave me, I could think of more, since that would be the very nature of my thinking process. How, then, would the supposed Wholeness of experience be logically possible? To this difficulty I should rightly answer, that an incompleteness for which, not the poverty of my experience, but the abstract endlessness of my demand as thinker was responsible, could readily be supposed to cease if I added one element *more* to my experience, or at all events to the type of consciousness which I now possessed. This new element would be added when-

ever I said that, my ideas being fulfilled in their essence by one case, I should gain no essential benefit, I should add no whit to the *genuine* perfection of my experience, by passing to new cases. If I now, by some deliberate act of attention, arrested myself, or found myself arrested, in this one act of conscious fulfilment of my system of ideas, I should be perfect as a knower and as a possessor, in a sense in which I should *not* be perfect if I continued to seek, in hopeless repetitions, for truth that lay always beyond. For such search would involve either an ignorance on my part that nothing novel was thus obtained, or a blind fate that drove me helplessly further. The ignorance I should escape, on the hypothesis that I knew my situation. The blind fate I should escape, if my ideals were all fulfilled. The fulfilment of the ideal of escaping from the blind fate would however involve precisely *the presence in me of the will to arrest myself*, or to be arrested, at this one world as a single whole of experience. In other words, the perfection of my consciousness, in the supposed case, would involve the element called my will. And my will would mean an attentive dwelling upon this world to the exclusion of the barely possible worlds, which would remain unreal for me merely because my attention left them unreal.

In a variety of terms there is, in such a case as the present, where one has gradually to eliminate various accidental associations, a certain advantage. We may, then, venture on still another name for the present aspect of the Absolute Consciousness. The theology of the past has frequently dealt with the

attribute called the Divine Love, which it has opposed, on occasion, to the Divine Wisdom. Now just as Will may be generalised as the process, or aspect, of selective attention in consciousness, so Love also may be generalised as an affection or colouring of consciousness which involves a selection of some content as valuable for reasons which can no longer be abstractly defined in terms of this content, or in terms of its mere contrast to the contents to which it is preferred, be these contents actual or possible. A beloved object, as such, is *experienced* as a datum, is *known* as embodying ideas, but is *preferred* by virtue of characters that remain, despite all knowledge, undefined and, in some respects, undefinable. What is clear, to the loving consciousness, is that *no other* object fills just the place, or could fill just the place, occupied by the beloved object. Now, in viewing the world as the object of the love of an absolute being, one supposes the Absolute Consciousness to contain a moment or aspect that conforms to and exemplifies this generalised definition of Love. This world has a value from the absolute point of view such as no other world, conceived as an abstract possibility, would have. And while this value is, up to a certain point, explained and defined by the fact that the world fulfils these and these specific ideals, one aspect of the matter remains always unexplained, namely, why some other world, with a different sequence of data, might not fulfil, just as well, the same ideas. The selection of this world as the one fulfilment of absolute ideas and ideals would involve, then, an unexplained element. This element is precisely the

one that might be expressed as the actual Divine Love for *this* world. The same character has been defined by the term "Will" in the foregoing discussion. The presence of such a character, its value as the very element whereby the Absolute Experience attains wholeness and complete self-possession, and its further character as an element irreducible to the terms of mere thought and mere content of experience,—all these features may now well be suggested by calling this the Divine Love.

But, in the foregoing, one consideration has been introduced that has remained, as yet, undeveloped. I refer to what has been said concerning the relation of Will to Individuality. I have said that the object of Will is, as such, an individuated object. How much is implied in this consideration, cannot be understood until we have undertaken the extremely difficult task of examining the fundamental nature of the category of Individuality. To this I now proceed, in the Third Part of the present paper.

PART III

THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION

THE question : What is an individual? and the related question : What principle is the source of Individuation, or of the presence and variety of individuals in the world, or in our knowledge? — these are matters of no small importance for logic, for psychology, and for metaphysics. All these three doctrines have to do with individuals, as possible objects of thought, as well as with those other logical objects called universals. The psychologist has to ask the question : How do we come by the knowledge of the individual objects? — whether primarily or by some secondary process, and whether solely through experience or by virtue of some reflective or intuitive insight. The metaphysician is above all concerned with the questions : What sort of individuals does the real world contain? and, How are they distinguished from one another and from the other types of reality which the universe contains, if there are such other types? The present division of this paper has something to say of all three aspects of our problem; and, as a fact, all three aspects are obviously closely related to one another.

I

DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM

As to the general interest of the problem, even outside of technical philosophy, there can be no

doubt. When one reflects upon the social and ethical problems which have gathered about the word "individualism," one is reminded that, after all, men bleed and die in this world for the sake of logic as well as for the sake of home and bread, and that the problems of the study are also the problems of human destiny. If one turns from practical life to the questions of theory, one is reminded that, in theology, God is conceived as an individual, and that each man is an individual, and that Christianity has always involved assertions about the individual as such. In natural science, moreover, a vast collection of problems, especially of biological problems, centre about the definition and the constitution of the individuals of the living world. One cannot hesitate, then, as to the significance of our question. It surely deserves a close study.

Strangely enough, however, this problem has been, in its general philosophical aspects, somewhat neglected, especially in the history of modern philosophy. Leibnitz is almost the only modern thinker who has given it a place correspondent to its dignity. The logical, psychological, and metaphysical problems of universality, of law and of truth and knowledge in their more universal aspects, have otherwise received a much more detailed study than has been given to the correlative problems of individuality. In part, however, this very neglect has been meant as a sort of indirect tribute to the significance of the individual. Individuality has been so little subjected to critical scrutiny, because the existence and importance of the individual have been tacitly assumed as

obvious. When every logic text-book discusses the theory of the general concept, and easily passes by, with a mere mention, the knowledge of the individual, this is because your knowledge of the individual is supposed to be something relatively so clear and familiar to you that the logician need analyse hardly at all what you mean by that knowledge. "Does not everybody know? Why, you yourself are an individual!" It is of the universal that the logician must speak, because that seems to be something artificial, abstract, an invention of language and of science. Any man of sense has only to open his eyes, or to observe himself within, to appreciate how all original knowledge is of the concrete, the definite, the individual. This, I say, is what the traditional method in logic seems to imply. One fails to comment lengthily upon our knowledge of the individual, because that knowledge is felt to be somehow primary, common, and of central significance in daily life. Just so, too, when in metaphysics one deals with the universal principles, with Reality, with Finite and Infinite, with Law and with Cause, with Knowledge and Illusion, one does all this feeling that it is the concrete world of individuality that is to be explained, to be justified, or to be saved by the truth. One says little about individuality, as such, because one presupposes it.

Yet philosophical neglect is always a misfortune. We can never comprehend until we have learned to reflect; and to presuppose individuals is not to reflect upon what one means by them. So soon as the questions are put: What is an individual? and,

What is the principle that individuates the world? we are fain to conceal our uncertainty behind a mere repetition of the assertion that individuals are facts.

I cannot but think that the bare assertion of the actuality of individuals, without a prior and general consideration of the whole problem of the category of Individuality, is responsible for much of the difference that appears to exist between Professor Howison's Ethical Individualism and the Idealistic Monism which he combats. The antinomy referred to at the outset of the present paper has appeared thus far as an antinomy between the claims of theory and the presuppositions of ethics. The theoretical need can only be met by the world where all facts are present in the unity of the Absolute Consciousness. To this Professor Howison replies, that the dignity of the ethical individual demands the real variety and separate existence of the citizens of the "City of God." But the citizens of this City, if they exist, are not merely ethical but logical individuals, and the question, What is an individual? applies to them as well as to the humblest conceivable individual object. Suppose the answer to this question should involve the perfectly universal assertion, that on the one hand the theoretical view itself, in order to attain its completion in the apprehension of the universe as one Whole, is obliged to make use of the category of Individuality. Suppose that it should then appear that this category is essentially indefinable in purely theoretical terms,—that, in other words, as we have already said, the presence of individuality is essentially an expression of the divine Will. Then at

once it would appear that the very claims of theory involve giving the world a *practically* significant aspect. Suppose that it should then further appear that the category of Individuality, as already indicated, demands and secures differentiation of individuals within the unity of the whole consciousness which we have defined as the Absolute. It might well prove, that, since by hypothesis the individuals would then exist not merely as brute facts but as differentiated expressions and cases of significant Will, their significant separation as ethical beings would not, when it existed, involve their mutual isolation as brute facts. In that case all the variety, all the individuation, all the mutual independence that ethical theory demanded might be perfectly consistent with, and even essentially implied by, that very unity of consciousness in which and by virtue of which the individuals were real. Thus the solution of the antinomy might appear by virtue of the definition of the category of Individuality.

On the other hand, this definition could not well be attempted without a consideration of very general logical problems. We should be able to discuss the ethical individual, only when we had first considered the logical individual of any grade, as he appears in ordinary regions of knowledge. Our present discussion will therefore, for the time, lay aside our idealistic presuppositions, take the world of thought as we ordinarily find it, and treat of Individuality as if it were a category of no ethical significance. This method we shall pursue until the discussion of itself leads us back to the point where the meaning of our

category dawns upon us. In other words, whereas, in the preceding Part of this paper, we discussed the category of Will until we were led to say that the Will individuates, so now we shall discuss the meaning of Individuality until we are led to the assertion that individuation implies Will, but Will in precisely the sense in which our theoretical study of the unity of the world led us to the assumption of that category. Thus the circle being completed, the harmony of theoretical and ethical considerations may be in general rendered explicable; and we shall then be prepared to proceed, in the Fourth Part of our paper, directly to the discussion of the Self-conscious Individual.

As said above, the customary way of dealing with the individual in logic has been to assume that the individual is the beginning of knowledge. But it is useless thus to try to escape from an essential difficulty by becoming dogmatic, and by declaring that individuals are the immediately known realities with which science begins. For in fact, on the contrary, the far-off goal of science is the knowledge of the individual. We do not really begin our science with the individual. We hope and strive some day to get into the presence of the individual truth. All universality is, in one sense, a mere scaffolding and means to this end. That this is true is precisely what this discussion will undertake to indicate before I am done.

II

THE THOMISTIC THEORY OF INDIVIDUATION

Our problem, then, has been too much neglected. Yet it has indeed had a history. Although Plato considered the matter, Aristotle was the first philosopher who possessed the technical means for fully defining the problem, in all its main aspects, — logical, psychological, and metaphysical. He did define it, — and left it unsolved. The schoolmen, long afterwards, resumed the unfinished task. As the preclassical period of scholasticism was especially busied with the problem of the universal, so the classical and postclassical periods of scholasticism gave great attention to the problem of the individual. Controversy existed, both as to the interpretation of Aristotle's authority, and as to the independent treatment of those elements of the question which Aristotle had left undecided. In theology, the problem of the Trinity, the problem of the individuality of the "active intelligence" in man, and of the individuality of the human soul itself, in view of its possession of the "active intelligence," and, finally, the problems of angelology, gave special significance to these scholastic discussions of the Principle of Individuation.

St. Thomas, one of the two principal scholastic students of our problem, decided that form as such, in the Aristotelian sense, is "not to be communicated to various individuals unless by the aid of matter." This holds, at all events, for the entire created world. In consequence, matter, and in particular

what Thomas called *materia signata*, i.e. designated matter, matter quantitatively determined, or limited by particular spatial dimensions and boundaries, is, in corporeal substances, the principle of individuation. On the other hand, it is not at all true, as it is sometimes asserted, that, for St. Thomas, matter is the *sole* principle of individuation in all grades of being. The Thomistic doctrine of the individual, viewed in its wholeness, seems to run much as follows :

An individual (*Summa Theol.*, P. I, Q. XXX, Art. IV) possesses a certain characteristic *modus existendi*, in so far as an individual is something "*per se subsistens distinctum ab aliis.*" Individuals are also to be called, according to the well-known tradition, "first substances" or "hypostases" (*Id.*, Q. XXIX, Art. I). The name "hypostasis," however, is more properly applied to the rational individual, the person, or to beings "who have dominion over their acts," or who act *per se*. The fact of such self-determination gives a peculiar dignity to their individuality; and individuals of this grade are properly called persons, or "hypostases in the proper sense." Every person is an individual, since actions are "*in singularibus*" (*loc. cit.*). On the other hand, not every individual is a person.

If one speaks of the rational individuals, or persons, one observes, then, that their individuality need not be dependent, in any sense, upon material conditions. Thus, according to Thomas (Q. III, Art. II), a form such as that of God, self-subsistent and not "receivable in matter," is individuated by the very

fact that it "cannot be received in another." Thus, too, the persons of the Trinity are, for Thomas, individuals. "The word 'individual,'" says Thomas, in another passage, "cannot belong to God in so far forth as matter is the principle of individuation, but only in so far as the word 'individual' implies incomunicability" (Q. XXIX, Art. III). In this sense (Q. XXIX, Art. IV), an individual is something *indistinctum*, or unseparated within itself, but *ab aliis distinctum*, that is, set apart, by reason of its subsistence, from other individuals. The principle of individuation in case of the Trinity is the unique character of the *relatio* which distinguishes, for Thomas, the three persons. In God, each person is a *relatio subsistens*, that is, not merely an abstract relation as such, dependent upon its terms, but an individual and concrete term that subsists or is distinguished solely by its relational function. "As *Deitas* or Godhead is God, so the divine Paternity is God the Father." A divine person, or person of the Trinity, signifies therefore a relation as subsistent. Thus Thomas states the case in the *Summa* (Q. XXIX, Art. IV): "In the comprehension of the individual substance, that is, of the distinct or incommunicable substance, one understands, in the Divine, a relation." So far, then, one has distinction of "subsistent relations" as the principle of individuation within God. But this case is unique. Nowhere else is relation, as such, the principle of individuation.

Amongst the created rational beings, the problem of individuality becomes important in two cases.

Coming downwards from God, the first case is that of the angels. They (Q. L, Art. II) are not "composites of matter and form." "It is impossible," says Thomas, "that a *substantia intellectualis* (such as is an angel) should have any kind of matter whatever." The angels are therefore, according to the famous Thomistic doctrine, primarily individuated by their species, *i.e.* by their forms, since they too are (in so far like God) *formæ subsistentes*. "It is impossible that there should be two angels of one species, as it is impossible to say that there are several separated whitenesses, or several humanities" (Q. L, Art. IV). One must add, of course, that the individual angel is no mere abstraction, like whiteness or humanity, but has those other characters of the rational individual before enumerated. Within himself, namely, the angel has, as Thomas proceeds to expound, his self-consciousness, his freedom of will (a freedom now, to be sure, confirmed forever to good or to ill), and his measure of knowledge of the truth that is both above and below him. In his relation to God, the angel has his individual "mission." In respect of other angelic individuals, the angel has his incommunicable and specific *distinctio ab aliis*. In all these ways his individuality is marked off, and herein lies the separate subsistence of his form.

If one passes to the case of the human soul, one meets with a new problem. The Thomistic doctrine of the soul was notoriously a subtle and complex one — a development of Aristotle's doctrine, in a somewhat difficult sense. The soul itself is not a composite of form and matter. It is immaterial. Yet its

function is, to be the form of the human body; and this it is, even in its intellectual operations. All human souls are of the same species. But we learned in case of the angels that immaterial substances can have no individuation within any one species. How then are the immaterial souls of men, intellectual entities as they are, preserved from flowing together into one intellectual soul? The answer is: They are first individuated by the bodies to which they are joined. In Thomas's words: "Although the intellectual soul has no matter from which it is constituted, just as an angel has none, yet it is form of a certain matter, as an angel is not. And so, according to the division of the matter, there are many souls of one species, whereas there cannot be many angels of one species" (Q. LXXVI, Art. II).

Hereupon, however, one would suppose that this diversity of the souls of the one human species would cease with their separation from the body. This, of course, Thomas denies. His reason is, that since the soul is, *secundum suum esse*, or naturally, joined to a body, and since the multiplicity of any type of entities depends upon their *esse*, the accident of the separation of soul and body between death and judgment cannot destroy the essential individuality of the separated souls. An *inclinatio* to an individuated body exists in the separated soul, and individuates the latter. In sum, then, the human individual is such, first of all, by the fact that his soul is naturally the form of this individual body, and Socrates, for instance, is defined, in this aspect, as the being who possesses "this flesh and these bones." On the other hand, in

the composite called man, the body exists for the sake of the soul, and not *vice versa*. The being thus primarily individuated exists in order that his intellect may attain self-possession, a knowledge of the truth, and the right ultimate relation to God. But in the ideal condition of ultimate perfection thus defined, the intellectual individual, whose character as this man has its material basis in the body, attains, as his completed individuality, to an exercise of free will and of reason which will assimilate him to the angels. Separated from the body at death, the soul will be reunited thereto at the end; and the completed individual in his final state will be subsistent *both* materially and formally, — *through* matter, yet not merely *as* matter.

If we finally pass to the world of the individuals below the human level, namely, to animals and to inanimate objects, we reach the realm where matter, as the true principle of individuation, becomes at last paramount. To be sure, even here, matter of itself *causes* no individuality, since form is everywhere the final cause, and since every individual is a composite of form and matter, in which the matter exists for the sake of the form. Only matter, as the *materia signata*, or matter of "determinate dimensions," is the *conditio sine qua non* of individuation. The fact that whiteness, cold, crystallisation, etc., as these accidents, here inform the particular *materia signata* whose substantial form is water, and whose place is in yonder cloud, — this gives you, as result, this individual snow-flake. To be sure, there are many hints, in Thomas, that the sensuous, immediate, and, in so far, appar-

ently unideal or unintelligible basis of individuation which seems to be implied in this account is not any absolute, but only a humanly distorted truth. One's first impression of the doctrine is, indeed, that it makes the individual a mere brute fact of sense, and in so far incomprehensible. For the *materia signata* of the Thomistic account is not mere matter in the strict Aristotelian sense, viz., matter as mere *potentia*. On the contrary, the *materia signata* is sensuous matter, the brute fact of the world of perception; and the meaning of the doctrine seems, in so far, to be that corporeal individuals are essentially sensuous and immediate, and not intellectually intelligible beings, just in so far forth as they are corporeal individuals. The intellect knows universals; the senses show us individuals; and, so far, the old Aristotelian difficulty returns, but, on the other hand, this is not the end. The same Thomas who makes the corporeal individual thus wholly indefinable for our intellect, by reason of its sensuous materiality, also asserts that not only God (Q. XIV, Art. II), but also the angels (Q. LVII, Art. II), must know corporeal individuals. But the angels know truth in purely intellectual, not in sensuous forms. "By one intellectual virtue," declares Thomas, "the angels know both universal and immaterial, singular and corporeal objects." If this be true, then the material opaqueness, the sensuous and indefinable immediacy, of the corporeal individual, as we view it, must to an angelic intelligence possess the same sort of clearness and of ideal and definable intelligibility that is possessed, for us, by universal principles. Our opaque material individual of the

world of sense cannot, then, be the individual as God and the angels know individuality.

So much for St. Thomas's doctrine of Individuation. It sums itself up in the assertion, that, whereas the higher forms of conscious and rational individuality are definable in various and relatively intelligible, although still more or less empirical terms, corporeal individuals are, for us, although not for God, nor for the angels, nor in themselves, undefinable and ultimate facts, known *to us* only in so far as a communicable form gets embodied in one spatially determined and sensuously observable matter, so that the resulting composite nature is "singular and incommutable."

There can be little doubt that this doctrine of individuality is at once skilful and vulnerable. It formed a favourite object for attack in later scholastic discussion. Most noteworthy is the doctrine that Duns Scotus opposed to Thomas concerning this topic. Duns Scotus is the second of the two principal scholastic students of our problem.

III

THE SCOTISTIC THEORY OF INDIVIDUATION

The chief discussion of individuality in Duns Scotus occurs in the Angelology of the second part of the Subtle Doctor's commentary upon the *Sententiæ*, in the first half of the sixth volume of his works. Duns Scotus employs, throughout, a widely known and, so far, purely formal definition of indi-

viduality. By an individual, as an object of knowledge, one means something opposed to a universal. Now by a universal, as *man*, one means an object of thought that one can conceive as logically "divided" into "various parts of which it can be predicated." Thus, *man* is divisible into the European and non-European classes of men. But of both classes, *man* itself can be predicated. On the other hand, by an individual, one means an object of knowledge that "cannot be divided into parts of which it can be predicated," or, in the terminology of Scotus, that "cannot be divided into *partes subjectivas*." Thus, the leg or the eye of Socrates is not Socrates, and Socrates cannot be divided into parts of which Socrates can be predicated. Or, again, there cannot be two men, each of whom has the nature of Socrates. Herein Socrates the individual differs from *man*. A snow-flake, or other corporeal thing, is an individual precisely in so far as one says: "It is *this*, and *such a this* that you cannot predicate it, the whole, of any of its parts, or of any two representative cases." Not otherwise, however, for Duns Scotus, could the individuality even of the angels be logically defined. But such a formal definition is a mere introduction to the general problem.

Duns Scotus examines, at great length, not only Thomas's theory, but also other theories of the metaphysical principle that can give individuals this character of logical indivisibility. This principle, he reasons, cannot be in any sense a mere negation. This stone is not an individual merely because it is *not* that stone, but rather because there is "something

positive, intrinsic to this stone," which forbids the stone "to be divided into *partes subjectivas*" (Duns Scotus, *Opera*, Vol. VI, p. 375). On the other hand, material substance, by the mere fact of its existence as such, is neither explained as an individual, nor shown to be the source of individuality in anything else. For, first: Existence, as such, is no determined predicate of anything, and so cannot individuate what is otherwise undetermined (*Id.*, p. 379). In other words, individuation, if it is a truth, is a *somewhat*, needing to be defined. If you have not already defined, apart from the fact of existence, what makes Socrates and the stone, viewed in their nature or essence, individuals, you cannot make the individuality clearer by merely saying, *Socrates* (or *The stone*) *exists*. Moreover, the question would then arise about existence, as before about essence: What is the nature of individual existence? The concept of existence is not identical with the concept of individuality. Individuality is, then, a something pertaining to the *nature* of the individual object, and is not a result of the mere existence of the individual. You can say, indeed: "All that actually exists is individual." But you do not thus explain what individuality is. God knew individuals, as pure ideas, before the creation. This Thomas himself asserts. These individuals must, then, have possessed an individual essence in advance of their existence.

Moreover, the Thomistic doctrine of the corporeal individual, as individuated by reason of the quantitatively determined matter that enters into its composition, must be false; for the individual can persist,

although its corporeal dimensions change; while, on the other hand, when the corporeal individual is corrupted, the same quantitatively determined matter remains, but the individual is lost. Furthermore, quantitative distinctions in the material world, *i.e.* distinctions of position, shape, and the like, are all of them primarily known to us in universal form,—not as individual but as specific characters of the object that we have before us. Quantity is no more and no less individuated for our reason than is any other object of thought. *This place, this shape, this size,* and *this* definite matter, are just as hard to define in an individual way as *this* angelic nature, or *this* immaterial soul.

In consequence of these and many other considerations, Scotus considers himself warranted in substituting for the Thomistic theory of the individual another statement, namely, first, that, wherever an individual exists, there exists, as the background of the individual, a certain common nature (*e.g. man* exists as the background of Socrates), and this common nature has indeed its unity, but a unity "less than the numeral unity" of the individual. Secondly, the doctrine asserts that, added to this unity, in case of the individual, there is another, and, as Scotus strongly insists, a "positive *entitas*," or "individual nature," which *per se* determines the common nature to singularity. This positive *entitas*, or, as the Scotists later always called it, the *hæcceitas* (although it is not certain that Scotus himself, in his authentic writings, uses this latter technical term), "makes one with" the common nature, or, in the individual, is

organically "fused" with the common nature (*op. cit.*, p. 403). "As unity in common," says Scotus (*op. cit.*, p. 406), "*per se* accompanies entity in common, so some sort of unity accompanies *per se* every entity; therefore, unity *simpliciter* (and such is the unity of the individual, often hereinbefore described, namely, the unity which forbids division into many *partes subjectivas*, and which forbids that the individual should fail to be this designated object)—unity *simpliciter*, in case such unity exists in beings, as all opinion supposes, accompanies *per se* some entity. But this unity does not accompany *per se* the entity of the common nature, for the latter" (e.g. the nature of man) "has its own special sort of real unity—and so the unity of the individual" (e.g. of Socrates) "accompanies some other entity determined as *that*." Thus the entity of the individual appears as something *essentially intelligible*, and in no sense either accidental or material. This individuality of Socrates belongs to the idea of Socrates as an idea, in advance of the existence of Socrates; and remains with Socrates even when this *materia signata* of his flesh and bones wholly changes.

An objection to this view of the intelligible *hæc-
ceitas* appears, of course, in the well-known fact of the actual indefinability of the individual—a fact often cited, upon Aristotle's authority, by the schoolmen. To this objection Scotus replies (p. 414): "The singular is *per se* intelligible, in so far as it exists *ex parte sua*," i.e. in so far as itself is concerned. "But, if it is not *per se* intelligible to a particular intellect, such as ours, the impossibility is once for all

not from the side of the singular, which is *per se* intelligible; just as it is not the sun's fault if it is invisible, but the fault of one's vision in the night, or of one's eyes." In consequence (*op. cit.*, p. 491), there is no reason why the angels may not know the individual, because it is essentially intelligible. Just so, too, there is no reason why there should not be as many individual angels of the same species as God is pleased to create.

IV

CRITICAL COMPARISON OF THE THOMISTIC AND SCOTISTIC THEORIES

Possibly these scholastic subtleties may appear ineffective and wearisome; yet to me, I confess, they constitute an almost indispensable introduction to the study of our problem. The scholastic angelology always furnishes an admirable means for the definition of the nature of finite rational individuality as such, by reason of the ease with which this doctrine of the angels can hypothetically abstract from the empirical conditions of our human life. So that a modern student of philosophy may well envy the scholastics their angels. A metaphysician needs illustrations, and the angel is a peculiarly neat and charming sort of illustration. For the rest, the doctrines of Duns Scotus and Thomas are as instructive by reason of their essential agreement as to the main problem, as by reason of their really non-essential differences. The doctrines show one where the

nerve of the problem lies. The very naïveté of that Aristotelian theory of knowledge which the scholastics agree in employing, helps to render simpler the statement of the issue. Let us, then, next restate the matter more in our own way, pointing out, as we go, how our two representative scholastics, although differing in terms and in emphasis, really face the same problem, and leave it in much the same obscurity.

There are individuals in the universe. That is a matter of "common opinion," or in other words, is known to everybody. Moreover, Aristotle says, and our scholastics agree, that our human insight begins through some sort of more or less vague, and even indefinitely universal, knowledge of individual objects. But next comes the question: How do you define, in a purely formal way, the connotation of the term "individual"? Here, at once, two methods of definition appear. One method, that made the more prominent in Thomas, seems dependent directly upon experience, or upon revelation, and tells us what it is that is empirically needed in order that one individual should be regarded as different from other individuals. As a fact, then, the world contains individuals in so far as it contains objects "indistinct," or undivided within themselves, *ab aliis vero distincta*. This, as we may remember, is what Thomas says. Thus one first appeals to mere facts. They may be viewed as revealed facts,—as in case of the Trinity or of the angels,—or as facts of self-consciousness, as in case of my own individuality, which I feel to be other than yours; or they may be facts observed

in the outer world, as when I see that this stone is another object than that stone. In any case, individuals are, so far, facts of direct or of revealed experience. So the world is made; viz., with separated or segmented masses of observable contrast in it. Individuality first means just this observable or immediate discreteness of structure in the universe. One might seek to rest here, and might ask: Where then is the problem? The universe *is* cut up into segments. That is matter of fact. One can as little tell what such segmentation in general is, as one can tell what colour is. One observes the fact. The ultimate principle at the basis of it all may be known to God, but is not for us to know.

But there is another and a puzzling aspect about this individualisation of the world. Discreteness exists not only in the world of facts, but in the world of ideas, and not only as the discreteness of individuals, but as the discreteness of universals. The numbers are discrete; yet they are not individuals in the sense in which Socrates and Plato are individuals. Good and evil, white and black, colour and sound, cause and effect, motion and rest, are present to our minds as various, as distinguished, as discretely sundered objects of possible knowledge. Yet these are not individuals. Our problem is then unfinished. We need to know, about the individual, not merely what in experience distinguishes one individual from another individual, but what distinguishes the individual, as such, from other objects of knowledge, viz., from the various types of the universal. And here is a reason why Leibnitz's later and famous doctrine

of the "identity of indiscernibles," and of individuation through mere ideal or typical variety, fails to meet all the conditions of our problem.

So a second definition of individuality is needed, and a second method must be tried. When one says: Universals or ideas have no concrete or ultimately real existence, but are artificial products of the process of knowledge, or when one tries to mediate, as the scholastics did, between this view and opposing views, by the famous distinction between the universals *ante res* (viz., in God's mind), *in rebus* (merely as the formal or ideal aspects of reality,—the laws and types present in the natural world), and *post res* (namely, as the abstractions of the human mind),—in every such doctrine one contrasts the individual and the universal aspects either of reality itself or of our human conception of reality. In any case, whether one is nominalist or conceptualist, or even Platonic realist, one is bound to tell what one means by this contrast between individual existence as such and universality of type as such,—and that, too, no matter how much one insists that the real world contains no universals, but only individuals, and no matter how much, on the contrary, one despises the individuals, and regards the universal aspect of reality as the truth.

One turns, then, to the second method of defining individuals. Individuals are segmented objects of knowledge; but then, as we have just seen, not all segmented objects of knowledge are individuals. How does the individuality of experience differ from the sort of segmentation that exists in the world of

ideas? And now we come to the more purely logical attempts to give a formal answer to the question: What is the connotation of the term "individual"?

To this question, viewed in this second way, the formal answer accepted by Duns Scotus, and traceable, of course, to Aristotle himself, seems indeed well applicable. A logical universal is capable of logical division into *partes subjectivas*. A logical individual is an object *incapable of such division*. This, as a merely formal definition, appears, I repeat, fair enough. In a very recent book, viz., in Schroeder's admirable *Algebra der Logik*, in that very interesting chapter of the second volume which is devoted to the formal logic of the individual, a variation of this classic definition appears, in two or three different symbolic forms. The substance of Schroeder's definition is, that by an individual, in the formal logic of extension, one means (1) a class, or "*Gebiet*," different from zero, or from the "*Null-Classe*," i.e. from a non-existent class; and then one also means (2) that this existent class is further *incapable of being at once partially included within each of any two classes that exclude each other*. Thus, if Socrates is an individual, he is conceived as incapable, as long as he exists, of being at once partially within and partially without the class defined as Athenians, or as incapable of being at once partially within each of the mutually exclusive classes, Athenian and Milesian. On the other hand, the class *philosopher*, which is not a logical individual, can exist as partly Athenian and partly not, or as partly Athenian and

partly Milesian. So it is that Schroeder states, although in his own more exact and symbolic language, the substance of the classic definition, not of the empirical individual, viewed merely as an object segmented from other objects, but of the logical individual, viewed as something different from a universal object.

Well, let us take this second or formal method of defining what we mean by "individual," and let us return with it to that world of empirical objects that we left behind us a moment ago, when we resolved to try this second method. We have begun by saying: The empirical world is, as a fact, segmented into discrete masses of contents. There are you and I, there are Socrates and Plato, there are the separate stones and the legions of angels; there, above all, is God. Now, these segmented facts are what we mean by individuals. But our definition was, so far, incomplete. The world of pure ideas is full of segmentation and of contrast; yet good and evil, beauty and ugliness, man in general and angel in general, although segmented, are not individuals. We need further to know, how the individual is contrasted with the universal. Now we get an answer. The logical individual, as contrasted with logical universal, is the object incapable of logical division; incapable, then, as predicate, of being predicated of two subjects; incapable, as subject, of being classified into subordinate classes; incapable, in fine, of being exemplified by, or in, more than one case. In brief: The logical individual is a type or kind of being which, by definition, is incapable of being realised

in more than one single instance. Or, yet again, the logical individual is the *essentially unique being*.

But let us put these two aspects of individuality together. For it is admitted, as Thomas throughout implies, that we believe in individuals, either because, as a fact, we experience their presence, or because we conclude their concrete reality by reasoning from our experience, as Thomas does in case of God, or because we get their presence somehow revealed to us indirectly, as, for Thomas, revelation assures us of the Trinity and of the hosts of the angels. On the other hand, it is sure, as Scotus insists, and as Thomas too would admit, that we logically mean the individual to be intelligibly different from the universal, in precisely the abstracter way just defined. But what then? Is not our true problem at last fully before us? We observe or otherwise learn of the concrete and segmented masses of contents in the world of fact. And now—here is the puzzle—*we are somehow sure that each of these segmented objects, in respect of just what we call its individuality, is unique in its individual kind, represents a class that can have but one possible representative, or is the sole individual of its own separated sort.* Now the real questions are: What do we mean by this assertion? How come we to be so sure of it, and what is the metaphysically real condition of this segmentation of the unique? These are the questions as to the Principle of Individuation.

In Thomas's answer, the philosopher tries, with characteristic simplicity and kindly fidelity to the facts as he sees them, to reduce, so far as possible,

the logical uniqueness of the individual to the empirical fact of the separateness of each individual from every other. The result, however, is that the problem really gets no one intelligible answer at all. In the world of sense, one individual, as a matter of fact, is presented as materially — that is, in the end, immediately and inexplicably — different from the other, however much the two may agree in universal type. This flesh, these bones, differentiate Socrates from anybody else. But at once come objections. Is Socrates, as the individual, an intelligible object at all, or is he merely a brute fact of sense? If he is intelligible, then one who knows him, not as a mere man, but as *this man*, apparently has an idea, *i.e.* an "intelligible species," of Socrates as *this man*. But, in the scholastic theory of knowledge, an idea, or "intelligible species," is a "form" — in a knower — that is immaterial, and that agrees in type with the type of its object. In other words, an act of knowledge, as I should myself prefer to express it, involves, as such, an imitation of an object in terms of a construction which a knower produces within his own consciousness. But, if this be so, an "imitation," an "intelligible species," an "idea" of an object, is, as such, *per se* universal. One has not to look about in the world of experience to see whether another individual precisely like Socrates ever appears there. If one ever intellectually knows, and not merely sensuously observes, Socrates as *this man*, then *ipso facto* the individual type of Socrates has been repeated in the imitative intelligent consciousness of some knower, and this type has no longer a unique exemplification.

But this cannot be if Socrates is to remain unique *as this man*. The result, so far, seems to be perfectly obvious. It is as Aristotle said. The individual as such is an immediate object, but not an intelligible object. What result, after all, could be more obvious? Nobody's knowing of Socrates could *be* Socrates, or even another case of the same man. Hence, in order to save the reality of the individual, you have to exclude some aspect of him from any possible intelligible knowledge. And this aspect is precisely his individuality as Socrates. This flesh, these bones, — they are matter. You will never get them into pure form.

But, alas! — one's perplexities have only begun. Socrates, it seems, is, as individual, unique, and therefore never to be made an object of intelligently complete contemplation. Only his type — his humanity, whiteness, etc. — could be imitated by a knower of him. Knowledge is of the common, the universal. Is this the end? No, indeed; for there is One who knows Socrates through and through, and who knew him from eternity, when time was not. That One is God. The Divine ideas are not only of universals, but of individuals. Thomas expressly proves the fact. Moreover, Socrates, even as individual, has a twofold being: in God, as an individual idea eternally present; and out of God, as created being. Are these two cases of the unique Socrates the same? No; Thomas, in one passage, very carefully distinguishes the two, — and curiously enough he distinguishes the created being of things, as their *hoc esse*, from their ideal being in God, their *esse*. Yet

the *esse* of Socrates in God, before the creation, was as individual as Socrates now is! Here then is Socrates, the unique individual, present twice in the world of being,—as uncreated but known, as created, yet to God also known.

Now, is this difficulty a mere accident of the Thomistic theology? I think not. From any point of view, as we see, the question arises, not merely: *Is* there the individual Socrates? but: *What* is the individual Socrates?—how is the idea of him defined? If this question is answerable, then wherever the answer is supposed to be absolutely adequate the *esse* of Socrates gets, in the world of absolute being, *two* exemplifications, or else Socrates is no longer an individual in so far as individuality means uniqueness. But if the question is unanswerable, then individuality remains, for God as for men, either an unintelligible brute fact, or something still to be pointed out by philosophy.

Yet, even if this problem of the Divine knowledge, and of the *esse* of the uncreated Socrates, had been set aside as essentially above our comprehension, the question would recur, for Thomas as for others, in other forms. Socrates is known as this man to at least one angel, viz., his own *angelus custodiens*, or guardian angel. But angels are intellective beings, who sense no brute facts as mere facts, but know what is for them essentially intelligible. Moreover, Socrates reflectively, if inadequately, knows himself to be nobody but himself. Hence, for self-consciousness, individuality is not a mere brute fact, but means something,—is ideal, formal, universal, and, as Duns

Scotus well insisted, must certainly mean more than an *inclinatio* toward this flesh and these bones; or, as we should say, must mean more than mere constancy of "visceral and muscular sensations." Moreover, there are the angels, who are individuals, and who, for themselves, are through and through intelligible and intelligent. All these problematic facts of the scholastic world are but illustrations of the universal issue which we must all somehow face. I use the scholastic examples only as such illustrations. "*De te fabula,*" we say to anybody who is disposed to smile at the tangles. "You believe that you know individuals as such. Then just such problems are for you." Meanwhile, Thomas has to admit that, in itself, if not for us, individuality, as such, must in view of these considerations depend upon some intelligible principle of differentiation, which somehow gets applied to the ideal nature of the universe, and which so, in the end, formally individuates. Scotus, in the last analysis, asserts no more. For Scotus, the *hæcceitas* is a positive individual character, essentially ideal and intelligible. And yet Thomas is right in his instinct that intelligible individuality, in so far forth as intelligible, seems at once, on the other hand, to involve principles that, as ideal, are universal, and that therefore, when applied, will explain only classes or types of objects, and never uniqueness. Why not another case of this *hæcceitas*, if the *hæcceitas* is ideal and intelligible?

The special arguments of Scotus now hardly need here further analysis. The real point of the Subtle Doctor, I take it, is that you never can rest content in

your mind with the empirical individuals of sense and of revelation. For these segmented facts, as they present themselves, are indeed sundered; but they are not yet logical individuals. For the logical individual is not the segmented as such, but the unique as such,—viz., that which is sole in its kind. No empirical character,—not the mere fact of existence,—not immediate material presence,—not even quantitatively determined matter, which is but another name for an intelligible type,—can explain individuality. An individual is such because of its *hæcceitas*, *i.e.* because its ideally intelligible nature determines the universal to an essentially unique expression. This is the notion of Scotus; and we saw that the angelic doctor Thomas, who in his beautiful way sees all sides of his subject, but who, with his gentle discretion, always avoids recognising his own inconsistencies, by reason of his instinctively skilful and imperturbable silence to all his most intractable problems,—we saw that he, too, substantially admits as much as Scotus demands, while explicitly making prominent in his mind the empirical aspects of individuality. Of the two thinkers, Thomas, in fact, is the more instructive, just because, as to this matter, he is the more empirical and the more inconsistent. Yet even Scotus is wholly unable to tell us what the *hæcceitas* is. That he leaves to God and the angels. He only knows what the *hæcceitas* does. Fusing with universals, it makes individuals. And so, in character, it is comparable to Kant's "*Schema*," since it is an idea when it gets amongst the ideas, but is a *this* when it is viewed in the world of experience. Like the bat in

the fable, it scratches with the beasts and flies with the birds, whenever the two parties contend; but, most of all, it loves hiding and the twilight.

V

THE INDIVIDUAL AS UNDEFINABLE BY THOUGHT, AND
AS UNPRESENTABLE IN EXPERIENCE

Our schoolmen have now admirably defined our problem for us. A study of Leibnitz's later doctrine would, I think, give us no essentially new light on the subject. We must try our own hands. The empirical world contains various sorts and degrees of segmentation. We call, or may call, any segmented mass an individual, of a lower or of a higher grade. But we mean more than the mere presence of segmentation by the use of the name "individual." We mean that this *one* before us is not only segmented, but, in respect of its *hæcceitas*, unique. The question is, first: How can we be sure of this uniqueness? The first obvious answer is: "Sense, or some other form of brute experience, assures us of the fact." But to this the equally obvious retort is: "Mere experience, as such, cannot immediately assure us of anything of the kind. Uniqueness is an idea of great subtlety. Individual Identity requires in general careful proof, or, at all events, careful reflection, as in case of our own identity. Moreover, what experience really presents is the fact of segmentation. Logical considerations, it would seem, must then supply the element of uniqueness." On the other hand, this opposed answer

seems equally difficult. Experience, let us say, does not prove the asserted uniqueness. Then how can thought prove the uniqueness? Only by identifying the presented and segmented Somewhat with a concept; say, the concept of *this man* or of Socrates, which is such a concept as to forbid any multiple exemplification. But, now, how could one define an idea so as to forbid the defined nature to have multiple exemplification? To define is to specify, but not to individualise. Define a man of such shape, size, colour, eyes, hair, "finger-prints," feeling, knowledge, and fortune. You have only defined a type. That this type has but one exemplification, you must leave to experience to prove. So far, then, the antinomy seems complete. Thought, as such, cannot define uniqueness, and must appeal to experience; experience, as such, cannot present uniqueness, but must leave that, as being either an intelligible type or nothing, to thought.

It is customary to avoid noticing this difficulty, because one asserts that experience does come to us wholly individualised into experiences of *this* moment, *this* place, and so of *this* desk, *this* pen, and the rest. I need not here wearily repeat Hegel's destructive criticism of the concept of the *this*, merely as the presented fact of what he called "sense-certainty." It is enough here to observe that the *this* of passing experience is often and rightly regarded as an individual content; but it is so regarded because one assumes already a previous knowledge of an individual whole, or of a determinate fact, within which, or in relation to which, the *this* of the passing experience becomes secondarily

definable as a full-fledged and then unquestionable individual. For example, if you assume this room as an already known individual, then indeed this observed place in this room gets a perfectly determined individuality, in relation to the rest of the room. Assume that this day as a whole is already known as an individual, and then this moment, timed by my watch, has its place in the day's wholeness. In general, give me one individual, and I have my $\pi o \bar{v} \sigma \tau \bar{o}$, and can know other individuals of the same type to an indefinite extent. Give me, as a supposedly fixed point in space, this origin of co-ordinates, and this plane of individually fixed direction, and then I can define, first, all three of my co-ordinate planes, and then the individual position of any point you please in space. But just as I need to assume, as an individual point, my origin of co-ordinates before I can define the place of any other point in space; just as I know not where any *here* is until you first give me the place of some other *here*, to which I can relate the first; so, in general, the *this* of passing experience is a true individual for me only by contagion, so to speak, *i.e.* in so far as the *this* catches hold upon individuality through its relation to other presupposed or assumed individuals. In my life, assumed as an individual whole, *this* experience, in relation to other assumed individual experiences, has its unique place. Nor is it otherwise with any *this* of experience. The *this* is not a presented individual, but borrows its individuality from the presupposed individuality of others. To appeal to the *this* is thus to trade on credit. As we shall later see in this

paper, even our empirical self-consciousness is no exception to this rule. The self, as the mere empirical *this*, borrows its individuality from the presupposed social individuality to which it is related. The empirical ego, in its phenomenal presence, is a social contrast-effect. I am this individual, in ordinary life, because of my determinate and conscious relation to other assumed individuals.

But the holder of the doctrine that experience does come to us wholly individuated is accustomed to insist still more elaborately upon space and time as principles of individuation; and fairness demands a little closer examination of this thesis, which nowadays may be said to hold the field in all the customary presentations of the problem of the individual. Accounts such as that of Wundt, in his *Logik*,—accounts of which very many examples might be found in modern literature,—declare the original of our idea of the individual to be the *this* in space and time, the *here-and-now* object. The object, thus individuated in space and time, as this empirically impenetrable thing, whose place cannot now be occupied by another thing, is supposed to be followed thenceforth by our consciousness, and identified by virtue of the continuity of its appearance as it changes its place, or as it is seen again from time to time; and thus, as one supposes, the concept of the individual gets differentiated. The uniqueness of the individual means, from this point of view, simply the experience that *no other* object can occupy the same place at the same time. Were our experience ideally continuous, we should follow this same object from place to place, and perceive

that throughout its history it was *always* such that *no other* object could occupy its place, whatever that place might be, at the same time with this impenetrable individual. Thus the individual would remain always unique, *by virtue of its permanent exclusion of any other from the place occupied by it at any time*. Hence the conceived uniqueness of the individual gets defined. It is admitted by Wundt, and by others, that such impenetrability and continuity is only imperfectly observable in our actual experience of things; and this is why, according to Wundt, the conception of the ordinary thing of common-sense gradually gives place, as science progresses, to the conception of ideal things, called substances, whereof molecules, atoms, etc., are examples. But the origin and essential nature of the concept of the individual is supposed to be thus explained.

To this familiar explanation of individuality we must still stubbornly reply, that what it has identified is always a collection of universal types, never an individual. In the visual space before me at any time, I actually see—what? So far, masses of colour. What, from a logical point of view, are these? Answer, universals. Were I confined to visual experience, I should in the long run, and after allowing for the occasional occultation or eclipse of one visible object by another, learn that these same masses of colour are mutually exclusive, so far as concerns the occupation of the same space at any time. But would this knowledge, viewed simply in itself, apart from other facts and motives, be what I now call a knowledge of individual things? Answer,

No; so far, it would be a knowledge of the repugnance of what I now call certain universal qualities. The meaning of it, technically expressed, would be simply that various colour experiences cannot at the same time acquire the same "local sign." But the local sign, or complex of local signs, by which in the long run I define any one portion of my visual field, is essentially a universal, a quality; and that this same quality cannot be associated, at the same time, with two different colour experiences; is a fact belonging to the world of universal law, namely, of law relating to the mutual repugnance of qualities. Neither local signs nor colours, as such, are yet individuals. Nor is their union an individual. Nor is the segmentation of the field of colour vision, viewed with or without its local signs, as yet an experience of anything but universals. Nor does repugnance between various universals, or between various combinations of universals, nor does the fact that a given universal *A* cannot at the same time be associated, or fused, with two universals of another type, *B* and *C*, while it can be fused with either of them singly,—nor does, I say, all this taken together as yet present to us the kind of uniqueness that is meant by individuality. We learn, in brief, that if *A* means a local sign whereby a given region of the field of vision is distinguished from the rest, and if *B* and *C* mean colour experiences, then the combination *AB* is possible, and the combination *AC* is also possible, but that *AB* excludes *AC*, and cannot co-exist with it. Surely we learn, in such a case, of nothing that establishes any relation except such as

could exist and constantly does exist amongst ideas, or purely universal objects, wherein there is no trace of individuality. So far, then, the field of vision is not defined as presenting to us individuation.

But one may insist that by *this object or thing*, seen before me, I do not mean merely the mass of colour, but the object with which, by experience, touch and muscular sensations have been combined. The "real thing" is a blending of colour experiences with touch and muscle-sensations, which have all come to be localised in what we call objective space. And by the impenetrability of the thing we mean a collection of experienced facts in which touch and muscular sensation play more part, or certainly not less, than visual experience. The *whole* impenetrable thing, which excludes others from its place, is thus the presented individual of daily experience. In reply to this argument, I admit, at once, that I doubt not the individuality of the thing of ordinary experience, *as maturely conceived by us*. What I deny is, that its individuality can ever be defined in terms *merely* of its spatial characters and of its physical exclusion of other things. The individual object of ordinary experience seems individual to us by virtue of the fact that "I," who behold it, am for myself, in mature life, already an individual, and that *this*, which occupies this definite relation to me, is therefore individuated by this relation. But how I came to be regarded as an individual is a question not to be decided in terms of sense-presentation. Moreover, the individual of ordinary experience is still further individuated by the fact that it occupies

a place in the individual whole now called "our space," or, at all events, the space of "our environment." But if one is to learn how we first individuated this space, one must not argue in a circle by first pointing out that *this thing*, in this part of our environment, is, as such, an individual by virtue of its relations to the presupposed whole of surrounding space, and by then saying that surrounding space gets its individuality through the mere summation of the individualities of the things and places that fill it up. We are still to see how the impenetrable thing first becomes presented as an individual. And my comment so far is, that, just as the field of vision, viewed in itself, presents us no individuals, but only sense-qualities, some combinations of which exclude other combinations, just so the addition of other sense-qualities, of local signs belonging to touch and to the muscular sense, in no wise alters, of itself, the logical situation with which we are dealing. The local signs, the sense-qualities,—they are all universals. Their segmentation, their repugnance, is, so far, like the segmentation of good and evil, or the repugnance of *A* and *non-A* in general. It presents us, as yet, no individuation,—only varieties and relationships of types. That the sense-qualities are universals, and that the local signs which were to be so important for individuation are universals, is proved by the very experiences to which one refers when one talks of individuation through impenetrability. The concrete thing *A*, which sense cognises, is not only coloured, but unyielding. What does this mean? It means that touch, sensations of re-

sistance, and colour sensations, or that the phenomenal qualities indicated by them, do in our experience fuse. That is, these sense-phenomena are, as they come, not yet individuals, since they are not even necessarily exclusive. Just so, the local signs of touch and vision fuse into the presented place of the thing in the complex called outer space, the colours and their local signs suggesting the local signs of possible touches. Thus the local signs are universals; for they, too, do not even exclude one another so long as they belong to different senses. The concrete thing *A* is now a more complex union of fused universals than it was when one considered merely the field of vision. As such fused group of universals, it now excludes, or renders impossible, certain other combinations. The colour-quality *a*, in combination with the touch-quality *b*, and with the present or suggested local signs of sight and touch, *c* and *d*, now proves to be such that, so long as *a* and *b* are linked with *c* and *d*, no other colour-and-touch group, *a'* and *b'*,—or, as we concretely say, no other thing *A'*,—can get this same group of local signs, or, as we also say, can get into the same place which *A* occupies. But by such combinations we define everything *except* what constitutes the true individuality of *A*. We define *A* as a certain combination, or fusion, of universals, which is repugnant to or exclusive of various other combinations of universals. And that is, so far, all that we do. It is precisely as if we said: “I cannot at the same time attend to the melody *A* and to the entirely unrelated melody *A'*.” In such a case, our mutually exclusive melodies are not yet defined as

individuals, although we could for other reasons, yet to be considered, individuate even the melodies. But as the melody which excludes all other melodies from the field of attention at the time when it occupies this field is not thereby presented as an individual, but only as a universal, so the sense-object that excludes others from possessing the local signs which it then presents is not thereby presented as an individual.

The fundamental reason why such highly popular views as the foregoing appear so plausible, and fill so much place in the ordinary accounts, is that it never occurs to us, in ordinary discussion, to ask what it is that makes this individual place or moment an individual at all. We assume that the *this* is, as such, an individual. But in fact the mere *this* is the barest of abstractions. It usually becomes an individual, at any moment, by virtue of its relation to myself, the constantly presupposed central individual of daily life. But how came I to be an individual?

Our result, then, so far is, that one might hopefully say: Give me first one single individual, known as segmented and unique, and *then* I will undertake, with experience enough, to define a whole universe of unique individuals. But our present problem is, how to get that first individual. So far, then, we have a restatement, in quite our own way, of the problem as to our own knowledge of the individual. Either experience or thought, it would seem, must determine such knowledge, but neither can do so, nor can both together; for each appeals to the other in vain to answer the question: What is *This Individual*?

Our other question, as to the metaphysics of individuality, now gets its parallel restatement. Laying the problem of knowledge aside, and passing to Being, to what principle is the individuation of the world due? To the ultimate and immediate brute fact of the segmentation of things? But that answer is impossible. For segmentation, as a mere brute fact, is not identical with uniqueness. Colour is a brute fact; but it is not unique. Good and evil are brute facts,— pain and pleasure, up and down, right and left, past and future, are not only facts, but facts with strong contrasts and segmentations about them. Yet this does not constitute them, in so far, facts or cases of individuality. Individuation is not identical with the brute fact of segmentation.

On the other hand, is individuation due to some rational law of ideal differentiation in the world? Just as little can that be so; for where law differentiates truth, where general processes combine to determine results, the product of such ideal differentiation, or combination, is this or that *type* of truth,— never this unique *case*. Individuation is therefore not due to a process that merely specifies universal types. Curves may be of this or of that more and more specified type; but hereby one never defines an individual curve,— only a type of curves.

Individuals are describable enough, if only,— as I said before,— *if only* you assume other previous individuals to which to relate them. But what universal process, or combination of processes, or overlaying of types, shall produce your first individual?

Thus, then, the individual, as it would seem, must be

either brute fact or ideally definable result, *i.e.* combination of universal processes or types. And nevertheless, as now appears, the individual can be neither the one nor the other.

VI

THE INDIVIDUAL AS THE OBJECT OF AN EXCLUSIVE
INTEREST

To define such a problem exactly is already far more than half the answer. My result, so far, is that individuality, although it is known by and in the unity of consciousness, is a category *indefinable* in purely theoretical terms. But, in so far, the cause of the individual is not at all a lost cause. As a fact, the world that we live in, as a moral world, although through and through *knowable*, is even more a practically significant than it is a theoretically *definable* world. And I may as well at once simply say, that, to my mind, the concept of the individual, in its primary and original sense, is distinctly an ethical concept, and that it is so whether you speak in terms of knowledge or in terms of being. Theoretically definable individuality there is, to be sure, in plenty, if by definition you merely mean the process of designating new individuals through an appeal to relationships to the presupposed individuality of other individuals. Such is the process which I just now exemplified. Individuality is like a ferment. Introduce the germ of it into your world of knowledge, and the universe soon swarms as with yeast, and individuality bubbles

out everywhere. For in relation to any one individual, you can define countless other individuals. But the first individual you can only know by breathing the breath of a new life into the otherwise dead and stubbornly universal categories of merely abstract theory. Man individuates the objects of his knowledge because he is an ethical being. God individuates the objects of his own world, and knows them as individuals, for no other reason. This will be my own thesis. In short, to use familiar but still not unphilosophical terms, I propose briefly to show that the Principle of Individuation, in us as in reality, is identical with the principle that has sometimes been called Will, and sometimes Love. Our human love is a good name for what first individuates for us our universe of known objects. We have good reason for saying that it is the Divine Love which individuates the real world wherein the Divine Omniscience is fulfilled.

And now the way to this result is simple enough. A child's first ideas are all unconsciously universal, or vaguely abstract, ideas. He does not early know individuals as such. He does very early know more or less indefinite types. Moreover, not only the child's early half-conscious ideas, but his first explicitly conscious ideas, are in their origin imitative, and in their nature contrast-effects, due to the comparison of similarities and varieties in his own acts, and in the acts of others, and in the forms and colours of like and unlike objects. And in so far the child's first conscious ideas must be of what we call the universal, as such. In his first use of language, as Aristotle

himself already remarked, and as the scholastics often repeat, he "calls all men fathers and mothers," — or, in other words, uses language not for the individual but for the types, which, in the midst of the shifting variety of his experience, he learns to recognise as the same types, persisting in the many presentations. The many presentations he cannot yet know as many individuals; for he has no such power to grasp single facts for their own sake. Such power comes only late.

The *one* that persists for the child through the *many*, — this, by virtue of its persistent contrast with unrecognisable confusions, he gradually learns to recognise *as* the one. But this *one* is the universal, the type, the idea. If you do not believe this, watch any young child calling flies "dogs," or independently recognising pine cones as potatoes, or thoughtfully saying "piece of moon all torn" when he happens to observe a bright star, — and you will know what I mean by asserting that not only the first unconscious general ideas, but also the first explicitly conscious ideas, are of the universal, as such. In all such cases the background of the universe is not yet the individual, but the unrecognisably confused many, the relatively undifferentiated mass of changing contents, which the child does not make out, and does not know except as the background of the universals that he does know.

On the lines thus defined, the child might proceed, for all that I can see, indefinitely, without ever reaching the knowledge of true individuality, were he *merely* a theoretical thinker. But now observe him

on another side of his nature. He has a plaything,—say, a lead soldier. He loves it. He breaks it. Now offer him—yes, at once show him—another plaything, another lead soldier, as nearly as possible like the one just broken. Were the broken one not, as such, before the child's mind, the new one might prove in all respects satisfactory. It has, perhaps, all the universal characters that aroused his interest in the former. But now, will the child, keenly fond of universal types as he intellectually is,—will he be very likely to accept the new soldier as a compensation for the broken one? No. He is very likely to mourn the more vociferously in view of your offer. If you could have hidden the broken soldier before he observed the disaster, and if you could have substituted the other, perhaps the child would never have recognised the loss, and all would have been well. It is not, then, that he theoretically recognises this simple lead soldier as observably unique in type or as definably different from all others. It is that his love for his toy is, in its subjective, instinctive, preconscious type, an *exclusive passion*, that is, a feeling such that the idea of the two objects that shall at the same time be conceived as equally possible satisfactions of this feeling, is a repugnant, a hateful, idea. Now, at this moment, I say, when the child rejects the other object—the other case that pretends to be an apt appeal to his exclusive love for the broken toy,—at this very moment he *consciously individuates the toy*. And he does this because he loves the toy with an exclusive love that *permits no other*. Of course, he indeed knows not why he

feels thus. This is a reflex of his nature. This is the fashion of his passion. The lost toy is now, for his consciousness, a class with one member and no more. Why? Because that one member is theoretically observed to have definably incomunicable, barely presented, unique characteristics? No. Because this broken toy is here in space while that one is yonder? Impossible. Because the child mourns the mere fact of the breaking, and cannot be comforted by the later presentation of an unbroken toy? No. For if you mend *this* soldier that is now broken, he will forget at once the whole trouble. He wants, then, to see again an unbroken toy. Why then does he not accept the new one? Because his exclusive interest, as such, is instinctively so set that it declines to recognise, in any unity of consciousness, the presence of two or more equally acceptable cases of the type defined by this love. It is not the object as presented, nor the object as thought, but it is the object as loved, which is such that there can be no other object consciously recognised as a fit representative of this type. The child does not observe that there is presented in this object the marks of individuality. He feels that there ought to be, that there shall be, no rival object of this love. The rival being consciously excluded, one stands in presence of an object concerning which one simply feels that *there shall be no other* of this particular value. This practical, this passionate, this loving, this at first thoughtless dogma of love, "*There shall be no other*," is, I insist, the basis of what later becomes the individuating principle for knowledge.

For what happens with the child crying over the toy, happens over and over again in our life. *A* is presented. So far, one has fact and type. Here, apart from relations to other presupposed individuals, knowledge, *as* purely theoretical,—knowledge, whether as sense or as thought,—finds only types, qualities, forms, universals; vague or exact, brutally immediate or scientifically computed and verified. *B* might come, after *A* or contemporaneously with it, and might show, either just the same contents as were noticed in *A*, or else contents contrasting with those of *A* only in universally significant respects, such as position. So far, then, *A* and *B* can agree or can differ,—but only as types, as universals. But now let *A* be loved, or, if you will, hated (since hate is, as Browning has it, a “mask of love”),—but loved or hated with the peculiar sort of exclusive passion that marks some of our deeper instincts, and that, in very diluted form, still colours many even of our gentler and more contemplative concerns. With such exclusive interests one learns to love each of one's more permanent possessions,—one's home, books, trinkets; one's children, and all the other members of one's family; one's country, business, life; the mass of contents and relations designated as one's self, and the other masses known as each of one's friends. With gentler, but still relatively exclusive interests, one recognises places revisited, complex objects of scientific interest once carefully studied; and so on, indefinitely. Well, *A* is present and arouses such a consciously exclusive interest. Could there be another object *B* so similar to *A* as

to arouse just this interest? One has to admit, that, theoretically speaking, there might be such an object. But we are sure of one thing, namely, that we could *not* be contemporaneously conscious of *A* and *B* as appealing to this same interest, however like they might seem to be. For the interest is itself, as instinctive emotion, exclusive, and demands an exclusive or unique object. Were an *A* and a *B* to present themselves as alike worthy of the interest, one would insist, however alike *A* and *B* seemed: "One of you or both of you must be false. For there can be, and shall be, for me but one beloved *A*, one example of this type, one exclusively interesting object of just this exclusive interest." Hereby one becomes conscious of *A*, not as an observed nor yet as a directly intelligible individual, but as an object that appears to represent a class which, according to the exclusive interest, can and shall possess but a single member.

Yet one may indeed say, not all love is thus exclusive. I fully admit the fact. Not all love is individuating. There is much love of unindividuated types. But—and herein lies the ethical significance of the category of Individuality—the ethically organising interests of life are individuating, and they all involve an exclusive element. Ethical love, organising interest, is precisely the sort of interest that cannot consciously serve two masters, and that accordingly individuates, first its master, and then countless other individuals with respect to that master,—viz., individual means to the one end, individual objects of the one science, individual acts

of the one life, and all the other individuals that in the end fill our known world of experience. It is by an individuating or exclusive interest in living one life for one purpose, that a man becomes a moral individual, one Self, and not a mere collection of empirical social contrast-effects. The love of pleasure is not an exclusive love. Hence it renders its slave vaguely universal. The love of one career, which excludes other ways of living, tends to individualise the professional man. The exclusive love of God, whom nobody else can serve in just the way open to you, tends to individuate your idea of your moral self. In another realm, the vaguer affections, as youth first knows them, are abstract universals, and may demoralise. The love for one beloved, and one only, is an accident which for the first time individuates both the lover and the beloved. The mother's love, for this infant, is exclusive, and so individuates both mother and child. In brief, it is such affections that, as they give us the consciousness of the One, henceforth tend to make our world one, and hence, by infection, to individuate for us every object in the world. Science, which is primarily of the universal, thus becomes secondarily that whose beloved but far-off goal is, as we said, the knowledge of the individual,— of that individual which love presupposes, but which theory can never finally verify in the observed world of any finite observer.

VII

THE REALITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL

We turn from the world of our knowledge once more to the world of reality. The only observer who could actually and finally verify individuality would be a being who knew his ideal types to be realised in a single world of fact, because whatever he loved was his own, and because what was presented to him fulfilled his love; while his love, in order to be organised and not vaguely infinite, in order to be definite and not confusedly various, in order to be self-possessed and not powerlessly dependent upon chance facts, was an exclusive love, — a love that only one world, one Whole, could fulfil. Such a being would say: "There shall be but this one world." And for him this world would be fact. The oneness would be the mere outcome and expression of his will. This would then be an individual world, that is, the sole instance of its universal idea or type. In this individual world, every finite fact, by virtue of its relations to the whole, would be in its own measure individual. And individuality, in such a world, would neither be absorbed in one indistinct whole, nor yet be opaque fact. For the exclusive love of the Absolute for this world would render the individuality of the fact secondarily intelligible, as being the fulfilment of the very exclusiveness of the love.

Turning back to the finite world itself, my last observation here as to the general metaphysics of

individuality would be that individuality, in so far as it is present in the finite world, is essentially a teleological category. Objects are individuals in so far as they are unique expressions of essentially exclusive ideals, ends, Divine decrees. This consideration must govern every concrete application of our category. In biology, the individual viewed as the unique variation of its type has often been made, of late, as it was by Darwin, the centre of the definition of individuality as known to that science. That such absolutely unique variations exist cannot, I suppose, be proved, except upon presuppositions of the sort herein defined. But the teleological interest of such variations for the process of evolution makes this provisional definition of the biological individual — namely, as a mass of living matter sufficiently well organised to represent apparently unique variations of a type — the most philosophically interesting of the various biological definitions of individuality, just because the unique variation is, as such, a conception of a relatively teleological significance for the evolutionary theory. If anywhere such unique variations are unobservable, one has on one's hands only an indefinite universal, — masses of living matter alike except as to their place; and then one might as well call the descendants of any given cell a single individual.

As to our old friend, Socrates the moral individual, he is and can be metaphysically differentiated and individuated only by the fact, if it be a fact, that the Absolute finds in him the fulfilment of an exclusive interest, such as, in this individual world, nobody else

can, or, from God's point of view, nobody else *shall* fulfil. This exclusive interest might, of course, be more or less met by Socrates the biological variation,—the unique temperament, unlike that of other sons of men. But in any truly moral sense it can only be met in case the ideal of Socrates, the meaning of his life in its wholeness, is such as no other moral process in the universe can fulfil. And this I take to be, in fact, the ultimate meaning of the individuality of Socrates. The meaning implies, of course, that Socrates the moral individual shall not cease from the world until his goal is fulfilled.

As to what has been called individualism in general, in the social and practical sense of the term,—as we referred to it in the first section of this Part of our paper, so now we observe that its eternal significance lies in the fact that since individuals are the objects, and, as moral individuals, the embodiments, of exclusive interests, such as cannot twice be realised, the last word of philosophy to the individual must be: Be loyal, indeed, to the universe, for therein God's individuality is expressed; but be loyal, too, to the unique. Be unique, as your Father in Heaven is unique.

VIII

INDIVIDUALITY AND WILL

The circle of our inquiry is, in a very general sense, complete. We have seen that a theoretical view of the world implies the wholeness, the completion, of the unity of the Absolute Consciousness

in a single moment. We have seen that this completion demands the presence of a factor not separate from thought and experience, yet not definable in terms either of bare thought or of the data of immediate experience, in so far as they are merely felt, or are present as the merely sensuous fulfilment of thought. This new factor we have defined as Will. We have seen that it does not form merely one of the contents of experience to which thought refers, but determines the world which fulfils thought to be *this* world rather than any other of the abstractly possible but not genuinely possible worlds. We have defined this aspect of the Universal Consciousness as its individuating aspect. Turning to the concept of the Individual, we have seen, on the other hand, that it is definable only as the object of Will. The object of Will must have contents, and must have a universal character; but as individual object it is defined neither by its contents nor by its character, in so far as this character is conceived by thought. As individual, the object of Will is the object of an exclusive interest, or love, which can permit no other to take its place. Thus knowledge, for its own completion, requires both Will as an attribute of the Absolute Knower, and Individuality in the world, as the object that expresses the will, or love, of the Absolute. But, since contents, as conceived by thought or presented by sense, do not define individuality, therefore in case we have reason to assume the presence in the world of various individuals, *we are not forced to draw any conclusions as to the kind of variety or separation of the contents*

of the world which this variety of individuals implies. The *same* contents may, for instance, form a part of very various individuals, in so far as the same contents may be the object of various individuating interests, each one of which excludes all other objects, while all refer to the same contents. It is in this sense that even in our ordinary experience different wills can individuate, in different ways, the same object, as many worshippers enjoy the same church, which is an individual in very different senses for all of them.

It follows then, already, that nobody may assume, in advance, any given segmentation of the world, as Professor Howison's theory does, in order to define a given type of individuation as real. If the Divine Will involves in its unity many ideals, purposes, interests, intents, it may well appear that the world of fact, viewed in the light of these various interests, may prove to be a world of many individuals. But one will *not* be obliged, in consequence, to break up the unity of the world of knowledge in order to find room for the presence of the various interests that together constitute the organism of the Divine Will. If a certain kind of moral independence amongst these various interests or wills which constitute the Divine Organism is the morally highest conceivable form of life; if, in order that the Divine Will should be the best, it must be differentiated into many forms of will, which do not wholly predetermine the one the other, but which freely unite to constitute the whole: then this variety will exist, precisely because it is the best; but the unity of the world of knowledge, by virtue

of which we obtain our rational assurance that the best is realised, will not be sacrificed for the sake of obtaining room for the exercise of this free variety of will. Professor Howison breaks up the world into many worlds of thought and many spheres of knowledge, merely in order to insure the immediate variety and independence of Will. To do this is to fall into the now exposed fallacy of regarding the category of Individuality as a matter of such a segmentation of contents as would be definable in purely theoretical terms.¹ On the contrary, as we now know, the unity of the world of knowledge presupposes, indeed, the existence of individuality and of Will, but neither the contents of the world of knowledge as immediately felt data, nor the ideas present in that world and fulfilled in the data, can define or present the means by which, or the sense in which, this same world is individuated. Thus the Will individuates according to its own needs; and if it needs for its fulfilment free individuals, it will possess them, and its life will be constituted by theirs; and, while the world of thought and of fact will present nothing that conflicts with such individuation, its unity will no more be thereby broken into fragments of knowledge and experience than, to refer to Schopenhauer's well-known metaphor, the sunlight is shattered by the various winds that blow through it.

¹ [Professor Howison also holds that this way of regarding the category of Individuality is fallacious. But he denies that a plurality of minds, each *a centre of genuine origination both as to thought and as to conduct*, involves this fallacy.—ED.]

PART IV

THE SELF-CONSCIOUS INDIVIDUAL

THE concluding considerations in the foregoing Part of our discussion have been meant to be only suggestions. We now come directly to the serious problem: What is the nature of a self-conscious individual? As has already been indicated in the considerations just cited, my reply will in the end lay stress upon three theses: (1) The Absolute is a self-conscious individual, and the only ultimately real individual, because the only ultimately and absolutely whole individual. As such the Absolute is unique, embodies one Will, and realises this will in the unity of its one life. (2) On the other hand, every finite moral individual is precisely as real and as self-conscious as the moral order requires him to be. As such, every finite, moral, and self-conscious individual is unique, and, in his own measure, free, since there is an aspect of his nature such that nothing in all the universe of the Absolute except his own choice determines him, in this one aspect of his nature, to be whatever he is, and since no other finite individual could take his place, share his self-consciousness, or accomplish his ideal. He is unique, first, in that the object, namely, the Moral Goal, which he sets before himself, and with reference to which he is this self-

conscious being, is for him the object of his exclusive interest; an object for which, in his eyes, no other could be substituted so long as he remains himself. He is unique, moreover, in that no other fulfilment of his ideal than his own attainment of that goal could meet his exclusive interest, so that no *other* self than himself could in such wise attain that goal as to fulfil *his* interest therein. He is self-conscious by virtue of his knowing his interest in his ideal *as* such an exclusive interest, and as the central interest of his moral personality. He has an ideal, because only in so far as he has an ideal is he a person at all. And now I shall also maintain: (3) There is no conflict between the first and the second of the foregoing theses, so that the uniqueness of the Absolute Individual, his inclusive unity, his freedom, his self-possession, hinders in no whit the included variety, the relative freedom, the relative separateness, of the finite moral individuals, who, in their own grade of reality, are as independent of one another, in their freedom of choice, but also as dependent upon one another, in the interlinked contents of their lives, as the moral order requires. They are not, like the Absolute, whole individuals, for each, as Professor Howison expressly admits, needs all the others. But the freedom of each finite moral individual is part of the Divine freedom,—not an absolutely separate part, but a part having its own relative freedom,—a differentiated element of this freedom itself. The uniqueness of each moral individual is a *part* of that which renders the Divine life, in its wholeness, unique. The self-consciousness of each finite individual is a portion

of the Divine Self-Consciousness. The One Will of the Absolute is a One that is essentially and organically composed of Many. These many forms of will harmonise with the Whole, just by being, in a relative measure, free in respect one of another. The many forms of will form One, because it is best — is an aspect of the perfection of the Divine Selfhood — that they should do so. The One Will stands differentiated into many, because in such variety of ideals there is greater significance than in a merely dead and abstract unity. The many ideals are indeed all thus subject, even in their very freedom, to the condition that their various embodiments of freedom should be *such as* ultimately to unite in the one system of the Absolute Will; but this condition simply does not exhaustively predetermine what each ideal contains or expresses, since the best type of unity is precisely such a unity as consists of elements which embody a universal type, but which are not exhaustively predetermined either by that type or by one another. The sort of dependence which each individual thus constituted has upon other individuals and upon the Whole is precisely the sort of dependence demanded by the moral world, namely, the dependence involved for me when I say that unless I, in my private capacity, will what harmonises with the Absolute Will as such, I shall be *overruled* by the other wills that (in that case, *despite* me) harmonise in the Whole. *Less* dependence than this upon the constitution of the “City of God” itself, no individual beside the Absolute could have in any moral world. *More* dependence, *less* individual freedom than this, our

theory does not demand. A world of individuals more separate than this, more endowed with absolute caprice than this, would be a world of anarchy, no "City of God," but a moral hell. The only possible moral world is a world where various individuals are so free from one another, so relatively separate from mutual predetermination, that each has his own share of the Divine Will, his own unique fashion of determining his attitude towards the Whole, while all are so related to one another, and to the Absolute, that they do realise, when viewed altogether, the unity of the Absolute Ideal. Substantially as much as this Professor Howison admits in every word in which he recognises the moral relations of the various free individuals of his world. Exactly such a constitution we assert, when we declare that it is God's Will, in freely differentiated, various, and unique forms, that appears as identical with the various individual finite wills, but *so* appears in them that the total constitution of this world of wills embodies the one Divine Will wherein all these free elements are united, organised, harmonised.

So far, our present theses in general. We shall develope them by treating, first, of the finite self-conscious individual. Him we shall consider, first as empirical psychology knows him, and then as metaphysical and ethical considerations define his true nature. For whoever speaks of the finite self-conscious individual, must begin with the facts of our human natural history. And whoever studies our natural history, must remember that empirical psychology raises, but does not by itself solve, the phil-

osophical problem: What, in my real essence, am I, this person? In the proper union of psychology with philosophy lies the solution of this problem. Having studied finite individuality in ourselves, we shall proceed to the question of the relation of our individuality to the Absolute, by briefly considering in what sense our Absolute is a self-conscious individual, and what is our relation to such absolute individuality. A reference to the problem of Immortality will close this Part of our paper.

I

EMPIRICAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS CONTENTS

First, then, for the empirical aspect of finite self-consciousness. I talk of myself, of my moral worth, of my choice, of my freedom, of my moral personality. What fact in the universe do I refer to when I thus talk of myself? Is not the self of my inner self-consciousness a mere collection of accidental experiences and processes,—a mere heap of feelings, of associations, of beliefs? Is there anything really permanent or eternal about me? Am I not a mere child of circumstance, an offspring of my ancestors, a result of an evolutionary process, a chaos of bodily products? What concrete facts do I think when I think of myself? Is it not a mass of internal sensations, of fleeting thoughts, of halting memories, that I refer to when I speak of myself? And, now, how can this chance product of ancestry and of circumstance, this creature of yesterday and to-day,

have any eternal nature or significance? Can there be any abiding core of personality about me?

To these questions our present general answer is this: If you ask as to what facts of experience go together to fill up the contents of my actual self-consciousness, you find, as every psychologist knows, that the consciousness of self is, in its complexity, the most delicate, unstable, and intricate of all the phenomena studied by psychology. But if you ask what our self-consciousness, when once it has come to exist, really means,—then you ask a question that no psychology, no mere natural history of mind, can answer, but that, as I hold, an idealistic philosophy can answer. One has to distinguish sharply between the brute facts of self-consciousness, as psychology studies them, and their true meaning, as philosophy defines it. As a matter of brute fact, and of mere natural history, my private self-consciousness is the most complex and evanescent thing about me. A headache deranges the empirical self; a social annoyance confuses it; a passing mood overwhelms it; a moment of drowsiness eclipses it; death ere-long utterly hides it. But if one asks, not, What happens to the empirical self, or when does it come to view? but, What value, meaning, metaphysical reality, is indicated by self-consciousness whenever, especially in the moral world, it comes to light, as the principle of choice, of intent, of reasonableness? — then the only answer is, that the rational self-consciousness, wherever it comes to light, reveals itself as of eternal significance, as an embodiment of God's plan. How can this be? How can this

creature of circumstance, this evanescent shadow, be also the embodiment and revealer of eternal truth? Let us try to indicate the answer to this question.

II

GENESIS OF THE EMPIRICAL EGO

As a matter of natural history, my idea of myself is of course a growth.¹ No infant begins by being self-conscious. One has to learn to be self-conscious. My ordinary self-consciousness (or, as the psychologists technically call it, my empirical self-consciousness) is a product of experience, slowly woven together according to the laws of the association of ideas. If you ask what inner experiences form a basis for the formation of my idea of myself, the answer is, first of all, my experiences of my own internal bodily sensations, in particular of my "visceral" and my "muscular" sensations, including many masses of skin and joint sensations. These vary, but their routine remains on the whole relatively uniform, while my experiences of what I see or hear or externally touch vary endlessly. So far, the self is a relatively stable group of what are called the sensations of the common sensibility. To these get early joined my experiences of my emotions, and my feelings of voluntary control.

¹ The considerations presented in the following section have been more fully developed in a paper entitled "Some Observations upon the Anomalies of Self-Consciousness." (*Psychological Review* for September, 1895.)

But now enters a factor of great importance for my later self-consciousness. A great deal of my natural consciousness of myself depends upon certain habits that grow up in me in connexion with my early *social experiences*. Very early the child comes to recognise more or less dimly that there are in the world the experiences, intents, and interests of other people,—of his parents, of his nurses, of his playmates. Now, the importance of all this recognition is of the vastest. For hereby the child comes to contrast his own inner self of bodily sensations and of emotions with the ideally conceived inner life of other people. The contrast gives the original self of bodily sensations and emotions a wholly transformed meaning. Henceforth, in a way that few of us sufficiently recognise, and that even the psychologists have usually ignored, the natural self-consciousness of a man becomes, and remains, the result of a certain very intricate and beautiful contrast-effect. I am consciously myself, in ordinary life, by virtue of the contrast between my inner life as I feel it and the inner life of somebody else, whose existence I believe in, and whose life I find set over against mine. Am I in a quarrel?—then I am conscious of myself as contrasted with the mind of my foe. Am I in conversation with you?—then I am self-conscious by virtue of the contrast between your expressed mind and mine. Am I in love?—then I exist for myself by contrast with the mind of my love. Ordinary self-consciousness is a contrast direct. I appear to myself in the light of my contrast with you.

The result of the contrast, however, is manifest. From the first, I repeat, we take note of ourselves by a simple or direct contrast with what we regard as indicating to us the minds, the feelings, purposes, or power, of our interesting social fellows. Here belongs, for instance, the self-consciousness of simple rivalry, expressed in our early life in the childish insight that yonder social fellow wants to do so and so, but cannot do it "as well as I can." In such a case, the contrast upon which the individuality of self-consciousness depends is of a relatively simple sort. So too with the self-consciousness of obstinacy, of social wilfulness, and of anger. Here, what I want is known to me by virtue of its contrast with what another wants, and this contrast, rendering relatively clear my consciousness of my own intent, tends, by its very existence, and by reason of the blindness of my passion, to inflame the opposition. In a more benign, but also, as I judge, in even a more primitive form, appears the simple contrast of ego and non-ego in all my imitative, or explicitly plastic and socially submissive, states of consciousness. Where I long to make out what my fellow means by his doings, and to that end try myself to repeat them, when I listen to his words and try to understand them, I constantly contrast what I mean with what he means, what I can so far do with what he can do, and in such ways increase the material of my self-consciousness. Of this highly important process the well-known questioning age in children is full. In all such ways, then, I increase the data of my self-consciousness by contrasting myself with my neighbour in a relatively

simple or direct, but endlessly repeated fashion. More complex grows the contrast of ego and non-ego when my attention is not merely attracted to the states of my neighbour's mind as indicated to me in one region of my mental life, and as thus directly contrasted with mine, but is also attracted to the fact that my neighbour is aware of me, has his opinion of me, and is concerned in me very much as I am concerned in him. For now I learn to contrast my neighbour's view of me, not only with my states as they already exist in me, but also with the view of myself that hereupon, by virtue of my natural vanity, modesty, obstinacy, or plasticity, gets aroused in me as my response to his conceived opinion of me. My neighbour approves me. And now I both note and value myself more. My neighbour dislikes my looks, my actions, my voice, the selfishness of my behaviour. I come also to take note of this view of myself. It arouses a response of resentment, of contempt, of shame, of obstinacy, of desire to reform, or of wish that I were another. And now I am conscious of myself in a very complex and indirect way, as well as by virtue of the direct contrast. My ideal self, the self that I want to be, as well as my real self, begins to emerge in this contest. What I am and what my neighbour is, what I am and what I seem to him to be, what he thinks of me, and what in response I think of him,—all these pairs now contrast. Moreover, I henceforth take note of what I myself aim to be. One may observe, however, that, just in so far as such experiences introduce this ideal element into my idea of myself, they peculiarly tend to give me

fixity, connectedness in inner selfhood. By my ideal I learn to know myself. The contrast of ego and non-ego grows, however, still more and more complex as all the foregoing motives join in endlessly varied interweaving, in that long drama of social warfare and of social harmony, of friendship and of enmity, of private interest and of public spirit, which passes before us as mind daily meets mind in the expression of feeling and of opinion, in the play of love and of hate, throughout our long, and, by nature, far too flickering existence. Everywhere it is the social non-ego by the light of which the social ego is seen, too often with a luridly confused irrationality,—in happy lives, however, with a gradually attained relative fixity and clearness.

But what motive, above all, tends, in this chaos of empirical self-consciousness, towards an ideal unity, fixity, and clearness in my insight into what, after all, I am for my own consciousness? I have already pointed out that this unifying motive is, above all, the presence of an ideal of what, amidst all the confusion of my life, I mean to be. I repeat, by my ideal I learn to know myself as one self, with one contrast that runs through all the endlessly varying contrasts of ego and non-ego. Surely no teacher needs to be reminded that one common name for all these motives that tend towards unity of selfhood and of character in a growing mind is: Whatever tends to give one's life the unity of a conscious plan. A sane self-consciousness involves a more or less clearly defined ideal of conduct, such as can be central in all the processes that tend to bring the special

contrasts between ego and non-ego into sight. If I really know what on the whole I mean to be, the chaotic succession of empirical states of my ego which varying experience brings to me will not break up my deeper unity. This knowledge of what I mean to be is in part an expression of the habits of my calling, of the mere routine of my business, as these habits and this routine gradually get established for me by fortune and by training, in the family and in the world. And so far, indeed, one can have merely the self-consciousness of one's little hoard of maxims,—the indispensable but relatively Philistine selfhood of the man who gradually becomes settled into his way and place in life. Such self-consciousness, which we all, in our imperfection, must more or less depend upon, is so far only a sort of abstract, or composite image, of the common elements of our actual states of self-consciousness as fortune moulds them. Our social habits get formed: we have our range, our private life, our round of friends, our daily tasks. These involve relatively constant repetitions of similar states of self-consciousness. From repetition springs inner constancy. And, so far, we in the end find our level, and take ourselves to be whatever the world has made of us.

But there is another and a much higher aspect of self-consciousness. My plan of life is not merely my way, but my ideal as such. I do not mean to be merely what by worldly chance I am. And here the very chaos of social accidents to which, particularly in youth, we are subject, proves serviceable in bringing to pass a most important contrast within the

world of one's self-consciousness; namely, the contrast between the ego that fortune has produced, in view of my calling and my limited sphere of action, and the ego that, as I more or less clearly feel, might have been, if these or these interesting accidents of my life, these or these passing moods of self-consciousness, had proved as fruitful and habitual as they were transient and inspiring. A man who has any but the most prosaic self-consciousness is likely to remember not infrequently what he might have been if other people had but given him a fair chance, if that lost skill or that noble purpose had proved stable, or if that dear friend had lived. The sailor, regretting his dog's-life at sea, and fantastically conceiving, during his sober and monotonous voyages, a career such as would have been worthy of him, on that land of whose actual life he knows only what brief spells of drunken idleness, when he is in port, reveal to him; the unsuccessful mechanic, who barely earns a hard living, but who would have been, as he tells you, a very great man if his enemy had not stolen his early inventions and crushed his budding opportunities to death,—these men are self-conscious, in so far as they contrast a painfully real with a hopelessly lost ideal self. You never know a man's self-consciousness until you learn something of this graveyard of perished ideal selves which his experience has filled for him, and which his memory has adorned with often very fantastic inscriptions.

But the ideal self need not remain this—still chaotic—collection of now changeless but forever

defeated illusions. It is indeed well for us that we have such defeated illusions to contrast with the prosaic reality of life's ordinary self-consciousness; for from the ashes of dead selves the very life of the spirit may spring, and, being such as we are, we never win ideals except through first lamenting dear and lost realities. But the ideal self, in the proper sense, comes into sight only in so far as we can learn from life that whatever we are, or plan or carry out, in the world that we see or touch, it is none of it an expression of ourselves as we ought to be; since the moral task of life is simply not to be accomplished by any one visible deed, by the success of any undertaking, by the fulfilling of any mortal office. That man is imperfect; that the moral law is too high for him now completely to accomplish the tasks that it sets him; that man, as he is, is weak, prone to error, doomed to failure even in the midst of his best successes,—these are observations that popular wisdom has for ages repeated. They can be interpreted despairingly. But wise men interpret them strenuously, and get from them a definition of self-consciousness which may be called the distinctively Ethical definition.

For this definition we are now prepared. My lost ideals, my buried illusions, illustrate to me my own nature, as *this ego*, in so far as they set off the chaos of my chance empirical selfhood against the conceived perfection of an ideal life that, as I vainly feel, might have been, but is not. I often am disposed to say: "That lost ideal self is my true self. For it has unity, connexion, orderliness, about it.

But the actual life is a heap of chance empirical fragments of personality." Yet there is a higher view than this. A rational conscience says to me : " Why need the ideal self be lost ? Conceive rather, in some rational terms, what you wisely can mean to be. Let this meaning, this intent, be attentively looked upon as expressing an unattained goal, with reference to which your experience is to be moulded, harmonised, rationalised. Keep this goal in sight." To do so involves rationally significant Attention, *i.e.* attention such as regards a specific content — namely, here, your ideal — as something to be held present before you, to the exclusion of all barely possible but, for you, rejected ideals. In the light of this ideal, view all your chaos of experience. Now it all has unity, for it is lighted by your intention to bring it all into subordination to that ideal. Now, also, whatever happens to you, you live one life ; namely, the life of aiming towards that goal. And now, once more, the very remoteness and ideality of the goal assures the unity of your life. For the ideal is not something that you can to-morrow attain and so have done with. Your ideal is precisely harmony, organisation, unity of life. This, you as you are can never completely fulfil. But for just that reason the ideal goal, shining through all your experience, makes that experience seem to you as one in intent, in purpose, in meaning, despite its empirical variety. Just because your ideal is above you, your real life becomes a single life, for it is now a life of seeking for the goal. The quest is one, however chaotic the wilderness through which the Self,

the knight of this quest, like Browning's Childe Roland, finds his strenuous way.

Now indeed you know yourself as one Self, as a person. For, first, you know your empirical self as the Seeker, meaning, intending, aiming at, that life-ideal; and here you have a contrast of real and ideal self. And, secondly, since your ideal is *this* ideal, the expression of the meaning of your unique experience, you can rightly contrast yourself with all the rest of the world's life. And now we may notice this surprising fact: What from a psychological point of view appeared to us as the evanescence, the infinite delicacy, the natural instability, of your selfhood, is now to be viewed, *in the light of your ideal*, as the essential uniqueness of just your significant experience of selfhood. For just what as mere content is so fleeting, is in the light of the one and unique goal a process tending and striving thither.

We are now ready to pass from the psychological to the metaphysical point of view. The facts of experience are empirically viewed, when you take them just as they chance to come, and try from an external point of view to observe their laws. The same facts are viewed as expressing the nature of reality, as having a metaphysical bearing, whenever you are able to view a group of these facts as embodying, in its wholeness, some one idea, and so having some one inner unity of meaning or of significance. The reality that in such a case you each time deal with is an absolute reality only in case the contents of experience that you consider, are, when taken together, identical with the whole life of God. In all other cases, you deal

with a reality of some lower grade,—a genuine reality, in its own grade, precisely in so far as it consists of contents bound into some unity of meaning by virtue of some one ideal.

Well, the real Self is the totality of our empirical consciousness *when viewed as having unity of meaning, and as exemplifying, or in its totality fulfilling, an idea.* Now this idea is, for us, as we have seen, an ideal, which is never wholly embodied at any one empirical moment of the human life that now is. This ideal gives our life its meaning. If our life can be viewed as ever attaining that goal,—say, in a super-human existence,—then all our individual experience, viewed as a whole, will appear as a total embodiment of this meaning. As we now are, our life that is has unity and meaning only in so far as we regard it as the struggle towards the embodiment of that ideal, which, hovering in still unattainable remoteness above all our earthly existence, gives, by its pervasive contrast, unity to our present fragmentary selfhood. And it is such a way of viewing life that prepares us for the metaphysical theory of the Ego.

One word more here as to the sorts of self that can be defined by referring to a life-ideal. I have spoken as if an individual life-ideal were, as such, a wholly good, a truly worthy, ideal. As a fact, any individual life-ideal, as such, has of necessity a large element of rationality, and so of goodness, about it. On the other hand, a relatively — although never a wholly — diabolical or damnable individual life-ideal is perfectly possible; and the relative unity of an individual self can be, and often is, defined with reference to just

such a relatively bad or devilish ideal. In such cases, the goal of life remains ideal, but the individual is an evil-doer, a relatively lost soul. There are such lives in plenty in the world. They have their own degree of selfhood, unity, ideality; but a deep colouring of baseness runs through it all.

III

REALITY OF THE EGO

And now I finally turn from the empirical to the metaphysical. I ask: What reality has the individual self in the universe of God? But in answering this question I indeed cannot and must not ignore the lesson of the foregoing empirical theory. That theory points out that what one empirically means by the self or self-consciousness is an extremely variable mass of mental contrasts, whose empirical unity depends upon conditions of the utmost complexity. I now ask: In what sense, despite this complexity and variability of the individual self-consciousness as it comes to us empirically, have we still a right to say that there is in the universe a real, and, within the range of our individual experience, a permanent being, to be called this individual Ego? I shall answer this question in a way whose proof I can only sketch. To state my whole case would involve a long course of lectures on metaphysics. I have time, here, chiefly for a relatively dogmatic statement, with mere indications of proof. I shall begin by repeating explicitly, that each one of us knows in his own case

such a real Ego only in so far as each of us finds his experience, in some coherent and connected way, determined and pervaded by a conscious and comprehensive plan of his life, which he experiences as his own plan, attentively selected from amongst the plans of life that experience has suggested. This plan need not be abstractly formulated. It must be concretely present.

A plan in life, pervading and comprehending my experiences, is, I say, the *conditio sine qua non* of the very existence of myself as this one, whole, connected Ego. If I have no such plan, whether abstractly defined or concretely intuited, I simply do not exist as one Ego, but remain a disconnected mass of fragments. But such a plan means that we are conscious of ourselves as continually setting before ourselves an ideal, noble or relatively base, good or relatively devilish; a model of what this individual life and its successive experiences, in our view, ought to be. This ideal, in the case of every rationally self-conscious human being, is such that we never do fulfil this ideal, complete this plan, or live up to this purpose of life, by means of actually attained experiences of life. Every human deed falls short of what the plan of life of the steadily self-conscious being demands; and that, too, whether this plan itself is divine or is, relatively speaking, damnable. Our ideal, in so far as it is a genuine ideal, is never attained at any temporal point of our experienced existence as individual beings. We never become, for our own rational consciousness, perfect individual selves. Yet all our empirical life has meaning, and constitutes the life of one Self,

just in so far, but only in so far, as this our empirical life is consciously viewed by ourselves as a process of progressing towards the fulfilment of our individual and consciously chosen ideal.

In consequence, the true or metaphysically real Ego of a man, as I venture now with emphasis to repeat, is simply the totality of his experience *in so far as* he consciously views this experience as, in its meaning, the struggling but never completed expression of his coherent plan in life, the changing but never completed partial embodiment of his one ideal. His empirical ego, or collection of egos, is constituted by his relatively self-conscious moments just as they chance to come. His metaphysically real Ego is constituted by his experiences in so far as they mean for him the struggle towards his one ideal. A man's Ego, therefore, exists as one Ego, only in so far as he has a plan in life, a coherent and conscious ideal, and in so far as his experience means for him the approach to this ideal. Whoever has not yet conceived of such an ideal is no *one* Ego at all, whether you view him empirically or metaphysically, but is a series of chance empirical selves, more or less accidentally bound together by the processes of memory. In the consciousness of such an incoherent being, if he is of human rank, there is indeed, in general, empirical self-consciousness; that is, there is a fragmentary empirical embodiment of the form of self-consciousness. But what I mean is, that, in advance of the coherent life-ideal,—the consciously chosen, even if abstractly undefined, plan of life,—there is no metaphysical truth in saying that the em-

pirical life of any man is the life of any *one* finite being who, in his wholeness, has any single definably clear and precise contrast with the rest of the life of God. The empirical ego, apart from the unity of life-plan, can be as truly called a thousand selves as one Self. In short, the term "person," in its metaphysical sense, can mean only the moral individual, *i.e.* the individual viewed as meaning or aiming towards an ideal, good or relatively bad, angelic or relatively diabolical, lawful or relatively anarchical; for only the moral individual, as a life lived in relation to a plan, a finite totality of experience viewed as meaning for itself a struggle towards conformity to an ideal, has, in the finite world, at once an all-pervading unity, despite the unessential accidents of disease and of sense, and a single clear contrast, in its wholeness, to the rest of the universe of experience. The consciousness of self, however, everywhere depends upon contrasts. And the individual is one Self, for himself, only in so far as he knows one sort of contrast between himself and the universe.

As to the relation of this individual, as thus defined, to God, I shall be equally explicit. I assert: (1) That this individual experience is identically a part of God's experience, *i.e.* not similar to a portion of God's experience, but identically the same as such portion; and (2) that this individual's plan is identically a part of God's own attentively selected and universal plan. God's consciousness forms in its wholeness one luminously transparent conscious moment; and whatever is, has, in general, such relation to that whole as, in our consciousness, the partial

elements of any one moment of consciousness have to the whole of that moment. On the other hand, I insist that this individual's experience, even by the aid of the very conditions that force psychology to view it as an evanescent and unspeakably delicate product of the most various and unstable factors, is, when viewed in relation to an exclusive ideal,—in other words, when metaphysically viewed,—a *unique* experience, and consequently a unique constituent of the Divine life, nowhere else capable of being represented in God's universe, and therefore metaphysically necessary to the fulfilment of God's own life; so that, thus viewing himself, the individual can say to God, in Meister Eckhart's beautiful words: "Were I not, God himself could not be." For so the individual can say: Without just my unique experience in its wholeness, and in its meaning as a totality of life progressively fulfilling an individual ideal, God's life would be incomplete; or, in other words, God would not be God. Furthermore, as to the individual plan or ideal, as such, I assert: (1) It is identically a part of God's plan, so that when I attentively find my life one with reference to the ideal which it aims progressively to fulfil, but can never, humanly speaking, attain, the attention that thus selectively determines my ideal is not similar to, but actually identical with, the fragment of the divine Will as defined earlier in this paper, *i.e.* with an element of the divine Attention. I assert: (2) On the other hand, this individual attention of mine, whereby my ideal is mine and whereby my experience is the life of one Self in view of the ideal,—this

individual possession of mine is a unique fact in the unity of the Divine life, a fact determined to what it is, not at all completely, nor in any fashion essentially, by any other fact or system of facts in the Divine life. It is not right to say: God in his wholeness is, as such whole, the maker of what I am. In my grade of reality, I am unique as this element in and of the Divine Will. Nothing else than my will gives my will its essential character. From this point of view, the individual will, in its essentially although always incomplete self-conscious determination to the pursuing of just this ideal, can say to God in his wholeness: "Were I not, your Will would not be"; for had I not this my unique attentive choice of my own ideal, God's Will would be incomplete. He would not have willed just what I, and I alone, as this fragment of his life, as this member of the Divine Choice, will in him, and as this unique portion of his complete Will.

I shall, then, also strenuously insist that the individual, as I define him, is free,—free with the identical freedom of God, whereof his freedom is a portion. For there is (1) in his consciousness an element which is determined by absolutely nothing in the whole of God's life outside of this individual himself. Furthermore (2), this element, namely, his attentively selected ideal, is determined neither by the contents of the individual's experience nor by the mere necessity of the laws of the individual's thought. For the thesis that the individual is thus free, I have prepared the way by showing that there is an element of freedom universally present in the

Divine life, and identical in nature with the rational essence of what we call Attention, wherever attention is viewed as rationally significant. For in so far as in us there is rationally significant attention, and in so far as this rationally significant attention is, as such, the free element of the Divine life, it may prove to be free in us as it is everywhere free in God. The individual attention, in just that aspect in which it constitutes the individual one Self, is peculiarly thus a rationally significant attention, since it concerns that choice of an ideal which gives the individual the whole unity and meaning of his existence. Therefore, as we shall maintain, in choosing the ideal, which is the one means of giving his life the unity of Self, the individual is free with identically the same freedom as is God's freedom, only that the individual's freedom is not the whole of God's freedom, but is a unique part thereof.

Meanwhile, it is never the case that the Self first exists, and then afterwards freely chooses its ideal. On the contrary, the Self exists only as the conscious chooser, the attentively free possessor, of this ideal. The Self finds itself only as having already begun to choose, never as now first choosing. It knows itself only as the being with this ideal. Had it not this ideal, this individual Self would not exist at all. But its choice of this ideal, or, in other words, its very existence as this Self, is determined, in its essential character, by nothing in all of God's life outside of this unique and individual attitude of attention itself. Therefore, while our current consciousness of our empirical freedom to do this or that is no doubt

largely — yes, mainly — illusory, our very existence as Selves is the embodiment of the Divine freedom. So that, once more, the individual can say to God: "Were I not free, you would not be free."

On the other hand, in order to prove the individual free, you have indeed first to prove that God is free as well as rational. For then, when the uniqueness of the individual's attention to his constituent ideal, to the plan that makes up the very essence of his Selfhood, appears amongst the facts of God's world as that without which this Ego could neither be nor be conceived, the already demonstrated Divine freedom may be applied to this unique case of the universal principle.

IV

THE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE ABSOLUTE

The proof of the foregoing theses, as I have said, can here only be indicated. The essential considerations, however, may be reduced briefly to these: We have seen how our empirical self-consciousness gets formed; namely, as what we have called a social contrast-effect, which arises within the circle of our actual and empirical consciousness. We are primarily conscious of the self as a very varying, unstable, and ill-defined mass of contents — thoughts, wishes, interests, memories, desires, sensations — which we find different from, and opposed to, or contrasted with, a largely ideal world of contents which we conceive as the minds, wishes, interests,

etc., of others, namely, our fellows in society. This primary self in time gets unified, in so far as we come to contrast the varying self-contents with more or less determinate ideals, concerns, plans, which give life a certain unity. From this point of view, I am one Self only in so far as I am conscious of my life—of memories, aspirations, devices, failures, triumphs—as tending, or at least striving; and therefore as known by contrast with, or in the light of, a certain type of fulfilled consciousness,—of attainment,—which is now, as the ideal Self or Other Self, the determining principle that makes my life the life of one being. We have asserted that if this ideal goal becomes an exclusive goal, such that *no other* is viewed as the possible goal of this life, and if this goal is viewed as one which, if attained through any other life than mine, would not be attained as I meant it to be attained, then my life is defined for me as the life of a unique, and so of a genuinely individual Self. We have asserted, moreover, that a Self so defined is a metaphysically real individual, and is thus defined not only from our point of view, but also from the point of view of the Absolute. We have asserted that such an individual selfhood—the selfhood of a moral Self—is a real fragment of what we have called the Self-Consciousness of the Absolute.

As we began our empirical analysis from below, so we must begin our necessarily incomplete defence of our metaphysical theses from above, and must first briefly explain our application of the category of Self-Consciousness to the Absolute Being.

After the foregoing general analysis of the function of self-consciousness, nothing, at first sight, could seem more incongruous than to speak of our Absolute, in its wholeness, as possessing, in any essential sense, an absolute self-consciousness. For the category of Self-Consciousness appears in our account as primarily one of limitation, of contrast, of relative separation between Self and Other. But the Absolute Experience and Will form, as we have asserted, one Unity of consciousness, one moment or instant of fulfilled life, over against which there is no external Other wherewith this whole could be contrasted. If I know myself by contrast with my neighbour or with my distant ideal, how can the Absolute, who has no neighbours, and no unfulfilled ideals, know such a contrast between himself and somebody else? In this sense, one would say, the Absolute must simply transcend self-consciousness. This is one of the well-known theses of Mr. Bradley.

In answer, one must point out that our Absolute, as inclusive Will and Experience, must at all events include the whole of the content which any finite self-consciousness involves, and must, at least in so far, possess self-conscious elements or factors in order even to transcend them. What I am conscious of when I am aware of myself, that at the least is a moment in the whole consciousness of the Absolute; and so much is involved in our general theory of the positive inclusion of all finite facts in the unity of the supreme consciousness of the Absolute.

But one cannot pause here. The unity of the Absolute Moment is, as we have seen, a fact not merely

immediate, and, on the other hand, not merely inclusive of whatever mediate and interrelated contents there are in the world; but it is also a unity of consciousness determined by its reference to the whole process that we express in finite mediations. The Absolute Experience knows — or, if you please to use the familiar metaphor, sees — the perfect fulfilment of the absolute system of thought or ideas. This fulfilment, first of all, constitutes what the Absolute as such sees, and, save by seeing this, the Absolute is no Absolute, no Experience, no seeing of truth, at all. Now this seeing, this consciousness, of ideas — of the truth — as fulfilled in the immediate data or contents of the Absolute Experience, is a seeing of a contrast, namely, of the contrast between the world of thought (itself a fashion of consciousness) and the world of facts, or data. Now these two aspects of the Absolute are seen as contrasted and yet as essentially related fashions of consciousness, contrasted as a thinking Self and a Self experiencing data. The Absolute sees these as fulfilling the one the other; since the thought, without the data, would be empty; the data, except in view of the thought, would be meaningless. Moreover, the thought, even in thinking of the data, essentially thinks of its own fulfilment, and so of the conscious aspect that beholds the fulfilment; so that the Absolute as the Seer of thought fulfilled, and the Absolute as the Thinker whose ideas refer to and aim at this very seeing or insight itself, together again constitute two conscious and contrasted aspects of the Absolute Unity, the Thinker and the Seer, as we might metaphorically

name them, and the relations of these two are again the relations of two that are contrasted as mutually related Selves. So far, we have what may be called a trinity of Selves (if one is fond of the traditional but, to my mind, essentially trivial amusement of counting the "persons" in the Absolute). But now if this organism of interrelated Selves is afresh viewed with relation to what we have called the Absolute Will, we have a further function whereby the Absolute as Knower (viz., as Thinker, as Experiencer of the data that fulfil the ideas, and as Seer of the fulfilment) is consciously contrasted with the Absolute as Will, or as Love. For the Absolute as Knower knows the Absolute Will as the determining factor merely, whereby the world of the Knower himself gets its wholeness, and so its unity; while the Absolute Will is attentive to precisely such arrest of the "unreal possibilities" of our former account — to precisely such wholeness of the divine Experience — as shall individuate, and so complete, the data which are experienced, and the world wherein the Thinker conceives, and the Seer views, the fulfilment of the Absolute Knowledge in the data which are experienced.

Here, if you will, are four contrasting aspects or functions whose presence, whose contrast, whose relation, whose unity, appears to be essential to the Absolute. I say "if you will," because at least *these* contrasts appear, while our mere enumeration pretends neither to completeness nor to absoluteness. These are conscious functions. They are not finite functions. The unity of the Absolute is not merely

above but *in* their relationship, their contrast, and their mutual implication. I make nothing of the number four. One might prefer to count them as two or as three, or, for all that I can see, as more than four functions, by laying especial stress upon one or another of various possible contrasts, or by uniting two or more under one name. As I say, I care nothing for a mere count of the "persons of the Godhead." Three or twenty,—it matters little or nothing to philosophy. But the essential thing is, that, whenever you count, at least the essential facts involved in this enumeration of contrasts appear, in some form, to exist, however many units you choose to regard it as convenient to distinguish. Now, since these contrasting and mutually implicated conscious functions exist, it seems at least fair to say that any one of these functions consciously finds in the others, or in any other you please, its own contrasting other Self, namely, that without which it is not what it is, while the other is still, as aspect, distinct from it. In this sense, one can then say, the Absolute Unity of Consciousness contains, involves, includes, not merely finite types of self-consciousness, not merely finite contrasts of Self and Other, but the contrasts and the consciousness of its own being as Thinker, Experiencer, Seer, and as Love, or Will, and all of these as essentially interrelated aspects of itself as Unity. In this, which I take to be the only defensible sense of the doctrine, I regard the Absolute Unity as essentially inclusive of various interrelated forms of Absolute Self-Consciousness. The Unity transcends these forms

only in so far as it is meanwhile constituted by and through them. And this is why, with all my indebtedness to Mr. Bradley's discussions of the Absolute, I am unable to view the categories of self-consciousness as "mere appearance," or to regard them as "lost," or "absorbed" or "transformed" into something unspeakably other than they are, as soon as one passes to the absolute point of view.

The Absolute, then, in the only logically possible sense of the term, is through and through pervaded by self-consciousness. That is, the Absolute Unity is the unity of a variety of mutually interrelated and interpenetrating conscious functions, which, while contrasted, essentially refer to one another, and are fulfilled each in and through the others, so that they may well be called, by virtue of the contrast, conscious Selves, each being conscious that the other Selves, his Divine fellows, are in essence but himself fulfilled and wholly expressed. Thus, and thus only, can the Absolute be conscious of himself. To be sure, it would be vain to reduce this unity in variety to that bare "identity of Subject and Object" in terms of which an older and highly abstract theory was accustomed to define the sort of self-consciousness that Herbart, in a famous discussion, so easily reduced to absurdity, and that Fichte viewed as the goal of an endless process, or, in other words, as an impossibility. Concrete self-consciousness involves contrasts. But my present thesis is, that such contrasts are not inconsistent with the unity of even an Absolute Consciousness.

V

THE ABSOLUTE AND THE FINITE INDIVIDUAL

The Absolute, then, possesses a logically complete form of self-consciousness. And the Absolute, as we have seen, is an Individual, whose life is known as the attentively selected fulfilment of its ideas, a fulfilment such that "no other" is admitted as genuinely possible. That selection of the possessed goal is, as we have seen, an absolutely free fact, and a fact of Will. It is free, because nothing in the Absolute Thought, as such,—unless, if you please, the very idea of free perfection, as such,—determines this fact of selection. But the freely selected goal is no single experience. It fulfils the whole system of ideas. It is therefore as full as the whole richness of life. The whole world of concrete facts belongs to it. Whatever is, is so far, then, an object of the one Divine Will, and helps to fulfil that Will. Therefore, as naturally follows, every fact in the world has, amidst all the necessity of its finitude, an element both of uniqueness and of contingency about it,—an element of contingency, because it is there to fulfil a free Will; an element of uniqueness, because it is a constituent in a single and unique integral Whole. This element in every finite fact is an element that no thought can predict. We express this when we say that every fact in the world is an individual fact, which cannot have its whole nature expressed in universal, that is, ideal terms.

Individuality, contingency, freedom,—these, as we have seen, are profoundly interrelated categories. Necessity concerns the finite interrelationships of thought—the universal, the finite links that tie fact to fact, the definable laws of being. The individual fact fulfils ideas, but is never wholly defined by them; embodies universals, but never can be analysed into them; conforms to law, but can never be wholly explained by law. *What it is*, ideas more or less fully tell us, just in so far as it has a universal nature. But no ideas ever tell us what constitutes it this individual object. So far, older theories of the individual have gone, when they defined the individual as the brute fact of sense. But our theory of the individual has gone still further. We have seen that mere immediacy of experience, the mere fact of sense as such, is not yet enough to constitute individuality. The individual is not merely *this*, but *such a this* that its place can be taken by “no other.” And, as such, the individual *this*, as we have seen, thus exists only as the object of an exclusive interest, and not merely as the object of a defining thought, or as the immediate datum of experience. But, as an object of an exclusive interest, the true individual of the ultimate real world is a fact that expresses the free Interest, or Love, of the Absolute as Will. A true individual, as such, is therefore itself a free fact. Its existence is not determined by the ideas that it embodies, nor even by the prior constitution of a fatal world of immediate experience. So far as these facts are concerned, many other data might have filled the place of this

individual. This individual is what it is, in order that the exclusive interest of the Absolute in just this world of fact might find a free expression. The individual, then, is contingent. It need not be, but is.

"But all this," one may say, "applies to the whole world of fact as One Individual, and to each fact only as this part of the Individual Whole, but not to any finite fact as such. Surely the whole determines the parts. This world of fact, as a whole, exists as this contingent and free fulfilment of the Absolute Thought, in a way that expresses the Absolute Will. But any one fact—say, this atom, this star, this man—is, as fact, determined by the one Absolute Will. At a stroke the Eternal World is finished. There is one Individual, and that is the Whole. The parts are predestined by the Whole. Each part is determined. 'Only One is free, and that is Zeus.'"

I reply with a question: Why so? Why not view the Individual Whole as a whole of many related but not therefore mutually determined individuals? Why is not that at least possible? Do you say that one system of Thought, one ideal unity of universal Ideas, or Laws, is by our hypothesis to be fulfilled, and that therefore the individual fulfilment can only be such that it realises the very system of laws in *this* system of facts, where the Whole is contingent, but the parts are predetermined by the unity of the system? Then I answer you, first, by instances. When I am to fill a space with matter, I have to do it so that whatever individual whole of matter fills that space shall conform to the system of the universal geometrical laws

of space; but I am still free to fill each part of that space by whatever individual bodies I please, independently of the filling of the rest of the space. If one conceives that the universal laws, such as the law of gravitation, are to predetermine the movement of whatever individual collection of material masses happens to be found in the material world, still there is in the unity of that law nothing that predetermines what bodies shall exist at all, or what system of bodies, as a collection of individuals, shall fulfil the law. The bodies, when once existent, must conform, by hypothesis, to the law — must exemplify it. But the individual whole which is to exemplify the law may be composed of members that, as to their mere existence, are *separate* individuals, equally and mutually contingent, so that neither the law nor the other individual bodies predetermine that any one individual body amongst those that are to conform to the law must exist. Here are cases where a system of ideas may be conceived as fulfilled by and in *a contingent whole whose parts are also contingent*, both with respect to one another, and with respect to the system of ideas that, taken singly and together, they are to fulfil in an individual case. Why might not our world of facts be of this sort, — an individual whole of mutually contingent parts, conforming to law in whole and in part, embodying universals, fulfilling ideas, yet with freedom not only for the whole but also for the parts? Why might not the Absolute Will be a complex of many wills in one unity of consciousness, and so its object be an Individual consisting of individuals, all expressive of

law, but all still mutually free with a freedom that is a part of the freedom of the Whole?

It is, then, possible that the selection of an individual whole should at a stroke determine the individual parts, or that, on the other hand, an individual whole should consist of mutually contingent individuals. The conditions that determine whether the one or the other of these logical possibilities shall be realised are not difficult to state. All depends upon the nature of the system of ideas that is to be realised. In any system of ideas, in advance of realisation the ideas may be of objects which stand to each other in relations that admit of no ambiguity as to their particular expressions. Relationships of this kind are very familiar. If in the world of ideas a is a quantity, and b another quantity equal to a , no ambiguity of any sort besets the relationship. In that case, any individual embodiment of this system of ideas in actual quantities — for example, A and B — will be such that I am free to choose only one of the two quantities, the other then being predetermined. On the other hand, in the most exact sciences, nothing is more common than cases of relationships which are not inexact, but which are in one sense ambiguous. Notoriously, any quantity a has two square roots, three cube roots, etc. If, then, I know that b is the square root of a , an individual embodiment of this simple system of ideas is not such that the determination of one object A in an individual embodiment predetermines absolutely the other individual. In this case, two alternatives are left open; and when I exemplify the system by

the individual quantity A, B is free to be either one of the two square roots of A . The n different roots of an algebraic equation of the n th degree illustrate a still more complex instance of this sort of ambiguity. In general, let us suppose a system of various ideas, a, b, c, d, e , etc. Let us suppose certain relationships, $r, r', r'',$ etc., so that I know in advance that a stands to b in relation r , b to c in relation r' , c to d in relation r'' , etc. Then each one of these relations may be, as to its logical definition, perfectly exact, yet each one of them may be such that if the first member is determined, two, three, or an indefinite number of possibilities may be permissible in the determination of the remaining number. In other words, the relation may be such that the relation r permits the equation which would express it to have two, three, or an indefinite number of roots. In such cases, the system of ideas would be such that when I undertook to give it individual embodiment, having first chosen the individual embodiment A of one of the ideas, I should still be able, without inconsistency, to choose from a considerable number of possibilities in defining B , and from still a new list of possibilities in defining C , and so on. And all this ambiguity, or rather multiplicity, this freedom, would not mean that my relationships were necessarily inexactly conceived. The conception of each, in its kind, might be rigidly exact, just as there is no ambiguity of a logically objectionable character in the definition of a root of an algebraic equation, although such a definition leaves it necessarily ambiguous which one of several roots we shall in a given

instance choose as our example of the class, in case of any given equation.

Now, it needs no argument to show that what we usually call in the empirical world Moral Relationships — that is, precisely the relationships which we conceive as existing amongst such ethical Selves as we have been defining — are to be conceived as of precisely such ambiguous character, no matter how exactly they may be defined. Here we speak not alone of metaphysical truth, but also of every-day fact. If we say that A and B are men, and are legal equals with respect to some form of social activity, we mean that what A does cannot wholly predetermine in the eyes of the law what B shall do in return; and that, too, however exact their relationships are, so long as they still remain quite equal. If, for instance, A and B are voters upon the same issues, and are equals as voters, that means that when A votes in a given way, B is left free by the relationship in question to vote in any one of several possible ways, as the case may determine, while remaining all the time the equal fellow-voter with A. Just so, when A speaks to B, B as his equal either may or may not speak to A in return; and if A makes a given proposal to B, B may or may not consent. The question, in all these cases, is not yet of any metaphysical freedom, but only of the nature of an ordinarily recognised relationship. The preservation of the equality, as a relationship, demands, within limits, the indetermination of the acts of one of the two equals by the acts of the other. The relation may be preserved, despite

the indetermination, in the midst of a great variety of possible responses made by B to A. In still closer relations, indetermination yet remains a feature of the ordinary world of moral relationships. For instance, if the relationship between A and B be defined thus: that A asks B a direct question, and that B gives what answer he can, then, to speak metaphorically, the equation expressing this relationship admits of three roots. B may say "Yes," or may say "No," or may express uncertainty. If uncertainty is excluded as being no answer, two roots of the equation still remain. In this way, quite apart from any question of metaphysical free-will, we may define the relationships of the moral world as such that, in the most exact of these relationships, any individual case that is capable of being taken as one of the terms of such a relationship does not in general determine, without ambiguity, the other term of the relationship, but in general leaves open not merely two or three, but even an indefinite number of possible other terms. Preserve the integrity of the relationship, choose your individual embodiment of one of its terms, and you are still free to choose one of several, often of many,—in some cases an infinite number of individual embodiments of the other terms. It follows, then, from the nature of moral relationships, such as in their highest form are exemplified by the relationship of *Selves*, that if there is to be a universe in which they are found, not one simple act of free choice, but an act involving many relatively independent acts, is involved in the individuation of such a world,—if the fore-

going account of the relation of choice to individual fact is to be maintained. For no one simple free act suffices, but many such acts are needed, in order to account logically for the individuation actually present in any such world.

But now let us take one step further. Let us make the moral relationships that we are to consider explicitly relationships amongst Selves of the type that we have been defining. Let A be one of these Selves; a conscious life, defined in its unity by its relation to some one ideal. Let B be another Self in the same world with A. From A's point of view, from B's point of view, and from the absolute point of view, these two lives are, first, distinct. They are, to be sure, as masses of fact, present *in* the unity of the Absolute Consciousness. But they themselves are more than mere masses of fact, that is, more than mere data. Each is metaphysically an individual, in so far as his life is the object of an exclusive interest, which we first define as the exclusive interest whereby the Absolute individuates this life, this portion of the world of fact. These two exclusive interests are, even in and for the absolute point of view, not the same. And so far we have variety, at all events, of will in the Absolute. Now, as we have before seen, from the point of view of A or of B, there exists a self-consciously individuating will, an exclusive interest in his life, as realising his ideal, or as struggling towards it. This will and self-consciousness in A is inevitably a part of the Absolute Will and Self-Consciousness, by virtue of the very unity of consciousness upon which our whole

view depends. The Absolute, then, individuates the lives of A and B by virtue of interests, of forms of will and of self-consciousness, which are different for A and for B, and which, in case of each of them, are such as to include, in one interest, A's will, in the other interest, B's will. Our question now is, whether these two forms of will are so related to one another and to the Absolute Will in its wholeness, that an Absolute Will such as is expressed in the world which contains A is necessarily at once expressed in a world which contains B also, or whether the Absolute Will might be expressed in A without necessarily being expressed in a world which, on that sole account, must contain B precisely as he now is. In other words, we ask whether A and B, who by hypothesis are actually existent as individuals, are as such predetermined by any one act whereby the Absolute should choose to individuate this whole present world of fact, or whether, on the other hand, the Absolute in choosing A is in so far left free as to the choice of B, and *vice versa*.

Our answer is already suggested in part by the consideration of the general nature of all moral relationships. Suppose A and B to be in so far predetermined by the system of the absolute ideas, that some moral relationship—that of equal, of fellow-citizen, of friend, of enemy, of lover, of questioner and answerer, or of any other moral nature, vague or exact—is to exist between them, at any point in their lives. Then, whatever this relation may be, and however sharply it may be supposed to be defined, still, so long as it is a moral relationship, it is such that

if you give to one of its terms any value otherwise possible, that is, any individual embodiment, the other term is not thereby predetermined. If one of these persons were conceived merely as the embodiment of the other's ideals, he would be fact of that other person's life. But, by hypothesis, the ideal or form of will embodied in A is distinct from that embodied in B; A is not what B wishes him to be, merely as such, nor is B what A wishes him to be, merely as such. For what the Absolute wills in A is at least, so far, *distinct* from what the Absolute wills in B. The only possible relations between these two persons in the moral world would thus be *either* total independence, so that neither in the least determined anything in the other's life, *or*, if the relations were definite, they would have to be of the types that admit many roots,—to use our former metaphor. And so the Absolute Will, in so far as it received individual embodiment in A, would stand in an ideally definable relationship to the will expressed in B, such that any one of various individuals of the type of B would be permitted to exist, when A once existed, and without conflict with the nature of this relationship. In other words, in choosing A, the Absolute would not, logically speaking, have yet chosen B, but only one of several individuals, any one of whom might have satisfied equally well the ideal relationship between A and B. But, now, what holds of the relationship between A and B would hold also of the relationship of either, or of both, to all definable other individual Selves in the universe. Of all these individual Selves we should alike say, according to our hypothesis, the

following things: (1) Their lives, as data, are all present in the unity of the Absolute Consciousness; (2) their wills, as personal choices of ideals, are included within a corresponding variety of ideals or forms of will, which together make up the Will of the Absolute, so far as it relates to the moral world; (3) their relations are such that whatever any one of them, A, is, neither the fact of his existence nor his character as an embodiment of the Absolute Will predetermines unambiguously the nature or contents of any other individual life, B. In consequence, we may now without question say that the one act of absolute choice which is embodied in this world that contains the individuals A, B, C, etc., *does as fact actually include many mutually contingent, that is, mutually undetermined, acts of choice, each of which is identical with that mode of will which gets expressed in the life of an individual, and which as a fact includes his own personal self-conscious will.* In other words, not merely is the Absolute Will, as expressed in the life and personality of A, *distinct* from those forms of the Absolute Will that are expressed in other individuals; but this distinction is such that the Absolute Will might be embodied definitely in all the other individuals of the world, and the absolute ideas and their system might predetermine the precise nature of the moral relation in which A is to stand to the rest of the world, and yet A might be left free to be any one of a very large number of individuals, *until* we conceive the Absolute Free-Will completed by a determinate act expressing itself in the individuality of A, inclusive of the individual self-

conscious will of the finite person A himself, and, as such, free from all the rest of the universe of the Absolute Choice. In this way, without for one moment destroying the unity of our Absolute, without at any moment interfering with the purely theoretical considerations that have forced us to define this unity, we should have defined the personal or individuating will of A as free, as an individual will, and as an integral part of the Divine Will. This individuating will of A we should have defined as expressed in his own conscious will, precisely as he himself views it when he knows himself as this moral being. And thus the foregoing theses would have received, for our present purposes, their relatively sufficient vindication. The moral individual can say, "*I am free,*" and "*I am part of the Divine Will.*" The antinomy is solved.

VI

THE TEMPORAL RELATIONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL

It remains here to say a few things as to the temporal relations of the finite individual thus defined. Our general theory of reality has implied the thesis that all temporal sequences are included in the unity of the Absolute Moment. This is not the place for a closer study of the metaphysics of the time-process. It is enough here to point out that the act of choice expressed in the moral, or individuating, will of any finite person is neither to be identified with any of the particular acts of our passing lives, nor, in the

case of any finite individual, to be abstractly divorced from these acts, or to be conceived merely as a transcendent and non-temporal act, occurring, as it were, in another world; for instance, in a prenatal life. From my point of view, the individuating will of any person, as this person, is expressed, from moment to moment, in his more or less conscious intention to view his life as a struggle towards, and consequently as in contrast with, his ideal goal. Neither this goal, nor this intention, in order to be self-conscious, need be defined in abstract terms. It is not necessary to be a philosopher in order to be a person; and often enough, as human nature goes, abstract ideas may be permitted so much to stand in the way of concrete devotion, that a given individual may appear all the more doubtfully to be a person by virtue of the fact that he has let himself become a philosopher. He is not a person, who has abstractly said: "Thus and thus I define my ideal, and thus and thus I define the contrast between my experience and my goal." He is a person, an individual in the foregoing sense, as self-conscious moral agent, who is aware, however vaguely, that some one aim illuminates his life, gives it wholeness as a struggle through whatever difficulties, and at the same time lies so far beyond his reach that no lucky stroke of human fortune could make him say, "My soul hath here found her rest so absolute," or, "Nothing else is worthy of me; there is nothing else that I could do or be that would fulfil me better." All these things, to be sure, a finite individual might say, as Othello said one of them, in a moment of transient illusion. But as the

dying Othello conceived of a task yet to be done, which fortune forbade him to engage in, namely, the task of doing strict justice to his illusions and to their causes, so, in general, the moral person is such, in our life, because his goal is beyond, and obstacles lie between. He may despair, as profoundly as he pleases, of attaining his goal. Suicide, in such despair, only emphasises, in a somewhat abrupt fashion, the contrast between the real and the ideal self, and so the genuineness of the moral personality. In such cases the contrast-effect is grim, but the moral facts are none the less evident.

Now particular acts, inspired by such an ideal, are, in so far, metaphysically considered, the expression, and so, from the absolute point of view, the deeds, of the moral individual. That is, from the absolute point of view, the facts of experience, as individuated from the point of view of this personal will, include the contents of such temporal acts as express this will. To say this, is to prejudge in no wise the psychological point of view with regard to the pre-determination, in the physical sense, of the temporal sequence of such acts. That, the world being what it is, temporal observers of phenomena are able to discover natural laws of the sequence of phenomena is a matter that has nothing whatever to do with either the metaphysical constitution or the ethical significance of the world. Metaphysically speaking, the whole world is there to express what we have called the Divine Will. And the Divine Will, as metaphysical fact, includes the self-conscious and free will of the moral individual. Both these wills,

as they are in their true nature, are facts of the eternal world, whereby I mean nothing transcendent of the totality of experience, and nothing essentially remote from this world, but merely the world as viewed in the unity of the Eternal Moment—the absolute Now. This Eternal Instant includes temporal processes, although we can never adequately conceive either its facts or its constitution in terms of merely temporal sequence. That is, from the absolute point of view, all temporal sequences are included in, and transcended by, some higher form of consciousness, into whose nature we have not further here to inquire. On the other hand, all temporal sequences given in finite experience are fragmentary facts from the midst of the unity of the One Moment. Ethically considered, the temporal sequences have a significance. In case of persons, this ethical significance comes into sight when we consider the relation of those particular processes which we call acts to the goal in the eternal world toward which they tend. From this point of view, we must rightly call these acts temporal and partial expressions of the freedom (and now of the individual freedom) which is expressed in those goals, and in the whole individual lives that strive towards them. We therefore say to the moral individual: "This your act, *in so far as you meant it*, that is, in so far as it expressed your striving toward your goal, is an embodiment of your freedom, and, in so far, nobody in the whole universe of God besides yourself is responsible for it, is expressed in it, or is to be judged for it. In so far, your acts show what you are.

Viewed with reference to your goal, they are part of you. In the long run, what they are, you are; and no will besides your own, no Divine choice beyond yourself, determines what, in the most individual aspect of your being, you are." It follows, of course, that we can say all this only to the moral individual as such, and not to every chance empirical creature who happens to assume human shape, unless we presuppose him to be a true Self.

On the other hand, it is a wholly different thing to view the individual psychologically. Here one studies, not at all the constitution of the real world as such, that is, of the eternal world as eternal, of the Absolute Moment in its unity, but the sequences of facts in fragmentary regions of temporal experience. Of these, one studies, not the significance, but the sequence and the phenomenal physical relationships. These are matters of natural history. One explains them as one can. For reasons that belong not here, one explains them only in so far as one detects uniformities of sequence in them, and one has every reason to say that, in so far as one views them in the light of empirical science, one can admit no freedom—that is, here, no capriciousness of sequence—as occurring in their phenomenal manifestations. But the moral freedom of the eternal world does not mean the capricious sequence of the temporal, at least as any capriciousness that could be recognised from the point of view of a successful empirical science. The empirical psychologist therefore knows nothing about freedom, as such, and those who seek for psychological proofs for the freedom of

the will comprehend neither psychology nor freedom. Psychology deals, not with the moral Self, but with the empirical creature called a man, viewed merely as he chances to be.

Meanwhile, the freedom of the moral individual in the moral world is, by virtue both of its metaphysical relationships and of the requirements of a moral order, a distinctly limited freedom. This it is; this it ought to be. This it is, since the moral individual stands in moral relationships. From the absolute point of view, these, as indicated above, are expressible in terms of ideas of relationship. These ideas, viewed as relational equations, permit any one moral individual, when others are supposed to be determinate, to be one of many — possibly, of infinitely numerous — abstractly possible individuals. But the possibilities are still limited by the nature of the ideas. There may be an infinite number of ways in which the individual A *could* be represented, in his place in the moral world, by other individuals, *had* A chosen to be other than he is. But on the other hand, A's moral relationships make certain that there is an infinite number of abstractly possible individuals whom A was *not* free to be, in view of his determinate place in the moral order. And the relation of A to the rest is itself determined by the consistency of the ideal divine plan, by what has been called the Divine Wisdom, which is neither God's choice nor A's. In his empirical life, this limitation of the possibilities for A will appear, in relatively significant form, and apart from psychological considerations, as the fact that A is in the most complex fashion dependent

upon his fellows, not only in his experiences, but in his moral opportunities, in his place as a moral agent; while he, in turn, will appear as limiting by his deeds the moral opportunities of others. That one moral agent can do not merely good but moral harm to another moral agent, can render the other's freedom of less scope and value, is not only an empirical fact, but (since the opportunity to do good which is implied in this very dependence is the basis of moral effectiveness) this very correlative power to do real mischief to other free-agents is an essential part of the constitution of the moral world. In view of this, I consider it not only vain but dangerous to regard the moral individual A as having such independence of B that one has a right to call him "infinite," — in the eternal world, any more than in the temporal. A world of so-called "infinite" free moral agents is, at best, a polytheistic world. At worst, it threatens, as I before said, to prove no "City of God," but something much more diabolical. The free-agents of a moral world are free only in so far as their essential moral relations ideally leave them free.¹ They have their place and must stay in it. They have their individuality and must subordinate it. They can do one another moral mischief, and the sufferer from such mischief proves the limitations, not merely of finite experience, but of moral individuality.

¹ [Doubtless. But their "moral relations," to be *moral*, must be relations set up by their rational *self-activity*, not imposed upon them by God. Professor Royce appears to conceive that "infinity" means indeterminate caprice, boundless self-will. Professor Howison does not so conceive of it. To him, *rational self-activity* is alone "infinite," in the true sense; the mere limitless is only the false infinite.—ED.]

VII

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL

But now as to one remaining aspect of the moral individual's place in the order of the universe. As we empirically know this individual, he is found subject, as to the sequence of his experience, to countless caprices of fortune, amongst which the most generally noteworthy is the seemingly quite arbitrary physical accident of death. For while death, as we see it, is a fact of considerable cosmological importance, it is of almost no discoverable and essential moral significance. Hence, from the point of view of the moral Ego, it has to be called an arbitrary chance. Necessary and intelligible enough as a natural phenomenon, and so, when cosmologically viewed, as rational an event as is any other phenomenon of nature, death stubbornly refuses to have any constant relation to that ideal which gives the whole meaning to the life of an individual Ego; it simply seems, either abruptly or, in case of its slow approach, gradually, to interrupt the entire process that was to fulfil that ideal. But when the process is interrupted, the Ego of which we have been speaking vanishes from manifestation in so much of concrete experience as is within our direct human ken. The question arises: Is this seeming interruption the true temporal end of the Ego? If so, of course the individual Ego remains with its ideal unfulfilled, with its possibilities unrealised. For in this life the finite Ego is only a seeker of its goal, as a knight of his quest. Yet, by

our foregoing hypothesis, the goal of the Ego, its life-ideal, is one of God's ideals, actual or genuine; and for God there are no genuine possibilities unfulfilled; no true ideas that hover above reality as bare possibilities. God's ideas are fulfilled in his experience. The inevitable result seems to be, that, just in so far as the moral Ego really is unfulfilled in this life, there is another finite life in the universe, consciously continuous with this one, which, when taken together with this one, consciously reaches the here unattainable goal of this individual moral Ego, so that, in the universe, the individual is perfected in his own kind. To be sure, if his life-ideal has its essentially anarchical or diabolical aspect, this implies that this Ego may, as a moral being, reach the perfection of its own kind in the form of a relatively lost or morally bankrupt Ego; and I see no reason to deny that numerous individuals, freely attending to the ideal which rationally involves their own damnation, attain, in their special types of relative perfection, to their chosen goal. But the study of the problem of Evil belongs not here. Moreover, as I said before, even the lost, if they exist, cannot be utterly devoid of goodness, but are only relatively lost. Enough, however: the individual's life is a process of experience that means the aim of attaining his life-ideal. If this aim is one of God's aims,—as it is,—this aim does not remain, from an absolute point of view, a barely possible ideal. There is an experience, and a finite experience, which fulfils this aim, and which involves, then, the perfection of just this individual Ego after his own kind. And this experience is this individual

man's own experience, and is God's only in so far as it is this man's experience. This attainment of the ideal of one's life is a concrete, a conscious attainment. It does not occur in our earthly experience.

Yet here one meets with a paradox. Perfection after my own kind, oneness with the ideal of my life,—this, we say, I must attain. I cannot attain it in this life. I must then have some other life. But what life? An endless one? An endless series of strivings toward the goal must be ahead of me? So the matter seems, if I observe merely the before-mentioned fact, that, from my present point of view, I cannot conceive of any series of deeds that would end in making me finally and utterly one with my individual goal. For, as a being who lives in time, it is of the essence of me to set my ideal beyond any once-reached point in time. I cannot conceive myself as conscious of my last moral act, as my last, any more than I can conceive the end of time. On the other hand, my goal is, from God's point of view, attained. Viewed in my wholeness, as God eternally views my life, my experience appears, not merely as a temporal series, but as perfected. It is eternally done. As temporal being I may then, as it seems, say: "I shall attain my goal." But, again, in time? Ah then, to be sure, there will come somewhere my last temporal moment. Thus I am in a strait between two. If I am to be perfected in my own kind,—as I must be, so surely as God is,—then there seemingly lies ahead of me the temporal fulfilment of my life, the last moment of my process towards my perfection. On the other hand, if there is ahead of me

such a last moment, it must be a last moment, not of a nature-process, but of a moral Ego. But a temporal moral Ego that still says: "Now I am fulfilled; there is no more beyond; time ends for me,"—it seems a contradiction in terms.

The traditional view of immortality is subject to just this paradox. Its essence is, to say that the just in heaven are perfected, that the lost in hell are fixed in an eternal state. This view is so far, barring its allegorical form, strictly philosophical. On the other hand, tradition tries to conceive this perfected state as one in which something temporal happens. But the temporal happening conflicts with the perfection. An atrocious tautology of irrational torment emphasises ever afresh to the damned the now absolutely trite brute fact that they are damned. The fact at once loses all rational significance when thus repeated. One has to add an endless, ugly, and useless misery, in order to keep the now established and ancient fact of damnation temporally and sensuously alive. The effect of the doctrine is, so far, grawsome but grotesque. Yet the perfection of the saints, when you view that as a temporal affair, is obviously conceived in an equally unreal form. What now happens? The individual saint knows no change, progresses to no new ideal, survives in an endlessly delicious and insignificant tautology of bliss and of thanksgiving. Nothing happens, but all goes on and on forever.

I hasten to add that tradition is often aware that all these things are but symbols of an experience that eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, and that it hath not

entered in the heart of man to conceive. I also hasten to point out that the lesson of all this is, that our temporal categories are wholly inadequate to express the ultimate facts of an eternal life. To the restless questions of a human consciousness whose present temporal form is wholly inadequate to its moral ideals, philosophy must reply simply thus: When you want immortality, you want what rationally means simply that this moral individual, at home as he is in God's world, does not remain fragmentarily expressed, as on earth he is expressed, in a life of broken chance. You want to know that somewhere he—this individual, he himself and not another—knows himself as fulfilled after his own kind; as possessed of a life that, in its wholeness, earthly and superhuman, is adequate to his ideal. Now, that this is the case is just what tradition has asserted in its doctrine of the final perfection of the just and of the unjust, each after his own freely chosen kind. Philosophy here supports tradition. This is a moral world. All moral battles get fought out. All quests are fulfilled. The goal—yes, your individual goal—is by you yourself attained in the eternal life. You yourself, and not merely another, consciously know in the eternal world the attainment of that goal. But how? Where? When? To this philosophy at once answers: The temporal as well as the spatial world is but a fragment of the complete experience; your fulfilment will never come in time; and *how* your eternal experience of your perfection is individually realised by you, is a question which cannot be answered, in so far as you remain on this shoal of time.

PART V

REPLIES TO CRITICISMS

FOR obvious reasons, the foregoing discussion has been planned with constant reference to the criticisms of Professor Howison, contained in his contribution to the original discussion before the Philosophical Union. My difference with Professor Howison appears the most fundamental amongst those developed during that discussion; and yet, despite the plainness of speech in some of the foregoing incidental replies, I have everywhere borne in mind the hope of reconciliation expressed at the outset of this supplementary paper. Nor have I desired to make my criticisms merely destructive. Professor Howison appears, at the outset of his argument, as one who deliberately adopts idealistic principles. If, as I have said, his actual doctrine takes rather the form of an Ethical Realism, that is because, to his mind, the ethical relationships amongst individuals, while existing solely for the sake of the individual minds themselves, appear to him, as he expresses himself, to be irreducible to the contents in any one mind, or to any other element definable in terms of any single unity of consciousness. In consequence,

if we take Professor Howison as he expresses himself, we find the constitution of the moral world, according to him, essentially resembling the constitution ascribed by realists to "things in themselves," existent apart from the processes, the organisation, or the contents of any mind. On the other hand, from Professor Howison's point of view, my own thesis inevitably reduces the constitution of the moral world to a collection of contents, presented merely as contents in the unity of the Absolute Experience. And Professor Howison not unjustly insists that such a thesis, if viewed as the whole of my doctrine, would deprive the moral world of elements essential to its genuine constitution. In reply, I have endeavoured to show that the development, and in fact the only consistent development, of my thesis introduces into the definition of the Absolute elements which render the definition of a moral world not only adequate and intelligible but inevitable; and that, too, without detriment to the absolute unity of this ultimately real Consciousness itself.

I

PROFESSOR HOWISON, AND THE ANTINOMY OF THE
MORAL WORLD

In view of the position that has thus been reached, I venture to return explicitly to the formal statement of the antinomy which was indicated in the Introduction of this supplementary paper, which was discussed substantially in its Second, Third, and Fourth Parts;

and which, as I conceived the matter, was essentially solved, as I stated in passing, at the conclusion of the fifth section of the Fourth Part. This antinomy, when separated from the rest of the argument, runs substantially as follows:

THESIS

The entire world of truth, natural and ethical, must be present in the unity of a single Absolute Consciousness.

The world of truth, for the reasons developed in Part First of this paper, must constitute an Organic Whole of Fact, realising ideas. Otherwise, there would be relations of ideas and facts which were real relations, and which yet transcended all consciousness. Such real relations, as transcendent "things in themselves," prove to be meaningless. Hence the Thesis is established.

ANTITHESIS

The constitution of the moral world demands a real Variety of Individuals,—such a variety as cannot be present in the unity of any single consciousness.

Moral relations are relations of individuals, who are free as to their will, and independent both of one another and of any whole of reality to which they belong. Such independence implies mutual separateness, and forbids the free individuals to be the mere fulfilment, in a world of facts, of ideas of any one being. Hence the individuals cannot be contained in any single unity of consciousness; and the Antithesis is proved.

The Thesis, as will be remembered, I maintain absolutely, and without alteration. The only new element in the present discussion is a development of the theory of the Organic Whole, that is, of the unity of the Absolute Consciousness; or, to use the language of the first paper, is a proof that the attribute of Omniscience implies other divine attributes. This development, distinctly predicted in the opening paper, is nothing but what so abstract a concept as that of

Omniscience naturally demands. In this development, the actual constitution of the empirical unity of consciousness, as we human beings know it, has everywhere been taken into account. That the Absolute is an Absolute Experience, I still deliberately maintain. That even in order to be such an experience, it must involve other elements besides experience, that is, besides the mere presentation of data, or of immediate contents, is what has been shown, and what was very obviously implied in the original discussion. In other words, along with immediacy, there must be mediation; and what kind of mediation, has now been defined,—not with any pretence to exhaustiveness, but with an effort to give to the abstract considerations of the original paper something of the concreteness which was from the outset regarded as necessary for the completion of the theory, even in the most tentative statement. I submit, however, that my conception of the Absolute must be judged by its developments, as well as in the light of its original deduction. For such developments were predicted from the outset of the argument.

As to the Antithesis, on the contrary, I assert that it embodies a natural, and, in advance of analysis, an inevitable illusion, just in so far as it uses the true conception of moral freedom as a proof of the false separation of the individuals. This is the illusion that the category of Individuality is definable in terms of the segmentation of contents, and therefore implies such segmentation, be these contents empirical or ideal. I assert that two individuals need not

be sundered as to the unity of consciousness which contains them; and that if they were so sundered, they would not thereby become individuals. The chasm that is to sunder an individual A from another B may be defined as you please. You may make this chasm a "thing in itself" or a matter of feeling,—an unintelligible presupposition or an object of what you define as a sentiment of "stainless allegiance." In no whit are you helped by such devices. Chasms do not individuate. Feelings do not need chasms to make them rational. The principle of individuation is not the principle of the sundering or segmentation of contents, whether within a unity of consciousness or as a fact transcendent of such unity. The life of an individual A is individuated, and is kept from being confounded with the life of any other individual B, solely by the truth, if it be a truth, that the life of A, as presented system of contents, fulfils or meets an exclusive interest *I*, which is such that it declines to admit of more than one system or collection of facts as capable of furnishing it its desired fulfilment; while the life of B similarly meets an exclusive interest *I'*, which is *different from* the exclusive interest *I*. That these two interests, or that the contents of these two lives, should be presented as contents to the unity of one experience, and possessed as interests by the Will which in its wholeness individuates the entire system of the world's contents, does not in any wise militate against the individual distinctions, whatever they are, between A and B. Meanwhile, that these individuals should be not merely numerically different, but free, that is,

in any respect mutually independent, or that they should be independent, in any respect, of the rest of the constitution of the Absolute Will,—this does not demand the segmentation of the interests I and I' , as “things in themselves,” or as otherwise transcendent realities, from one another, or from the rest of the universe. Such freedom demands only, that in the individuation of the universe, as it is, the interests which are expressed in the other individual lives and facts of the world shall not, by virtue of the constitution of the world of ideas, absolutely predetermine how the interest I , as such, shall either formulate or express itself, and that the same relative independence shall hold of any other interest I' , such as gets expressed in the life of a free individual.

Herein, as asserted above, lies the essence of the solution of our antinomy. And I offer the solution, not merely as a polemic, but as a suggestion towards reconciliation. I see not why the ancient and to my mind rather superstitious objection to Idealism,¹ which has received so skilful a formulation in Professor Howison's discussion, should longer be regarded as any essential obstacle in the way of a rational philosophy.

My further answers to Professor Howison's objections may now take a less irreconcilable tone than would otherwise be necessary. My argument is taxed with a certain “solipsistic” tendency. The

¹ [No, not to *Idealism*, but to Idealistic *Monism*. Professor Howison submits that calling this objection — that Monism is irreconcilable with the self-activity indispensable in a moral world — a “superstition,” is indeed a striking novelty, be the objection as “ancient” as it may.—ED.]

essence of such an objection is the failure to comprehend that self-consciousness and the unity of consciousness are categories which inevitably transcend, while they certainly do not destroy, individuality.¹ The unity of the world is first known to us in terms of knowledge. The world of the Will, as we first see it, is very rightly an individuated world, which appears full of conflict, of mutual independence, and of limitation. By moral Self, we mean, in the ordinary world, the individual as individuated by and through the relation of his will to the contents of his life. The individual is indeed not *mere* will, nor mere contents of life, but *a life viewed in relation to, that is, as individuated by, the exclusive interest which is his characteristic individual will.* If such an individual is considered as a knower, this view of the world naturally regards his knowledge as a sort of accident, or instrument, of his will. When such an individual Ego says: "My knowledge, completely developed, pursued to its ultimate consequences, is identical with the Absolute Knowledge," his fellow-individuals, naturally observing that his will is not theirs, and that his individual life in no wise includes or can include their individual lives, are disposed, if they are unlearned, to make sport, — if they are philosophers, to interpose more

¹ [Professor Howison, in a full apprehension of the questions involved, does not admit that the unity of consciousness transcends Individuality. On the contrary, Individuality is itself the highest category — the very nerve of knowledge. This is not only the clear implication, but the real significance, of Professor Royce's whole argumentation for the presence of what he calls "Will" at the heart of reality.—ED.]

technical but actually ungrounded objections. The individual's knowledge, such objectors insist, is something that he carries perhaps in his head, perhaps as a mere organ of his immortal soul, perhaps as his reflection of the far-off Sun of divine insight. In any case, however, it is just *his* knowledge; and he is primarily a being with this life and this will, wholly incapable of including within either his life, or the knowledge that is so far a mere incident of such a life, either the knowledge or the life of anybody else. If he thinks that he does this, he is deluded into the vain fancy that he can absorb the whole universe into his head, can swallow all souls in his own capacious soul, or can live all lives while he lives his own! Professor Howison, as philosopher, is beyond the cruder forms of such polemic. He admits that our thesis need not mean that the world is absorbed into the narrow individual Ego as such. But he objects that, in that case, the individual, as such, is, in his turn, inevitably lost in the self-abnegating consciousness: "I am He." But not thus are the alternatives exhausted. Knowledge is a form of self-consciousness. So also is self-conscious individuality. But the two, while in the closest and most organic relationship, are distinct, and secure their organic relationship by virtue of this very distinction. The finite knower, as such, is thinking of and conforming to the beyond, so long as he is finite knower. For herein lies his essence as knower. He lives in self-surrender, in seeking to understand what he possesses by discovering its relation to, its inclusion in, an

organic whole from which it is inseparable. As knower, such a finite individual, *if he were isolated* from the whole, would be an absolute self-contradiction. What he discovers in every act of knowledge is, that, just in so far as he sees truth, he is *not isolated* nor sundered, by any chasm, from the truth that he sees. He learns, in the end, that his knowledge has no meaning, no existence, except as a moment in and of the Absolute Knowledge. Thus he discovers that the world of knowledge is, as a fact, absolutely one, despite whatever variety or apparent or relative sundering or finitude may exist within it, either as to its contents or as to the types of its organisation.

On the other hand, the moral individual, in whose life his own will is to be expressed, exists *as expressing* this will, and so as declining to confound himself with any other individual, and as incapable of absorbing other individuality into himself. His first view of his situation, in so far as he uses his knowledge merely as the instrument of his individuality, is therefore that he is sundered by impassable chasms from all other realities.

But if we once see that the unquestionable unity of the world of the knower, viewed as Absolute Knower, implies the very individuality by virtue of which the whole world is known as whole; that individuality, in a moral world, means a variety of forms of will, mutually and, although only relatively, yet very really independent, both as to their meaning and as to their expression; that the world of the will is not sundered from the world of know-

ledge, but is merely another aspect of it; that the world of the various forms of will, expressed in the contents of finite life, is a world of Moral Individuals, as free as the moral order admits and demands; and, finally, that each individual, while possessing his ethical freedom, and expressing it in his life, is as *knower* an organic part, as *will* a particular will-form, and so, as complete individual, a moment, of that total Unity of consciousness whose will, whose thought, and whose life constitute the world,—if, I say, one faces these considerations, together, and in their whole meaning, the paradox vanishes. The unity of the world of knowledge is not “solipsistic,” in the sense in which that word was first used. There is, indeed, but one knowing Self, when we pass to the highest unity of the world of knowledge, or to what we have before called the Absolute as Knower. At the same time, even this very unity of the Absolute Knowledge implies, as we have seen, and contains an organic variety of interrelated selfhood, even when we confine ourselves to the categories of knowledge alone. On the other hand, the Absolute Self, as such, is not the finite individual, as such; and when, as knower, the individual identifies himself with the Absolute Knower, he does not do this in so far as he is this finite individual, but in so far as his knowledge is universally reasonable knowledge. Meanwhile, *both* the Absolute and the finite individual are true individuals. The Absolute, as individual, is One; the finite individuals, as such, are many. They are not confounded with one another. They do not slip as

dewdrops into any sort of a shining sea. They are individuals, constitutive of an Individual. And the "City of God" is God, while its citizens are free and finite individuals. No finite individual possesses the wholeness, the grade of reality, which the Absolute possesses. But, on the other hand, the finite individuals are as real as the moral order requires or permits them to be.

II

PROFESSOR MEZES, AND THE CONTENTS OF REALITY

While I have not hitherto expressly mentioned, in this new discussion, my two other critics, I have throughout borne in mind their statements, and have anticipated, in the course of this paper, most of what it would otherwise be necessary here to state in answer to their comments.

Professor Mezes offers two objections to the definition of the Absolute given in my first paper. Both of these objections refer to the inadequacy of the contents of the conception, so far as I explicitly defined these contents. In one sense, I accept both these objections, and enter a plea of "confession and avoidance." My statement of my conception was intended to be abstract. I was not concerned with the question: What finite beings exist? but only with the question: What ultimate unity has the world of knowledge? Moreover, in my first paper I consciously avoided considering the relation of the moral world, as such, to the Absolute. Hence I did not

point out how the unity of the eternal world is related to the significant temporal events of the moral world. Professor Mezes is, however, perfectly right in declaring that both the foregoing questions: What finite beings exist? and, What is the relation of the moral world to the Absolute? are questions of great importance for philosophy. He is right in observing that, since my discussion omitted the definite consideration of these problems, it is inadequate. I need make here only the general plea, in "avoidance," that I did not profess that my discussion was adequate.

As to the particulars, however, of Professor Mezes's objections, I have indeed a few observations to offer. Professor Mezes, in the first of his two general comments, expresses some curiosity as to how I should undertake to supplement my conception, so far as concerns the wealth and the "spirituality" of the Absolute Life. Whence, he asks, can I derive, on the basis of my argument, the more "spiritual" attributes of my Absolute? My natural reply is a question addressed to Professor Mezes: Whence does he himself derive the conception of the "spirituality" whose presence he misses from the conception of the Absolute so far as I have defined it? For him to answer my question will inevitably involve the answer to his own. One has somehow or other formed, upon the basis of one's finite experience, thought, reflection, and will, an idea of types of life that are higher in the scale of spirituality than are other types of life. In consequence, one avers that the single finite individual is, as such, of less import

than are many individuals taken together. Social life, as one sees, is richer than isolated life,—an organism of co-operating moral agents is worth more than is the private experience and aspiration of any lonely self. The fulness of spirituality is more dignified in grade of being than is a world where one finite thinker, "tucked away in a corner," has his aspirations fulfilled, and where he and the abstract Absolute are together all in all. This, I say, is somehow known as a truth, to one in the position of Professor Mezes. How, otherwise, should his questions be formulated? Unless he somehow knows all this, he finds and states no lack, no difficulty, in my conception. But if he knows this, then what does his knowledge imply? He has an idea, and, by hypothesis, a valid idea, of the possible spirituality which, as he affirms, the Absolute of my conception lacks, so far as I have developed the conception. Unless this idea is known to Professor Mezes as valid, the objection fails. But if it is known as valid, then the needed supplement is furnished by the very meaning of the question. This idea,—this valid idea,—what relation has it to the Absolute as explicitly, although abstractly, defined by my original theory? As valid idea, *it is one of the ideas that the Absolute finds fulfilled in his experience.* Escape from this conclusion there is none for one who, like Professor Mezes, accepts my theory as far as it goes, and who then observes this lack as an obvious lack, and who, in doing so, asserts as valid this idea of a higher spiritual perfection than my statement had explicitly defined. I had not expressly mentioned, in my original paper, the special forms

of spirituality which Professor Mezes chooses to mention. But in mentioning such forms, he himself at once defines their place in the unity of my conception, precisely in so far as he regards this ideal spirituality as something whose presence is needed in order to complete the perfection of the life of the Absolute.

Perhaps Professor Mezes may insist that his objection, as stated, is not in this way adequately met. For, as he states his case, "Nothing can be held to be a part of the inclusive experience of the Absolute until its existence is fully proven." He admits, indeed, that "it is not the business of philosophy to prove the existence of individual facts," but he adds that "it *is* the business of philosophy to establish the truth of such principles as are indispensable for proving the existence of any and every individual fact not directly observed." With this latter statement I cannot at present adequately deal. I admit, of course, that philosophy is concerned with numerous relatively special "principles" which form no part of the present discussion of one most fundamental concept. On the other hand, I should not admit that philosophy can undertake to consider *all* the principles that would be "indispensable" in proving the existence of "any and every fact not directly observed," including, for instance, the principles that would be needed to guide one in finding out how far what he reads in the newspapers about the battles in Cuba agrees with the "unobserved" occurrences in that unhappy and apparently mendacious island. Philosophy can as little take the place of common-sense as the latter can take the place of philosophy; and

the "principles" which would be "indispensable" to one who either undertook to follow common-sense or to correct common-sense in all its daily dealings with "any and every individual fact not directly observed," would far transcend the ken of any philosopher. But, of course, as to the first of these statements of Professor Mezes, namely, the statement that philosophy is not concerned "to prove the existence of individual facts," as such, there will be no question. The two statements, however, raise a problem as to the sense in which a philosophy such as mine, in defining the life of the Absolute, has first to deal, either in "principle" or in detail, with the individual existence of this or of that finite fact. And the problem here deserves still a word of answer.

Any one of us, as individual, believes in many finite facts that are needed to give his life any meaning, and that lie, as such facts, beyond the range of his private experience. Now comes philosophy, and says: The world as a whole has meaning; the Absolute sees all valid ideas fulfilled. The finite individual retorts with his questions: "But is this absolute meaning *my* meaning, or is it so inclusive of my meaning that my ideas of finite objects, say, of my wife and children, of my neighbours, of human life in general, of the higher and lower in the spiritual realm, are sure, in certain definable types of cases, to represent finite facts beyond my private experience? Am I insured against finite illusions by the organisation of the Absolute? Or can the Absolute so fulfil its own system of ideas as merely to refute or to neglect or to defeat my ideas? Can my life be a dream and

a cheat, *although* the Absolute Life is clear and sure? If this last may be the case, then what do I care for the Absolute? For then his truth is not what I call 'spiritual.' But if the Absolute's organisation insures the truth of any and all finite ideas, merely in so far as somebody holds them, where is the distinction between truth and error? I demand, then, a guiding principle, whereby I can distinguish true from illusory types of finite ideas. And I demand this principle from philosophy as such, and decline to be merely sent back to the realm of common-sense." Now the demand thus defined is indeed fair enough. And while our former abstract statement failed to furnish an explicit answer to this demand, it did indicate the criterion which I have just applied to the questions stated by Professor Mezes, and which serves, rightly applied, to meet all questions that can fairly be asked of the philosopher, and that are not directly practical problems about the mere plausibilities of the world of common-sense, viewed as such mere plausibilities.

The criterion in question is not hard to state. As finite being you can err, you can dream, you can suffer from illusions, you can go insane; in brief, your finite judgment is never infallible. Just in your fallibility lies, as I have shown in my above-cited chapter on "The Possibility of Error" (*The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, Chapter XI), one ground for the proof that the Absolute is, and is infallible. But now, when you err, you still form an idea of the beyond; and this idea really refers to, bears upon, and so belongs to, the world that includes the be-

yond, and that still, in its totality, has aspects which, relatively speaking, refute and transcend your idea. How, upon our idealistic basis, is such finite error possible? I answer: Only by virtue of the fact that the world, which well knows and includes your idea, and which fulfils all valid ideas, fails to fulfil your idea just in so far as your finite idea is a part, a fragment,—a mere shred, it may be,—of a more inclusive and more significant total Idea, which in its wholeness transcends your idea, but includes it, and transcends it only by including it. The truth is truth because it includes and fulfils whatever was positively significant about your idea, by actually fulfilling an idea, that, as inclusive idea, is more significant, is richer, is larger, than yours. The fulfilment of the richer idea may involve what you now call the relative defeat of the less significant idea. Actually, then, while there is error, there is never any absolute or total error believed by anybody. The truth includes all that the illusion meant, and more too. Hence the special and fragmentary meaning of the illusory consciousness may be refuted, but the positive significance of it is kept; just as a man of heroic nature who is morally successful in the midst of a long life of commonplace trials may fulfil the spirit of the illusory hopes of his ignorant youthful ardour, not by the deeds that his boyish imagination painted, but by the endurance that more than accomplishes, in the sight of God, such tasks as his early dreams had defined in their own falsely coloured fashion. Just so, in an ideal world, all quests, as we said before, are fulfilled; and all others,

and illusions too, are refuted *only* through the realisation of all that was rationally positive about their meaning.

We cannot say to the finite being, then : " You are infallible ; you are subject to no illusions." On the contrary, we must say : " All finite ideas involve more or less illusion." But we must add : " No illusion is a total illusion ; " and, " You are wrong only in so far as the truth is richer, is more concrete and significant, than is your error." Therefore, when one asks whether his ideas of his fellows, of the social order, of his wife, of his children, and of his spiritual destiny, are warranted in the light of an idealistic analysis, we reply : " Yes, and No." They are all sure to be coloured by finite illusions, and that fact you yourself already recognise whenever you reflect. But the truth confirms all that is significant about your meaning, all the essential ideas involved in these illusions, just in so far as they are ideas that have a positive conscious intent and sense. For instance, if your meaning involves essentially moral ideas, then you are, in absolute truth, a member of a real and concrete social and moral order, which contains your life along with the lives of other moral individuals. You are this ; for all these ideas, upon analysis, prove to possess an essential positive meaning, such as the Absolute Life inevitably fulfils. Moreover, whatever you do and intend as your act in a moral world really accomplishes what it morally ought to accomplish. So far, then, your life is real, and not illusory. And the Absolute, which includes life of such types, is as genuinely " spiritual " as any definable idea can ask

it to be. While, then, you may and do misread your social and moral relations in many ways, your real relations are concrete, are social, are moral, and of the types which your experience now suggests to you. And the world-order which contains you is more "spiritual" than your brightest finite dream of spirituality, more social than your closest human intimacy, and infinitely more wealthy than your largest society of human individuals.

The second main objection of Professor Mezes brings into view the general relation between the Absolute and the time-process. Moral significance, he pleads, is essentially bound up with the real time-process as such. In the world of the eternal Now, as far as I defined this world, there is no progress of the whole, the time-process, by hypothesis, being transcended by means of some higher type of inclusive consciousness. Hence, from the point of view of the eternal, nothing morally significant appears to happen. Professor Mezes finds this aspect of my conception ethically unsatisfactory.

A complete reply would involve that elaborate discussion of the metaphysics of the time-process which has already been declined, as beyond the scope of the present paper. In dealing with the problem of Immortality, I have already indicated the kind of answer that I should undertake to develope, did space permit. Here, if you will, is another antinomy, of the same general type as the one discussed with reference to the problem of Individuality. Theory demands that the eternal world should be a finished whole. Morality, as essentially a temporal process,

now demands, in its turn, that moral activities should be conceived as incapable of being ended in time. The solution of the antinomy would, as before, insist upon the difference of the points of view. It would demand that we render unto eternity the things that are eternity's. These things are precisely the fulfilled ideals, the attained goals, of the Absolute Life as such. Unto time, on the other hand, we should render the things that are time's; namely, the processes whose end cannot be temporally conceived, and whose significance lies in their struggle for goals which they find always remote. Illustrations of such twofold realities, drawn from the mathematical world, have been so often repeated as to be philosophically tedious, and I need not dwell upon them here. Any convergent infinite series approaches, as to its sum, an unattainable Limit. When this Limit chances to be definable by us in terms quite other than those which the infinite series embodies, we are able to be, at once, in possession of the Limit, aware that this is the Limit of the infinite series, and able to see how the infinite series is absolutely incapable of ever attaining this its own goal. On the other hand, when the Limit is an irrational number, it is, in general, known to us *only* as the unattainable goal of an infinite series; and here we see only one aspect of the Limit. Applying the simile, one may declare that the moral consciousness, as such, views its goal only as the term of an infinite series, and so as unattainable. That, from an eternal point of view, this Limit should be viewed as attained, is no more surprising than that the mathematical consciousness should be able to de-

fine a quantity in either of two ways: first, as an unattainable Limit, defined only by means of the series which fails to attain it; and, secondly, as the otherwise known quantity which may be viewed as the Limit of a series. Inadequate as is the similitude, it may suffice to hint that the antinomy is soluble. And here there is room only for the hint.

Granting, however, that what appears in time as an endless moral process is known from the eternal point of view as fulfilled fact, Professor Mezes seems to be quite wrong in supposing that the real distinction between the earlier and later stages of a temporal process would vanish, from an eternal point of view. From the point of view which recognises the otherwise known and attained Limit as the unattainable goal of the infinite series, the infinite series itself exists, in its own way and degree; and its earlier terms are still quite distinct from its later terms, so that the earlier, as earlier, retain their definable place and significance in the series. Just so, that the earlier stages of a finite life—a life that appears to us temporally endless, but that, absolutely viewed, is the life of a finite being—are earlier, are *present* at only one point in time, and are *past* for all later moments,—this, from the absolute point of view, as from our own, is a fact precisely as real as is time itself. And, as has now been sufficiently pointed out, time does not vanish, from the eternal point of view, any more than any incomplete experience vanishes, from a more inclusive point of view. The Absolute is not, in our account, a Void into which the finite realities pass and vanish. It is precisely such

a concrete whole as includes every shadow and wavelike of finite experience; and it transcends relatively illusory points of view precisely because it includes them. Therefore, from the absolute point of view, there is real change, and in only one direction, in time; there is real progress wherever there is a temporal success; there is a real difference between past and future time; in brief, all temporal items and significances remain what they are, even while, as included in the completer whole, they are viewed as forming a part of the content of the Eternal Instant. The eternal Now is simply not the temporal present. On the other hand, all present temporal moments are amongst the facts which form the experience of the Absolute Moment. And so, in general, we may say, to Professor Mezes or to any other objector: "Show us what you need for the moral world, in the way of progress, of real difference between past, present, and future, and whatever else you choose to define, and we will undertake to find a place for such facts, precisely in so far as they are facts, in the organisation of the Eternal Moment."

III

PROFESSOR LE CONTE, AND THE CONCEPT OF EVOLUTION

As I approach, finally, the comments of my revered teacher Professor Le Conte, I must first express the strong hope that he may find in this supplementary paper a more or less acceptable development of some

of the thoughts which he missed in my former definition of the Absolute. In the former paper I observed that the divine Omniscience cannot be the only real divine attribute. In the present paper, I have given very full place to the other divine attributes that Professor Le Conte missed in my previous discussion,— to the attribute which I have called Will, or Love, and to the attribute of Personality. I have indeed especially endeavoured to show the organic connexion between these attributes and that of Omnipotence. The very completion of knowledge, so I have asserted, demands a factor in the absolute Unity of consciousness that cannot be defined in purely theoretical terms, with due reference at once to its nature and to that which it determines. This factor, the Will, individuates both the Absolute and its world. Hereby the Absolute becomes a Person, and completes both its knowledge and its personality, through its self-expression in a system of mutually free as well as mutually interrelated, and in so far dependent, moral Selves. To these Selves, from their definition as moral beings, expressive of really distinct elements of the Absolute Will, I have assigned a nature which forbids us to conceive their lives as limited by any definite temporal boundaries. In this sense, while distinctly and deliberately declining to define the concrete nature, or contents, or temporal relations, of any individual immortal life, I have declared that what tradition has called *eternal life* positively belongs to the moral individual. I do not pretend to know, and absolutely decline to affirm, that any and every being bearing human form rep-

resents one of the moral individuals of the eternal world. But I have so defined the moral individual that it is perfectly possible for anybody who is one to discover the fact in self-conscious terms. The other human beings, if such exist, may as well expect to find philosophy sparing of compliments in this matter; and I do not myself think it required by humanity to identify every empirical human being as a separate moral individual. On the contrary, I very much hope that many of the people who phenomenally appear to us as human beings are not, *as we see them*, distinct moral individuals at all, but mere fragments of a finite personality whose type is hidden from us, and whose individual meaning may therefore be much less sinister than the fragments within our ken would suggest. In immortality as a boon offered to anybody who feels a wish for it,—as a solace for our ill fortune, or as a character to be attributed, by way of social compliment, to any featherless biped who happens to be called a man,—in all this I feel no philosophical and but little personal interest. What we ought to wish to find finally saved, in our own fortune, in our own lives, or in the lives of those whom we love and honour, is distinctly moral personality, conceived as a self-conscious process aiming towards a unique goal,—a goal that cannot be conceived as attainable at any temporal moment. Such individual goals, as Idealism teaches us, must be attained in the eternal world. And in the eternal world there are therefore moral personalities,—individuals, who are yet one in God. The only immortality that I pretend to know about

is precisely the presence of these individuals in the eternal world. And nothing else, as it seems to me, can be clear to us, as to individual fortunes, apart from particular empirical evidence; which, in this case, we do not possess. My theory, for instance, involves no sort of assertion that individual consciousness is temporally continuous, when one considers the time immediately before and after the death of a human being. As, in this life, consciousness is interrupted by sleep and by accidents, so the temporal processes, in whatever variety they have, which fulfil in their wholeness and in their relations to the eternal order the life of an individual, may be, for all that I can see, in any one of a large number of relations to us and to one another,—contemporaneous, continuously successive, or discontinuously successive, with temporal gaps of any magnitude. As the word "immortality" is commonly and almost inevitably bound up with very definite and, to my mind, very ill-founded hypotheses as to precisely these temporal mysteries, I can make use of the term only in so far as I explicitly add these provisos and explanations. Granting, however, the foregoing metaphysical theory of the individual, and the definitions associated with it, I have defined and defended a theory of immortality which, as I hope, may in some measure supply what my honoured teacher very rightly missed in my original discussion.

This is no place for any adequate consideration of the relation of Idealism to the doctrine of Evolution,—a relation which Professor Le Conte has briefly indicated in his critical paper, with a reference to

his extensive discussions in other places, and therefore with a suggestion of ideas whose discussion would carry me far beyond the present limits. For the rest, as Professor Le Conte's pupil, who first learned from his lips the meaning of the doctrine of Evolution, I must frankly confess that, as Professor Le Conte well knows, I have never been able to give to this doctrine, justly central as it is in the world of recent empirical science, the far-reaching, the philosophical, the universal significance which he still attributes to this aspect of reality. Evolution, to me, is not a process in the light of which we can hope to learn much either concerning the Absolute or concerning the relation of the eternal to the temporal world. On the other hand, evolution is by no means any mere illusion or any merely human appearance, without foundation in extra-human metaphysical truth. In recent papers in the *Philosophical Review*, I have offered, as an hypothesis in philosophical Cosmology, an interpretation of the metaphysics of evolution which, if right, would make this collection of natural processes an indication of a real, and extra-human, finite world of life, whose relations to our own finite life are viewed by us, as it were, in perspective. Thus viewing our relations to other finite life in the universe, we naturally conceive the portions of the finite world more distant from us in type as lifeless, and the various forms of life which, in temporal sequence, or in contemporaneous relations to us, gradually approach our own type as indicative of a real progress from what we call "dead Nature" to our own grade. This process,

so far as we view it as a real progress from death to life, or from even what Professor Le Conte calls a diffused form of Divine Energy to a personal form, is not yet rightly viewed. Nature, on any level, is, according to my hypothesis, a hint of "other finite life than ours," — of a life presumably as individuated, as concrete, as our own; only that such life, by virtue of what I have hypothetically regarded as a "difference in the time-span," or length of a "typical passing present moment," or else by virtue of other differences, is so remote from ours that both its meaning and its individuation are unintelligible to us, so far as we appeal to direct experience. Thus, for instance, a being whose present moments were a million years long might have a very definite finite individuation, but though my finite experience gave me hints of the mere existence of his life, I should fail entirely, within my time-span, to observe any significant events in that life. In brief, in view of such hypotheses we should have no right to speak of "dead Nature," but only of "uncommunicative Nature." And the process of evolution would have to be viewed, not as a process whereby dead Nature passed into life, or diffused Energy into individuated form, but as a process whereby our finite human type of life has become differentiated in the midst of a world some of whose individuals are nearer to us, in the "time-span" of their consciousness, or in other respects, than are others. I have not here to defend or develop such hypotheses. Enough, so long as they seem to me even bare possibilities I must regard natural evolution as a process too ambiguous to

admit of any one assured metaphysical interpretation. Least of all could I hope to find in the consideration of this process the solution of any metaphysical problem so fundamental as are the problems of Evil, of Freedom, of Immortality, or, in general, of the relations of the Absolute and the Individual.

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